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Abstract
This is a study of the workings of a Swedish welfare scheme during a two year period
from 1979 to 1980. Its aim is to examine the effects of the scheme on the clients
involved, to analyse the relationship between official and client, and to demonstrate
the functioning of some components of the Swedish model at the front line. The study
focuses upon the collapse of the shipbuilding industry in Gothenburg on the west
coast of Sweden and the scheme designed to fmd jobs for around two thousand
workers threatened by redundancy in the spring of 1979.
The Capability Approach, as formulated by Amartya Sen, is employed to analyse
whether various state actors, mobilised to avert mass unemployment during the
shipbuilding collapse, were able to re-orientate career paths along mutually desired
trajectories. The strength of the approach lies in its focus on the individual, thus
enabling an analysis which departs from the traditional approach in Anglo-Saxon
studies of Sweden that focus on peak level politics.
The case study offers detailed information about the workings of the welfare scheme;
it draws upon rich archival and interview data as well as a range of secondary sources
previously untranslated. It demonstrates the importance of work within Sweden, how
that importance affects client - official relationships thereby offering a critique of
Esping Andersen's argument that Social Democratic states facilitate 'de-
commodification' .
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PART I
Introduction, Theoretical and Contextual Bases
12
Chapter 1
Introduction
A political commitment to full employment placed under increasing strain by global
competition and a national recession, a labour market structure that encourages
flexibility and life-long learning, a welfare system designed to get people back into
work, and an industrial relations model with labour working closely with capital. This
was Sweden in the late 1970s. With a few minor modifications, it could be a number
of European states today. Sweden emerged from the recession of the 1970s with its
full employment commitment intact, its welfare and labour market structures
weathered the storm. Today many European states face similar issues but their
welfare and labour market structures are not weathering this storm and face
fundamental reform. Can Sweden's experience of the 1970's recession inform the
policy initiatives which seek to tackle today's issues surrounding employment and
welfare? This is the subject of this research: a case study into 1970s Sweden focusing
specifically on an initiative that was designed and implemented at the local level to
assist around 1800 workers to find new jobs in the face of redundancy. The initiative
was considered a success on the grounds that solutions were found for every worker
and none of them became unemployed.
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Background to the case study
The collapse of the shipbuilding industry in Sweden in the late 1970s was very rapid,
it occurred without large scale labour unrest or large increases in unemployment. It
occurred during a time of flux in Sweden where no less than five governments over a
period of seven years attempted to solve the issues surrounding the collapse. It
produced an enormous strain upon the active labour market policies for which
Sweden was internationally known. Whereas Britain and West Germany had suffered
mass unemployment when their shipbuilding industries collapsed, Sweden did not.
Furthermore, this occurred during the late 1970s and early 1980s; a period of
recession in many Western economies with rising unemployment levels being
widespread, a problem which Sweden avoided. As such, the collapse offers the
researcher a case study into how the 'Swedish model' worked during a period of
strain. Yet works in the English language on the subject are few. Indeed, Storrie's
(1993) work on the rescue package for the Uddevalla shipyard and Strath's (1987)
general overview of the collapse of the industry stand out as the only examples.
Objectives
Using shipbuilding as a case study in general and the experience of one city provides
the researcher with an opportunity to study the workings of the 'Swedish model' at
the local level and at first hand. Works on Sweden are legion and this study adds to an
already large corpus. The focus upon front-line delivery distinguishes this work from
14
the dominant trend in studies on Sweden that focus on peak level politics. Situating
research at the peak implies top-down uniformity; otherwise a focus at the peak tells
us little of what happens at the localities and less about how policy actually works.
This study breaks with that convention and shows how, at the local level, policy is
interpreted, created and coordinated. A focus on central politics misses this vital
component of the Swedish model. The theoretical framework employed here will be
Amartya Sen's (1985a) capabilities approach which further shifts the focus away
from the peak level and official measures of 'success' and frames the research within
the scope of how policy helped people to realise valuable outcomes.
The case study here focuses upon a project that ran from 1979 to the end of 1980. Its
remit was to take approximately 20% of the shipyard's workforce in Gothenburg to
help them to find new work or maybe more accurately, to help them to avoid
unemployment. As such the project was both an example of Swedish active labour
market policy in action and also an example of local policy innovation within labour
market policy. Furthermore, the focus upon the period 1979 - 1980 frames the
research within a period of recession in many West European states in general and
one of political flux in Sweden in particular. This focus on a period of political and
economic stress means that the study will examine some of the workings of the
Swedish Model during a period where the system was under pressure. Thus not only
does this study depart from the ubiquitous peak-level focus of much literature, it does
so within the context of stress upon the system.
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The research problem, hypothesis and question
How did Sweden avoid the unemployment that the international recession of the late
1970s caused in many Western economies? During the period 1974 to 1984,
unemployment in Gothenburg never rose above 2.9% (Statistisk Arsbok Goteborg,
1985) (see Table B6, Appendix B), yet during the same period one of the city's
largest employers, the shipyards, collapsed shedding over 11,000 jobs. How did the
local authorities react? How did Sweden's active labour market policies work in
practice?
Initial interest in Sweden came from an earlier period when the author was an
undergraduate exchange student on the Erasmus Programme (European Region
Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students) based at Gothenburg
University. This period was important because it formed an early critical stance
regarding many claims made about the Sweden as much of the literature read at this
point about the Swedish model seemed remote and difficult to observe. In particular
Esping-Andersen's (1990) notion of 'de-commodification', allowing a person to
freely 'opt out of work' (p.6), did de-commodification really exist in Sweden? This
experience raised two hypotheses; firstly that some claims about the Swedish model
were largely theoretical and were not observed in practice, and secondly that by
focusing these claims on peak-level politics, authors such as Esping-Andersen had
missed the variance found in local practice. Later, when designing this research the
decision was made early on that it should focus upon Gothenburg for the practical
16
reasons that contacts and friends lived in the city and some knowledge of its history,
geography and politics was already known. The choice of shipbuilding, or more
accurately, the collapse of shipbuilding, was an early decision again based upon
practicalities. This was a major industry in Gothenburg and early exploratory visits to
the city archives and library indicated a rich source of data. Furthermore, the collapse
coincided with a particularly interesting period in Swedish history whereby political
flux and recession dominated. During this period the Swedish model come under
stress and we also see the emergence of literature asking can the model survive and
even if it should survive (e.g. Childs, 1980, Meyersson, 1982). Thus the collapse of a
major industry during this period of stress became the entry point for the research; the
two elements can not exist independently of each other since the collapse occurred
during a definite period and by choosing shipbuilding the research focuses upon how
the Swedish model operated under pressure.
Once the focus had been set, the two hypotheses mentioned above (claims about the
Swedish model were largely theoretical and that a peak-level focus misses the
variance found in local practice) framed the emergence of a research question. Firstly,
the focus upon the shipbuilding industry in Gothenburg allowed for an analysis which
would test the hypothesis that there was local variance within Sweden and secondly,
the collapse itself could be analysed to test the hypothesis that claims about the
Swedish Model's achievements were theoretical only. That the collapse occurred
during a period of stress adds an extra element insofar as the model can be analysed
during a period of political change and global recession.
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The term 'the Swedish model' is a very broad concept which can be used to refer to
any aspect of Sweden which the observer deems to be unique. There is, therefore, a
necessity to narrow the focus and this will be achieved by concentrating upon the
labour market and especially the Swedish active labour market polices. This focus fits
well with the collapse of the shipbuilding industry as the agencies charged with
fmding new jobs for the 1800 workers made redundant did so within the framework
of active labour market policies.
Having framed the focus of this study, we can now turn to the main research question
which asks how did the Swedish active labour market policy function when under
pressure? In answering this, the two hypotheses mentioned above (claims about the
Swedish model being largely theoretical and that a peak-level focus misses the
variance between local practice and peak level policy formulation) will also be tested
by rephrasing them into questions. Thus, two secondary questions also will be asked:
Is Esping-Andersen's notion of de-commodification an accurate portrayal of the
Swedish model? And is there variance between peak level policy and front-line
practice?
Research Methodologies
This study required a 12 month period of fieldwork based in Gothenburg, Sweden;
this allowed access to archival sources, interviewees and also a physical presence in
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the city which is this thesis' subject matter. Conducting this research from England
via email, web resources, telephone and secondary data was ruled out on account of
the lack of data available in these forms and the difficulty in using email and
telephone as a primary method of interviewing and collecting archival data. Frequent
trips between England and Sweden were also ruled out on account of expense and the
time wasted travelling, furthermore, a permanent presence in the city would allow a
more flexible working environment in which interviews and appointments could be
arranged with ease.
The period before starting the 12 month fieldwork trip was taken up with background.
reading and studying Swedish to a level necessary for this type of work. This
involved taking two distance courses in Swedish run by Foksuniversitet based in
Lund, background reading was primarily in Swedish and so both activities
complemented each other. Once in Sweden a one month intensive Swedish course
was undertaken to improve spoken Swedish and listening - two weak points for the
distance learning student. Informal methods used to improve language capabilities
included reading online newspapers, communicating in Swedish when contacting
academics, archivists and officials involved in the logistics of relocating abroad for
one year.
The story of the collapse of Swedish shipbuilding is long, spanning over a decade,
and in Gothenburg, the largest shipbuilding centre, the story is no different. In order
to narrow the focus of study the initial period of fieldwork was spent reading
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contemporary local newspapers over the whole period of collapse from 1975 to 1985.
This was designed to give both a comprehensive overview of the process and also to
find a point of entry for detailed study. The newspapers consulted were the local
Goteborgs Posten and Arbetet as well as the national Svenska Dagbladet and Dagens
Nyheter. Using a process of progressive theoretical sampling (Altheide, 1996, p.33),
data was initially wide in selection with a progressively narrower focus emerging as
concepts became identifiable and understanding became clearer. Through this process
the time period 1979-1980 was selected as was the specific project charged with
finding jobs for 1800 redundant workers. Once this focus was chosen, sampling was
once more widened and then narrowed to draw out discourses, debates and events
surrounding the topic. The focus on newspapers was essentially to build a background
and point of entry for in-depth archival research, but some documents were coded
using the 'open coding' method based upon grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin,
1998). Here the initial coding informed the process of progressive theoretical
sampling which in turn highlighted more key documents which required coding.
Once the sampling of newspapers was complete the focus moved to policy analysis.
The data here consisted not only of the policy texts, but also the debates, committees
and speeches surrounding them. Using the same methods employed above, this data
was coded and sampled in a progressively more refined manner. The media and
policy analysis, therefore, were designed to give a comprehensive knowledge of the
subject matter and debates surrounding it before visiting archives.
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Archival research was primarily based in two Gothenburg archives, the Regional
Archive and the County Archive. This was supplemented by material found in the
Maritime Museum's archive, the archive belonging to the Shipbuilding Historical
Society and the blue collar union Metall at the workshop level. Strategies employed
here were similar to the above and involved a wide search that progressively focused
as data emerged. Coding and analysis of data took place during the search periods in
order to inform further searches and close-off dead ends promptly.
Searches were initially based around the cataloguing system used by the archive in
question. Although this method was successful to an extent, it was limited by the
logic employed in cataloguing. Of value here were the archivists themselves who
could not only clarify the logic behind their system of cataloguing but could also
suggest new avenues into the data. Searches were made using a variety of keywords
including names of individuals involved in the topic as well as subject matter
searches.
Data searches were complicated here by the complex nature of ownership regarding
some archive material: documents were widely dispersed. The material was firstly
owned by the private shipbuilding firms, later control came under the state as the
industry was nationalised and then in the mid-1980s a private enterprise bought what
was left of the yards. At every step some material was transferred, some was left
under original ownership and some lost. As a consequence, there are some significant
gaps in the data where material could not be found.
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One such example is data concerning the labour market outcomes of the workers
transferred to the project that forms the focus of this study. Initially, the original
intention of the study was to focus upon outcomes and in this regard an early
influence was Storrie's (1993) study of the collapse of the Uddevalla shipyard some
eighty kilometres north of Gothenburg. Here, Storrie was able to access some rich
sources of data including the personnel files of every worker made redundant when
the yard collapsed and the subsequent files held by the labour market authority
(AMS). Analysing this data, Storrie was able to either directly discover the labour
market outcomes for all 2087 workers made redundant or was able to make direct
contact with the workers as the personnel gave him the necessary contact details.
Thus a remarkable response rate of 96.4% was achieved (Storrie, 1993, p.166) and
the presence of multiple sources of data allowed cross checking which strengthened
the reliability of the data. Key to Storrie's rich sources is the fact that the research
took place less than five years after the collapse of the Uddevalla yard during a
remarkably stable period in the history of Swedish shipbuilding. Ownership of all the
large Swedish shipyards had, by this time, consolidated within the state owned
Svenska VarY and this stability meant the data that needed to be analysed was
complete and held in a single location.
An attempt was made to replicate Storrie's approach in this research and for labour
market outcomes to form a significant part of the analysis. However, the widespread
dispersal of material and the subsequent difficulty in finding the necessary data
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hindered this approach. Of importance here is that the period of study was a
particularly turbulent time (1979-1980) and ownership of data from this widely
dispersed. As a consequence of this each owner had a differing policy regarding
which data to store and what to discard. Furthermore, the complex ownership
relations make tracing data difficult and ultimately this meant that the necessary data
needed to construct a labour market outcome picture is incomplete.
This was a major set-back in the early stages of the research and an alternative route
of discovering labour market outcomes was initially considered; either a
questionnaire given to all individuals that took part in the project or interviews
conducted either face-to-face or by telephone. This route was rejected for three
reasons: firstly the difficulty in accurately remembering details almost 30 years later
meant that any data created this way would be unreliable and as the official data is
missing, impossible to validate. Secondly, the 30 year time span suggests the older
members of the group could very well have died thus implying a complete set of data
would be impossible to generate. Lastly, the difficulty in finding all individuals that
were transferred some 30 years later was such that the project would have needed
long time extensions with no promise of success.
The missing data required a reformulation of the original research question away
from asking what happened to the redundant workers and toward the services that
were put in place and the opportunities created to assist the workers. Therefore the
focus was shifted from individual labour market outcomes and onto 'frontline' policy
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enactment. Although the research question had to be reformulated, the two
hypotheses which framed the research remained the same. Regardless of a focus upon
outcomes or policy enactment, either one of these approaches would allow for the
same critical analysis which could probe the relationship between peak-level policy
and frontline practice, and also examine some claims made about the Swedish Model
and especially the notion of 'de-commodification'.
Although significant gaps existed, archival data was the richest source of information
for this study both in terms of its breadth and depth. Archival research was also
complemented by a number of interviews with officials who were directly involved
with the project. These were undertaken during the periods of archive work and were
designed to help make sense of the official documents, to assist in uncovering new
areas of research and to help validate the fmdings based on official documents. The
interviews themselves were semi-structured (Kvale, 1996) and all were conducted in
the interviewee's native language, Swedish. The manner of recording the interview
was to an extent unorthodox; this reflected the limitations of language on the part of
the interviewer and interviewee. The interviews used a variety of communication
methods some of which would have been missed by traditional audio recordings such
as the use of drawings and diagrams to illuminate a point and the use of body
language, especially hand signs. In this regard the interviews were quite informal and
rather than the traditional interviewer recording the interviewee, the sessions were
based around a pad of paper which both interviewer and interviewee used to illustrate
points. This produced a body of data recorded on paper and included direct quotes
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when possible, diagrams annotated in both English and Swedish and any use of hand
signs recorded including the context. Once the interview was finished this data was
immediately arranged into coherent form, diagrams and hand signs were placed in
chronological order and re-annotated, and coding the data started immediately after
anonymizing the text.
The coding of interview data followed the open coding procedure used in the media
and policy analysis, the aim was to locate areas of archival investigation, to validate
archival evidence and also to produce a body of data independent of archive analysis
to assist in answering the research questions. The data was then 'triangulated'
(Denzin, 1970) both to validate and verify findings and also to overcome some of the
problems associated with single source data such as the potential fallibility of
historical inference (McCullagh, 1984, p.4), through the process of triangulation the
reliance on single source data is either reduced or eliminated.
Lastly, the use of what could be termed 'key informants' was invaluable. These were
often people with little direct experience of the shipbuilding crisis in Gothenburg but
their patience with my seemingly endless questions about the finer points of Swedish
society, about the unspoken assumptions and complex nature of public institutions
allowed for a more confident analysis to be made.
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Sources of data
The two main Gothenburg archives used, the Regional Archive and the County
Archive, are distinguished by their holdings. The Regional Archive holds collections
from non-state actors such as trade unions, administrative groups, healthcare bodies
and regional associations. The County Archive holds state collections including
county council records, education authorities, the civil service and regional
authorities. Access to these holdings is open to all users regardless of nationality as is
enshrined in the Swedish constitutional amendment that gave open access to Swedish
official records. The exception here being access to records considered to be
important to national security and also to private archives deposited by individuals
who often require permission before access can be granted. In the case of this study,
all records were open and of free access. These two archives were the source for
much of the data used for this study including minutes of the board of directors and
steering committee, personal files belonging to the managing director, various local
studies and papers from local politicians. Two holdings in particular were of great
value, they were the files of a lawyer called Soren Mannheimer who worked for the
, blue collar union Metall and was also a Social Democrat politician in Gothenburg and
the files of the personnel director of the Eriksberg shipyard, Leif Molinder. Both
Mannheimer and Molinder were key players in Gothenburg politics in the 1970s,
Mannheimer held a seat on many regeneration committees, as well as being a senior
member of the city council, and importantly had a particular interest in the collapse of
shipbuilding industry as the union he worked for, Metall, represented all blue collar
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workers at the yards. Molinder was instrumental in the design and running of the .
project, the focus of this study, having held many senior positions within the
shipbuilding industry, Molinder later went on to gain a reputation for liquidating large
plants whilst avoiding large scale unemployment.
Interview data formed another primary source; here interviewees included a former
official working for the vocational training department (AMU) of the local job centre
in Gothenburg who was directly involved in the project. A very clear understanding
of the day-to-day workings of the project was formed through this source and many
confusing aspects of Swedish institutions were clarified. Although much of the
information was already present in archival form, this interviewee was able to
contextualise documents and make wider links between institutions and the state.
Another key source was a former blue collar union official at the shipyards who
represented workers transferred to the project and who is now a member of the
Shipbuilding Historical Society. This interviewee was thus able to assist in the
capacity as an ex-union official and also as an archivist. This was an important source
for understanding the opinions of the shipyard workers both before and after the
collapse of the industry. One of the weaknesses with the archival sources was their
remoteness from the individual worker who often formed part of a statistical
measurement and little else. Thus a union official who represented workers at the
time of the collapse was an invaluable source of information. Connected to this
source was a former Social Democrat politician and blue collar union official at the
shipyards who was involved with the contraction process of the industry. This source
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was an important link between the peak level deliberations within the Swedish
parliament and policy implementation in Gothenburg. Furthermore, this interviewee
had started work at the shipyards as a welder and slowly worked up the union
hierarchy before becoming a union sponsored national politician. He had a close
working relationship with the head of Metall in Gothenburg and was also deeply
involved in the Social Democrat shipbuilding advisory group which informed the
parliamentary debates on the future of the sector in the late 1970s. The final
interviewee was a senior official from the education authority in Gothenburg who was
involved in the work of the adult education service. During the late 1970s when the
collapse of the shipbuilding industry occurred, this source oversaw the allocation of
resources intended to help retrain the ex-shipyard workers. This was important for
gaining knowledge about the funding of resources, accountability, and the degree to
which each institution had the freedom to use allocated resources.
Secondary sources included media accounts; chiefly local newspapers held in the
newspaper reading archive at Gothenburg University, union publications held by the
Shipbuilding Historical Society, and in-house magazines and news letters from the
shipyards held in the Gothenburg Maritime Museum. Some interviews undertaken
can be considered as secondary sources as they involved interviewees who were not
directly involved in the collapse of shipbuilding. This included academics who had
studied the contraction process and officials from various authorities whose expertise
derived from the functioning of their department. Lastly, academic studies and
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popular accounts of the shipyards both in the period of growth and contraction were
held in Gothenburg University's library.
Notes on the nature of archival research and on being a 'situatedresearcher
Working in archives presents various challenges to the researcher; most of which are
amplified when the archive is located in another country. Being situated in that
country is essential for effective research. Importantly, the researcher must
understand the rationale behind the cataloguing process in each archive visited,
typically, papers belonging to an individual or organisation can be held in a number
of locations, in various collections, and often are arranged in orders differing from
their original owner's system. Hill (1993) argues that the process of archiving is
essentially one of sedimentation and erosion. Here there are three stages of
sedimentation; firstly, the initial deposit of material is dependent upon the former
owner of that material. The rationale behind saving certain papers is not necessarily
one of preservation for future researchers; an individual's personal filing system is
often idiosyncratic and prone to constant rearrangements. Furthermore, what is
discarded and what is kept can be highly personal and dependent upon external
factors such as space and time. Another factor at play here is accidental erosion; fire,
floods, a loss during a move or even neglect can impact upon what remains. These
forms of erosion mean that collections are often partial and fragmented before even
entering an archive. This process can, though, give the researcher valuable
information about the nature of the agency that created the data.
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At the second stage the collection of material is further eroded by individuals charged
with making decisions about the future of the collection once it is no longer being
used. This can happen when an individual retires or dies or maybe when a department
moves location. Individuals placed in charge of the material can range from family
members or executors to individuals working in the department that produced the
material. At this stage the collection can be partially or fully destroyed, preserved in
its entirety or be subjected to sorting by a third party whose abilities to recognise
what is important differ widely depending upon subject matter and personal skill.
The third stage of sedimentation is deposition at the archive and here erosion takes
the form of sorting and arranging by archivists. Of note here is that often archives
refuse collections for a variety of reasons including relevance and space constraints.
Donors will then have to look for other archives to take the material and by this
process collections can find homes far away from their place of origin. Once in
possession of the files, archivists often re-arrange the papers according to the logic of
the archive. This often takes the form of chronological ordering which can disturb the
original filing system. Thus ordering chronologically can bring together material once
arranged by subject. Furthermore, this type of ordering can confuse the progression of
a topic by separating replies to letters which could be dated some weeks or even
months after the letter which prompted the reply. The priorities of the archivist also
differ from that of the original owner and or donor; which material gets sorted and
which is left un-catalogued for a later date depends upon factors within the archive.
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Thus by these three stages material can get dispersed, rearranged and lost. The
process is also ongoing as new discoveries can be made when another batch of
material is deposited or when a lost box of material is found. These latter discoveries
may not necessarily corne to be housed in the same collection or even the same
archive as the original material. This three-stage process will differ not only between
archives, but also between every collection donated, many factors are involved at
each stage and for the researcher it is crucial that this is taken into consideration.
For this reason the importance of being a 'situated' researcher becomes clear.
Developing a close working relationship with individual archivists is important to
verify the research data, as cataloguing idiosyncrasies and the logic employed in
ordering material can potentially leave valuable data hidden. The expertise of the
archivist in suggesting new avenues of research is amplified by the fact that material
is stored in restricted areas and the researcher cannot browse the shelves. It is thus
vital that research is undertaken whilst situated within the environment where the data
is to be collected.
Furthermore, by being situated the researcher becomes sensitive to many of the
subtleties within a culture that are not readily discerned from written data. This not
only includes the finer points of language, but also factors such as conventions,
notions of the common good and other forms or worth which are often compelling but
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rarely if ever codified. It is these subtleties that give data its context and indeed give
the researcher a glimpse of the motivations behind decisions.
Therefore, to remain outside the society a researcher wishes to study is to risk a less
comprehensive archival search, especially when taking into account the expertise of
individual archivists and the personal interaction necessary to extract their ideas and
suggestions. Remaining outside also implies a weaker link to society as a whole as
much contextual knowledge can be derived from the simple act of living in the
culture one is studying. With these points in mind; the nature of archival research and
the study of another society, it is of crucial importance that the researcher physically
situates themselves within the subject area of their study.
Notes on working in translation
All primary sources used for this research were written in Swedish, all interviews
were spoken in Swedish and many of the secondary sources were also Swedish. In the
early stages of the research, that is, the period before relocating to Sweden, all
sources were translated into English immediately. The major issue here was typically
one of time insofar as all sources needed to be studied twice: once in Swedish and
then again in English after translation. Minor problems such as translating idiomatic
expressions and some irregular verbs also took time. Once relocated in Sweden this
approach changed and gradually there was no translation stage. Rather, all documents
were analysed in Swedish, notes were taken in Swedish, and English was only used to
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translate the occasional word. Gradually, the entire process of research was conducted
in Swedish, including thought processes. Thus, there was no translation stage during
much of the research. Translation became important in the latter stages when the
material was written up in a final form. Here there were issues regarding the style of
translation when reproducing quotes in full, often a verbatim translation would make
little sense and so it was necessary to rearrange words, insert others and remove some
in order to make quotes readable in English. There was potential for error here,
especially where translation could shift emphasis by poor word choice and also by
rearranging word order to make quotes readable. Care was taken on these occasions
and the help of native Swedish speakers was sometimes sought to ensure the original
emphasis and meaning of the quote had not been altered through translation. Lastly,
working in translation often presents insights into the researcher's native language,
especially how meaning is socially constructed and when a word is used in a different
context in another language, it often reveals the assumptions contained in both
languages.
The structure of this study
The study comprises of three parts, part one, which this chapter forms part of, is
concerned with context and background, part two presents the empirical findings
from the research and part three offers some analytical and concluding thoughts.
Individually. then. Chapter two explores Amartya Sen's capability approach in some
detail, starting with Sen's critiques of equality; it shows how the capability approach
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hopes to overcome these issues. It then considers how the approach may be
operationalised within a variety of settings before laying out how this theoretical
framework can assist in better understanding the Swedish model. Chapter three
addresses that idea of the Swedish model; it offers a definition of the term by way of
a brief historical overview of developments in Sweden since the 1930s. Importantly,
it dedicates a large part of the chapter to developments after 1968 when industrial
action coupled with political action sought to redefine how policy was shaped. The
chapter argues that any study of Sweden in the 1970s must consider the consequences
of unrest in the late 1960s. The chapter finishes by offering a critique of some
historical works on Sweden which seek linear understandings with distinct epochs. It
balances this by exploring works that focus upon the continuities within Sweden.
Chapter four offers a contextual basis from which to frame the case study; it briefly
charts the history of Gothenburg in general and shipbuilding in the city in particular
from its gradual rise, to the boom years and then onto its rapid collapse. It then
outlines the state of the Gothenburg labour market during the period of collapse
within the shipbuilding sector. It demonstrates how important the sector was to the
city and shows some of the research into projected outcomes of the collapse which
were undertaken at the time. By chapter five and six the study is ready to present the
initiative designed to take 1800 or so workers out of the sector and help them find
new work. Chapter five describes the initiative in detail but not before showing the
role of expertise in its design and also the political debates at the peak level which led
to its creation. Chapter six shows how the initiative operated as a collaborative
project that incorporated many agencies and authorities. Chapter seven looks behind
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the statistical results which were used by the state to demonstrate the initiative's
success. Here is where the capability approach becomes important as it offers an
approach that focuses upon the individual and especially how the individual was
treated within the project. To this end, the chapter analyses the experiences of the
least-employable workers: those considered to be disabled or suffering from alcohol
problems as well as older workers and the young. It also examines the process of
categorisation and the circumstances behind the justifications used to categorise
workers in certain ways. Finally, Chapter eight moves the focus back to the original
research questions and presents some conclusions.
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Chapter 2
The Capability Approach
The Capability Approach has been pioneered by Amartya Sen who took a critique of
Rawls as his point of departure and has further developed the theory over a long
period of time (1985a, 1985b, 1987a, 1987b, 1991, 1992,1993,1999,2004,2009).
Other thinkers have used the approach to further a critique of Rawls (Nussbaum,
2003) or to apply it to a theory on social rights that goes beyond T.H. Marshall's
analysis (Browne et ai, 2002). A short investigation into these currents of thought will
give a better understanding of both the Capability Approach and its practical
applications in terms of this study.
Sen's critique of utility and recourse based analysis
In his 1979 lecture 'Equality of What?' Sen (1987a) criticised three types of equality:
utilitarian, total utility, and Rawlsian, he then presented an alternative formulation
which he called 'basic capability equality'. Looking firstly at utilitarian equality,
Sen's critique is that the theory is blind to distribution and is focused only upon
- .
maximising total happiness. This focus allows for distribution to be changed if that
change brings about an increase in total happiness, yet because all people are not
equal, this change can bring about unfair results. For example, a firm could decide to
award a pay increase to all its healthy employees to be funded by a pay cut to all its
sick employees, utilitarian equality theory could agree with this on the grounds that
the healthier employees will derive more pleasure from the money they will gain than
36
the unhealthy ones wi11lose as they are bed-ridden, thus increasing total happiness.
Furthermore, because of the diminishing marginal utilities associated with increases
in goods, it would make more sense to award the pay increase to one person as a
100% pay rise to one increases total happiness more than a I% rise to many.
Connected to this is the problem of utility functionings; a small pay rise to a man
saving up for a caravan holiday will maximise happiness more than a small rise to the
man saving for a long cruise - the former having lower aspirations and is thus easier
to please.
Sen's second criticism is directed toward total utility equality. Here the theory
attempts to equalise happiness rather than increase total happiness as before, it does
this by ranking all individuals using a scale called leximin and then focusing upon the
worst off. The criticism here is that the interests of the worst off rule to the
disadvantage of the majority regardless of how many make up the majority. For
example a firm that decides to award its lowest paid employee a pay rise funded out
of pay cuts imposed on the other employees is considered better than having one
poorly paid worker and many well paid workers. In other words, '10,10,10,10,5' is
worse than '9,9,9,9,9' even though the second example disadvantages more people.
Thus ''utilitarianism is attacked for its unconcern with inequalities of the utility
distribution and leximin is criticised for its lack of interest in the magnitudes of utility
gains and losses, and even in the numbers involved" (Sen, 1987a, p.l52).
The third criticism takes aim at Rawlsian equality. This theory sees equality in terms
of primary goods rather than happiness in either total or marginal measures. The
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primary goods themselves are split into three classes: basic rights, non-basic rights,
and income and wealth. The former two concern aspects of freedom often expressed
in constitutions and rights associated with specific positions in society such as voting
powers in an assembly. The third class is where Sen focuses, here the distribution of
primary goods is to be equal unless an unequal distribution benefits the worst-off.
This furthering of the interests of the disadvantaged is known as the 'difference
principle'. Sen's criticism here is that the focus upon primary goods ignores the
diversity of people and in doing so is blind to what individuals feel and therefore
cannot accommodate the fact that different people get different benefits from the
same goods. In this respect it is fetishistic as it values goods rather than what goods
do for people.
Sen then sets out his argument for constructing a theory of equality that combines the
three theories above with some trade-offs. He thus introduces the notion of 'basic
capabilities': 'a person being able to do certain basic things' (ibid, p.l60). This
approach overcomes the fetishism found in Rawlsian equality that is unconcerned
with what goods do to people and also shifts the focus from the mental reaction
toward goods (happiness) in the two utilitarian theories and places that focus upon
capabilities.
The Capability Approach defined
The bare bones of a capability theory as laid out in the 1979 lecture are fleshed out in
Sen's work "Commodities and Capabilities" (1985a), based on his 1982 Hennipman
Lecture. Sen uses the example of a bicycle to distinguish between capabilities,
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commodities, entitlements and functionings (ibid, pp.9-16). Here, an individual's
capability to achieve certainfunctionings is considered to be key in assessing one's
quality of life. As Sen puts it: '[a] capability [is] a kind of freedom: the substantive
freedom to achieve alternative functioning combinations' (Sen, quoted in Browne et. .
al, 2002, p.4). Functioning itself is seen as the ability of the individual to use a
commodity in a certain way. For example, to take a welder as our example; the welder
uses welding equipment (a commodity) to weld (a functioning); thus increasing his
chances of working as a welder (a capability). Naturally, a weldercan only weld once
he has attained a certain knowledge of welding, this, then, is seen as an entitlement.
Therefore, an individual's capability is dependent upon having the entitlement to
convert a commodity into afunctioning.
Of note here is the distinction between goods and functionings, and the related
distinction between functioning and well-being. Sen's example of a bicycle shows
how this approach allows us go beyond seeing it in purely market value terms by
looking at its characteristic of easing mobility. Although a bicycle can be seen in
terms of exchange value and indeed may be valued for its design or materials, this is a
narrow market based analysis which we can broaden by encompassing the usage
characteristics of a bicycle. With the distinction between functioning and well-being,
Sen uses the example of bread whose nutritional characteristics allow people to
function and typically the more bread, the more one can function (up to a point). But
as all humans differ in terms of being able to convert the nutritional characteristics of
bread into actual functioning, we need more information before we can adequately
comment upon the usage characteristics of bread and thus the well-being associated
39
with eating it. Sen argues that a person's well-being is 'best seen as an index of the
person's functionings' (1985a, p.25) and those functionings depend upon a variety of
personal and social factors. Taken as a whole, a person's total choice of functioning
options reflects their capabilities and thus their well-being. Sen defends the notion of
functionings reflecting well-being by stating that 'how well a person is must be a
matter of what kind of life he or she is living, and what the person is succeeding in
'doing' or 'being" (ibid, p.28).
The strength of focusing upon capabilities rather than achieved functionings lies in
the fact that it allows for the diversity of humans. Robeyns (2005) gives the example
of bodily integrity and compares a boxer who chooses to get 'beaten up' with a victim
of domestic violence who does not. In both cases bodily functionings have been
compromised, but in the former the boxer has the capability to choose whether to
fight or not, whereas in the latter example, the victim has no capability for choice.
Thus in this example a focus on achieved functionings would miss a crucial element
between the two people as it would categorise them both as having their functionings
harmed. Sen uses the example of a person fasting for spiritual reasons and a famine
victim who is starving to show how their achieved functionings are the same (lack of
nutrition), but only one has the capability to choose to be in such a state (Sen, 1987b,
p.37).
Nussbaum's critique
Martha Nussbaum (1988, 2003) has developed a critique of Sen's capability approach
and offered a differing formulation which tries to address what she calls the
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'incompleteness' of the approach as put forward by Sen. Nussbaum uses the example
of women in poor regions of India that suffer from malnutrition and disease; this
example has also been used by Sen to show the failings of other forms of distribution
vis-a-vis the capability approach. For Sen, the problem is that when questioned these
women say they are doing well and this is a consequence of their society which holds
I
that women should have less opportunities than men. Sen uses this to show how
distribution approaches that focus upon desire and satisfaction are left wanting, yet
Nussbaum argues that the capability approach as formulated by Sen also falls into the
very same trap:
"It seems to me that the capability approach will exhibit similar deficiencies, unless we
specify an objective valuational procedure that will have the power to criticise the
evaluations of functionings that are actually made by people whose upbringing has
been hedged round with discrimination and inequity. Sen seems on the whole to think
that we remove the problem by moving from the utilitarian emphasis on desire to his
own approach's emphasis on the valuation of capabilities" (Nussbaum, 1988. p.17S).
For Nussbaum, then, the incompleteness of Sen is in the fact that there lacks any
objective means of judging a person's functionings. This is a critique that Sen
accepts, and as will be explored in more detail below, this is purposeful. But for
Nussbaum, this incompleteness is a fundamental flaw and she goes further by
proposing ways of overcoming it. To this end she constructs a list of capabilities
which ought to be upheld through national constitutions, this list is known as 'Central
Human Capabilities' and these are seen as "central requirements of a life with
dignity" (Nussbaum, 2003, p.40). This must not be confused with Sen's notion of
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'Basic Capabilities' which are understood as being able to meet nutritional
requirements, being clothed, having shelter and so on - basic requirements which act
as a foundation for a person's functionings (Sen, 1987a, p.160). Nussbaum's Central
Human Capabilities underpins social justice to the extent that if a society fails in
guaranteeing these to all citizens, it will "fall short of being a fully just society"
(Nussbaum, 2003, pAO). This minimum conception of social justice is given concrete
presence by the construction of a list which is classified into ten groups which are in a
state of continual revision and modification.
Discussion regarding the composition of the list and the meaning of individual
categories runs the risk of being immediately dated as the list is always open for
alteration, but the idea of actually having a list has generated debate between
Nussbaum and Sen. Nussbaum considers such a list to be imperative if the capability
approach is to become operational. The main issues for Nussbaum are that without an
objective method of evaluating functionings, we risk a situation where any
capabilities are considered valuable including those which harm others. Furthermore,
without objectivity, the capability approach may be difficult to operationalise in the
areas of development projects where knowing which freedoms are important and
which are not.
"Any political project that is going to protect the equal worth of certain basic liberties
for the poor, and to improve their living conditions, needs to say forthrightly that some
freedoms are central for political purposes, and some are distinctly not. Some freedoms
involve basic social entitlements, and others do not. Some lie at the heart of a view of
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political justice, and others do not. Among the ones that do not lie at the core, some are
simply less important, but others may be positively bad" (Nussbaum, 2003, p.44).
Sen has resisted the notion of a concrete list of capabilities as it compromises
freedom and that freedom is 'always good although it can be badly used' (quoted in
ibid, p.46). For Sen the idea of a list is fme, but the problem arises when that list is
the only route through which the capability approach is applied. Sen sees listing of
capabilities as a democratic project between local actors and not the remit of
philosophers working in abstraction.
The problem is not with listing important capabilities, but with insisting on one
predetermined canonical list of capabilities, chosen by theorists without any general
social discussion or public reasoning. To have such a fixed list, emanating entirely
from pure theory, is to deny the possibility of fruitful public participation on what
should be included and why" (Sen, 2004, p.76).
Whereas Nussbaum sees the capability approach's 'incompleteness' as a flaw, Sen
sees it as a positive facet as it allows many approaches.
"But mostly my intransigence arises, in fact, from the consideration that the use of the
capability approach as such does not require taking that route [an objective method],
and the deliberate incompleteness of the capability approach permits other routes to be
taken which also have some plausibility" (Sen, I987b, p.47).
Robeyns (2005) notes that the differences between Sen and Nussbaum have produced
two currents of thought under the notion of the capability approach. For Sen,
capabilities are more concerned with opportunity. whereas for Nussbaum, capabilities
focus more upon people's abilities and characteristics (Gasper & Van Staveren,
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2003). This distinction has meant a favouring of one approach over the other in
various disciplines, for example Nussbaum's approach has appeal for those working
with policy on account of its focus upon guaranteeing capabilities through
constitutions. Sen's approach is more in tune with those working development such
as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which have used Sen's
approach as their grounding (Robeyns, 2005). Another distinction between Sen and
Nussbaum lies in their epistemological backgrounds. Sen's work is rooted in
economics and as such is attune to quantitative empirical measures, as can be seen in
his own work (Sen, 1992). Zimmerman (2006) notes the primacy of statistical
measures within applications of the capability approach that leave little room for
analysis of social environments and the situated diversity of people. Nussbaum's
approach is stronger in areas such as motivations, emotions and how freedom is used
and thus has greater promise in areas where we need to understand what motivations
are needed for action (Gasper & Van Staveren, 2003). Robeyns (2005) argues that
Nussbaum's concrete list of Central Human Capabilities gives her approach less
abstraction than Sen's as well as allowing for an approach that is more in tune with
social and interpersonal needs compared to the more individualistic version offered
by Sen.
Operationalising the approach
In terms of operationalising the capability approach, it has been applied to various
disciplines since its inception (specifically in the Human Development Reports where
Sen's version has been influential) (Robeyns, 2006), but it must be noted that the
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approach is not an explanatory tool, but is rather an evaluative tool. That is, the
approach can be used, for example, to assess a person's well-being, it can gauge the
success of a policy, or allow us to establish an objective stance from which to engage
in comparative analysis. It cannot explain why a person is inpoverty or why a policy
failed in practice to live up to its initial design, but it does have potential to inform
policy design.
Indeed, Alkire (2005) argues that the capability approach has a 'distinctive value'
outside of practical operations. One route here is to use the approach for policy
evaluation; this becomes a particularly valuable exercise if the policy in question has
a shared objective with the capability approach. Whereas the capability approach has
often been associated with poverty and measures within developing countries, if we
take the approach as a tool within developed countries we eliminate much of the
focus upon poverty (such as nutrition and shelter) and this allows for a concentration
upon freedoms that assume a very basic level of functioning that is often guaranteed
through national constitutions. Assuming a basic level does not imply that poverty
has disappeared, but rather that the analysis of policy assumes enough individuals
have achieved a basic set of functionings to make the policy a worthwhile initiative
and thus the analysis to be a worthwhile exercise.
The link between the capability approach and policy, and specifically social policy in
a European context, is explored by Browne et al (2002). Here, the 'basic conflict'
between social rights and market mechanisms, as formulated by T.H. Marshall
(1992), is revisited using the framework of the capability approach. For Marshall,
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social rights were a matter of bureaucratic provision and included income, services
and employment. To promote these rights implied a subordination of market price
and the two thus exist in tension. Browne et at argue that the capability approach
offers a route out of this conflict. Here the authors distinguish between social rights as
claims on resources and as forms of institutionalised interaction, the former include
areas such as welfare payments, whereas the latter is more focused upon areas such as
collective bargaining and corporate governance. In viewing this through the lens of
the capability approach, social rights become a normative goal with a view toward
equality of capability rather than a source of tension within the market. The
deliberately non-prescriptive nature of the capability approach (at least in Sen's
version) means this goal can be met through a variety of means. Thus:'
"In this way the capability approach and its form of social rights should not be seen as
replacing or stifling market mechanisms but rather offering a framework for market-
steering which results in better and fairer market transactions"
"[ ... ] the capability approach concentrates not on guaranteeing that individuals possess
a given set of resources but rather upon aiming to enable individuals to develop their
capacity to be substantively free to make their own effective choices, thus enabling
genuine and dynamic interaction in the market" (Browne et 01,2002, pp.212-3)
In this view, the capability approach is a current of thought to inform policy design
with the aim to equalise capability and thus make market transactions fairer. Policy
effectiveness is an argument taken up by Salais (2004) who extends Sen's critique of
Rawlsian equality by pointing to ineffectiveness within policy on the grounds that
people use goods differently and therefore equality in resources does not amount to
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equality of ends. The policy cursor, argues Salais, should be shifted from equality of
resources to equality of capability (ibid, p.287). "What is important is to evaluate
whether or not the selected policy or institutional system actually helps enhance
effective freedoms and capabilities" (ibid, p.290). Here we can see how the capability
approach can both inform and evaluate policy, indeed, the approach can be used as an
evaluative tool for policy that was never designed around Capabilities. In doing so,
the approach allows for a critical view that can fundamentally alter how we judge
policy.
The power of using the capability approach as a unique evaluative tool can be better
understood if we apply it to the policy of "workfare" in the UK and US. Although the
term is highly elastic (Peck, 2001), it typically involves activation and a shift away
from passive welfare. Crucially, supporters of workfare point to falling numbers of
welfare recipients as evidence of the schemes' successes. Indeed, this can be extended
further to incorporate "flexible labour markets" whereby receding unemployment
numbers have been used to point to the success of such an approach. Yet if we re-
examine both these cases using the capability approach, we may arrive at a far
different outcome. By shifting the focus from goods understood in the Rawlsian
sense, and from social rights in the sense Marshall understood them, to capabilities,
we move away from an analysis that focuses upon jobs as ends (Rawlsian) or jobs as
an outcome of a policy which arbitrates the clash between social rights and the market
(Marshall). Now, with the capability approach, we can view workfare policies in
terms of achievements. The power here lies in the fact that goods are seen as means
not ends and so a job is not a goal unto itself, but rather what matters is how a job
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entitles a person to achieve valuable functionings. Thus workfare, recast in this sense,
highlights the low wages, the low quality, highly flexible and often temporary nature
of jobs associated with workfare policies (Carpenter et al, 2007, Peck, 2001).
The Swedish model through a capability lens
The capability approach will be employed here, then, as an evaluative tool. In this
regard it will attempt to assess how a commitment to full employment impacts upon
the individual and especially how their freedom to choose valuable states of being is
facilitated, encouraged or even hindered by policy practice. Here, then, is the
capability approach's uniqueness in terms of assessing policy - its focus is upon the
relationship between the individual and a policy programme, rather than peak level
deliberations and outcome focused studies. It is the extent to which policy allows the
individual to realise real freedoms that forms the focus of this study. Thus, evaluating
the Swedish model through a capability lens will look how individual entitlements
can convert commodities into junctionings. How are these entitlements given? Are
they based upon what an individual wants to be and do or is there a deliberative
process in which the individual and officials working for a programme work out an
action plan that balances choice with context, or, indeed, is this a coercive programme
in which clients are given entitlements without their personal input? What is the role
of policy in forming a person's own capabilities here? The following chapter gives
some context to these questions by fleshing out the idea of the Swedish model. The
approach will be to offer a definition by way of exploring some of its historical
origins and importantly the developments after 1968.
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Chapter 3
The Swedish Model: a Definition
In 1936 Marquis Childs' influential work 'Sweden: the Middle Way' was published
and the image of Sweden as a model of consensus politics charting a path between
communism and capitalism and forging a-compromise between labour and capital
was cast. Whereas the historian may point to the appointment of Jean-Baptiste
Bernadotte, Marshal of France, as Karl XIV Johan, King of Sweden, or the 1905
dissolution of the Norwegian Swedish union, or the Aland crisis of 1920 as examples
of Swedish compromise politics, Childs' 1936 book introduced Sweden to a wider
audience. As Arter (1999) notes:
"Following Childs's analysis, Sweden became not just another state but a model
for other states, its solidarity 'people's home' respected as a shining example of
consensus politics and the product of an historic compromise between capital and
labour. Sweden became the epitome of an egalitarian culture and pragmatic style
of politics that many yearned to emulate." (p.l46).
Here, then, the observer is confronted with a wealth of works emerging from both
inside Sweden and intended for an outside audience and from outside Sweden looking
in. The notion of a Swedish model, such as it is (or even was), becomes a
phenomenon created not only through policy but also through analysis. Indeed,
critical accounts have often pointed to the 'myth' of Sweden being built up through
sympathetic observers, government propaganda and using politician's speeches as
evidence over actual policy implementation (Toft, 2003; Ruth, 1986). Indeed a clear
example of this can be seen from Tingsten's classic work 'The Swedish Social
Democrats: Their Ideological Development' (1941) where his analysis of the 1920
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party programme ignored the actual economic policy followed during that period and
thus confused rhetoric for action (Winberg, 1980; Tilton, 1991). Therefore, as we can
see, the 'Swedish model' is a term which must be approached with care as it has been
used to describe anything which the observer deems Swedish in nature and
particularly something which charts a 'middle way' or seeks a 'compromise'. The
defmition offered here, then, will be based upon a general overview of historical
works and is intended to highlight the themes which have come to be understood as
components of the Swedish model no matter their ability to withstand empirical
analysis.
Broadly, the term 'Swedish Model' has come to signify two interrelated aspects of
Sweden: notions of compromise and consensus, and the country's institutions and
policies. Since the 1932 general election, both these aspects have come to be
associated with the victorious Social Democratic Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska
arbetarepartiet: SAP) and their subsequent dominance of Swedish politics. The term
can be roughly divided into three parts; a social side (a people's home), an economic
side (the Rehn-Meidner model) and a labour market side (Saltsjobaden agreement).
Thus the Social Democrats' ability to forge coalitions and the industrial peace forged
at Saltsjobaden are examples of compromise and consensus, whilst the Rehn-Meidner
model and the idea of a 'people's home' are the policy outcomes.
To take first the idea of a people's home, the notion was coined by the Social
Democratic politician Per Albin Hansson in 1928:
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In the good home equality, consideration, cooperation, and helpfulness prevail.
Applied to the great people's and citizen's home this would mean the breaking down of
all the social and economic barriers that now divide citizens into the privileged and the
unfortunate, into rulers and subjects, into rich and poor, the glutted and the destitute,
the plunderers and the plundered. (Hansson, quoted in Tilton, 1991, pJ27).
Central to Hansson's notion of the people's home is the idea that cooperation and
consensus will produce a cohesive society that is concerned with the welfare of all
and all are concerned with the welfare of society. Democracy was seen as the vehicle
through which could be achieved but this was not limited to the political sphere as it
also envisioned a social and economic democracy. The achievement of a people's
home pre-supposed relinquishing the ascendancy of capitalism in favour of socialism.
For Hansson, capitalism was entirely incompatible with the fraternity embedded
within the people's home; exploitation, class mentality and authoritarianism cannot
sit alongside the democratic principles underpinning his vision.
In practice, Hansson was an early supporter of Alva and Gunnar Myrdal's ideas laid
out in their influential book 'Kris t befolkningsfragan' (Crisis in the Population
Question, (1934)). The authors claimed that their argument was "completely in line
with Per Albin [Hansson's] dream of the good people's home" (quoted in Tilton,
1991, p.147). The book recommended social reforms along functionalist lines to halt
Sweden's dropping fertility rates. This included, inter alia, high quality social
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housing, kindergartens, urban planning, free school lunches and sex education. As the
authors argued:
All rational policy is now more profoundly seen as an unceasing attempt to link
together and intelligently adjust social institutions to changing technological and
economic conditions. (quoted in ibid, p.l50)
The dropping fertility rates were undoubtedly caused at least in part by the large scale
migration out of Sweden during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Sweden lost 1.25
million citizens to the United States during this period and it was typically the young
(and fertile) that left (Ljungrnark, 2008). Both Hansson's and the Myrdals' ideas
should be seen in the context of mass migration and as an attempt to halt the trend. To
be sure, it was changing US attitudes to migration and the stock market crash of 1929
that had the most profound affect upon the level of immigrants entering the US, but
for Sweden there was no guarantee that previous emigration trends would not
reappear in the future. Hence the emergence of a policy that made the country more
attractive to would-be emigrants.
Yet the notion of the people's home has resonated further than Hansson's original
coining of the phrase and the democratic route into socialism has been largely
replaced by a far vaguer notion of a cohesive welfare state more in tune with some of
the Myrdals' proposals. Here, then, the people's home is about solidarity and
community, about universal welfare and democratic participation, but without the
necessary pathway to a fully socialist state. Indeed, the notion of a people's home,
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loosely defmed, has been used to indicate a type of third way politics between
communism and capitalism or latterly between Thatcherite capitalism and Mitterrand
era socialism.
If the people's home charts the waters between capitalism and socialism in social
policy, then the Rehn-Meidner model is its economic counterpart. In the years
immediately following the end of World War II Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner
worked for the blue collar trade union confederation's (Landsorganisationen i
Sverige: LO) research department. There they developed their model as an alternative
to Keynesianism which they regarded as inflationary and actually a cause of
unemployment through restrictive economic policies (Meidner, 1952). Their model
attempted to combine full employment and price stability with growth and equity,
into a permanent model that could replace the stop-go nature of Keynesianism. To
achieve this required four interconnected polices (the following discussion is based
upon: Erixon, 2001; Meidner, 1952; Rehn, 1952 and Whyman, 2003).
Firstly, a restrictive fiscal policy based on high tax levels would curb inflation and
compel firms to rationalise whilst keeping wage drift in check and prompting
structural change as unproductive firms would close. Secondly, a solidaristic wage
policy would promote equal pay for equal work regardless of the firm's profit
margins. This would further aggravate the tight economic policy and thus promote
structural change by pushing the least profitable firms into bankruptcy. These factors
will cause unemployment and so the third policy, the labour market policy, aimed at
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the achievement of full employment. It did this in three ways: selective demand
measures aimed at specific groups of workers or sectors, supply side measures
including relocation and retraining grants and lastly an intensive adjustment process
to match applicants with jobs. The fourth measure, marginal employment subsidies,
was designed to assist expanding firms to recruit and retrain their employees. The aim
was to both increase employment in growth sectors and to help reduce prices as
marginal costs would be reduced.
Taken as a whole the model's goal of full employment is achieved through an active
labour market policy; price stability is achieved through a restrictive fiscal policy and
solidaristic wage policy; equity is also the goal of wage policy whilst growth is
achieved through both the fiscal policy and employment subsidies. In the words of
Rehn and Meidner:
To summarise, we can say that the maintenance of full employment is a necessary
condition for the trade union movement's ability to carry through the largest possible
wage increase; that, at the same time, the retention of low profit margins is a necessary
condition for the rate of wage increase to be sufficiently low and not to cause a steady
rise in prices; that this condition should be fulfilled by the community which should
maintain full employment by suitable, local action on the labour market and a general
purchasing power level compatible with national economic balance without
inflationary pressure and restrictive controls. A further condition for the necessary
stability in wage developments is that trade union activities be, at least to some extent,
co-ordinated under the following motto: Wages policy of solidarity, taking into account
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the different nature of work in different industries and trades. (Landsorganisationen i
Sverige, 1953, p.99).
The pursuance of a solidaristic wage policy is linked to the third aspect of the
Swedish model; the labour market policy, specifically the 1938 Saltsjobaden
Accords. Here, LO, and the employers' federation (Svenska
Arbetsgivarefiireningen: SAF) met to institutionalise industrial relations and as a
consequence set in stone the idea of Sweden as a country of labour market peace.
The two organisations had separate reasons for entering into the agreement, for LO
it was the fear of increased legislation limiting trade union rights to strike, although
the Social Democratic government was seen as being favourable to labour
(Landsorganisationen i Sverige, 1984), how favourable was unknown and
furthermore, there was no guarantee that unfavourable parties could not return to
power in the future. Itwas therefore considered too risky to allow for the possibility
of future unfavourable legislation. For SAF the route into the agreement was that
they saw little prospect in extracting favourable legislation from the Social
Democratic government and had judged that the party would hold power for a
considerable amount of time. Thus according to Fulcher (1991):
"lying behind the emergence of joint central regulation were the ambiguities of the
Social Democratic State, which was pro-capitalist enough to produce a state
intervention threatening the unions but sufficiently socialist in potential to make the
employers fear state intervention." (p.l51)
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Therefore, both parties came into talks by different routes, but both fearing increased
government legislation. Given how much has been written about the Saltsjobaden
Accords, the actual text is surprisingly modest both in terms of length and what it
achieves. The agreement institutionalised negotiations, rules for strikes and lockouts,
and conflict resolution. Importantly it also assumed that both parties were able to take
"responsibility for developments on the labour market" (De Geer, 1992, p.88) and
that the parties would not seek political solutions when bargaining failed to bring the
desired outcome (ibid).
In terms of defining the 'Swedish model', the Saltsjobaden Accords stood as an
example of the spirit of compromise. Here were two organisations which during the
early 1900s had been at the forefront of escalating and often violent labour unrest
(Carlson, 1969), the complexities of their routes toward agreement are lost in the
generalities of the 'Swedish Model', what stands out is the element compromise and
collaboration.
What this short piece has aimed to show is that notions of the "Swedish Model" have
their grounding in three key policy areas all of which share elements of consensus. In
the idea of a 'people's home' we can see a discourse aimed at seeing society as a
family with no one left behind or outside. In the Rehn-Meidner model a commitment
to full employment is coupled with a policy of lowering inequality, low inflation and
high growth. The Saltsjobaden Accords codify compromise between the two parties
involved. Furthermore, the three aspects are interconnecting; the economic side is
S6
dependent upon the social side, the labour market side lays the ground for both
economic and social elements, and the social aspect requires labour market peace and
full employment.
Taken as a whole, the Swedish Model has come to signify compromise and consensus
grounded in the three aspects outlined above. The notion has become so persuasive
that it is accepted without question. Missing is the continuing use of the strike
weapon, often unofficially, after the agreement of 1938 (Korpi, 1974). The notion of
the people's home misses the 'discovery' in the public conscience of real poverty in
1960s Sweden (Johansson, 1973). The use of the Rehn-Meidner model to signify
elements of the Swedish Model ignores the fact that it remained a largely theoretical
construct that was never applied in its full capacity in Sweden (Erixon, 2001). Yet the
term is used often in complete ignorance of the contradictions. The Swedish Model,
then, must be seen as an ideal type: a construct against which policy can be judged or
analysed.
Developments after 1968
On the 9th December 1969, at the Leveaniemi mine in Svappavaara, 100 miles north
of the Arctic Circle, the miners walked out. The many explanations for this wildcat
strike have included poor working conditions, strained worker-management relations
and wage lags between blue and white collar workers (Ruin, 1974). Another
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explanation here was that the strike was an expression of dissatisfaction with the trade
union movement:
The local trade union leadership was accused of being too dependent on advice and
instructions from the National Union of Miners. The union was in turn accused of
being too dependent on advice and instructions from the Federation of Labor (LO).
Trade union leaders at different levels in the highly centralized Swedish trade union
movement were said to be indifferent to demands 'at the bottom', and leaders 'at the top'
were viewed as cooperating too closely with their adversaries. (ibid, p.178).
Thus the 1969 strike was, in the words of Ryner (2002), a 'representational crisis in
the wage-determining institutions of joint central regulation' (p.128) and that a
'central component of the story was the sense of alienation within the union
collective' (ibid). The strike spread to other northern mines and before it could be
resolved another wildcat strike broke out in Gothenburg at the Volvo car plant and, in
total, 250 wildcat strikes broke out in 1970 involving 25,000 workers (ibid, p.127).
Through sympathetic media reports I the strikes came to be seen as a crisis of
representation within the Swedish model as a whole with a dominant discourse on the
alienating aspects of the active labour market policies. Whereas Swenson (1989)
argues the strikes should not be seen solely in terms of alienation, as the major factor
behind the strike was blue collar wages falling behind those of white collar workers,
the way the strike was framed within the Swedish media meant it took on a meaning
J Key to the sympathetic nature of the reports was the decision by the Stockholm newspaper Dagens
Nyheter to send a reporter called Sara Lidman who had recently wrote a popular and compassionate book
about the miners in the north called Gruva (1969). The word has a dual meaning, it can be used to mean a
pit or mine, but it also means despair.
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far beyond the original antagonisms. The strike was about the failings of the Swedish
model/.
This discourse took place during the same period as the 1970 reform of the Riksdag
that had removed Sweden's upper house and transformed parliament into a
unicameral assembly with 350 seats. This had the effect of removing the national
elections to the upper house which traditionally took place half way through a
parliamentary session. Without this, the ruling government lost a valuable gauge of
the electorate's feelings and thus became more sensitive to public opinion and public
opinion was focused upon the striking miners (Schiller, 1988). Another factor that
became more influential were study circles, although often seen as an aspect of the
labour movement (Linton, 1985), they were active in all political parties and in many
other informal and non-aligned settings also (Larsson, 2001). Olof Palme would call
this 'study circle democracy'; a policy of 'letting a hundred flowers bloom' (Berman,
1998) and it was a key source in feeding ideas from below to the peak and became
more important in this regard after the removal of the upper house. Here worker
unrest was the spark that started the process of peak level response, but it was the
steady information from the study circles on the subject of industrial democracy that
convinced the peak to act (Eiger, 1982). That said, the influence of the study circles
must not be overestimated; in the 1970s a critique of Swedish research policy
emerged that argued that study circles were marginalised by a research establishment
2 An earlier LO research report given at the 1966 congress and later published in English as "Trade Unions
and Technological Change" (Anderman, 1967), had warned of the negative and alienating consequences of
industrial rationalisation and the rediscovery of this report after the strike wave appeared to add weight to
the sense of crisis within the model - not only had its predictions appeared to come true, but the peak level
union leaders had done little to act after it was published.
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dominated by a 'scientific-technical and corporate elite' (ibid, p.127,
Landsorganisationen i Sverige, 1980) that often failed to disseminate its findings.
The reaction to the strike at union peak level was to re-establish authority; the wildcat
strikes had shown the rank-and-file could organise themselves and press for demands
without the need for a union. Furthermore, the traditionally Social Democratic unions
were fearful of the Communist party making inroads by mounting a more
sophisticated anti-capitalist argument in-tune with much new-left thought prevalent at
the time. For the unions it was necessary to increase power in the workplace in order
to respond to the critiques behind the miners' strike. It was clear from the outset that
two areas where local authority could not be enlarged were in wage setting and the
strike weapon - changes here were considered incompatible with the solidaristic
wage policy.
Rather, the focus settled upon the day-to-day activities of the workplace. The problem
here was, of course, that the Saltsjobaden Accords had upheld managements' right to
manage - an increase in union authority would necessarily clash with this. In order
for union authority to be increased at the workplace, that right would need to be
overcome (Schiller, 1973). In other words, it would require the abolition of paragraph
32 of the SAF's constitution:
Collective contracts concluded between a part owner or member of the Confederation
and a trade union or trade union federation must contain the provision stipulating the
right of the employer to engage and dismiss workers at his own discretion; to direct and
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allot the work; and to avail himself of workers belonging to any organisation
whatsoever, or to none. (Quoted in Landsorganisationen iSverige, 1972, p.50)
To accomplish this, LO turned to the Social Democrats who themselves had become
more sensitive to voter sentiment and also more concerned by the Communist Party's
championing of the strikers' cause through their anti-capitalist stance. The ground
was fertile for the growing calls of industrial democracy to take root
(Landsorganisationen i Sverige, 1972). Indeed, these calls were not limited to LO; the
white collar union federation TCO also championed the cause and in a political
environment dominated by the Social Democrats, both the Centre and Liberal parties
supported such a drive (Ryner, 2002, p.l34). The Social Democrats themselves had
lost the parliamentary majority won during the 1968 elections in 1970 and decided
that in the approach to the 1973 election they would make the 'democratisation and
renewal of working life' (Martin, 1984, p.260) a major theme. The legislation, then,
which Olof Palme called ''the greatest diffusion of power and influence since the
introduction of universal suffrage" (quoted in ibid, p.263), amounted to a number of
acts designed to shift the balance of power at the workplace in favour of labour
(Anderman, 1983, Sigeman, 1981). During the 1973 - 1976 parliamentary sessions a
number of laws were passed which shifted the balance of power at the workplace in
favour of the unions, the most relevant of which will now be outlined.
Security of Employment Act (1974)
This law required a minimwn notice of one month to be given by either employee or
employer before a contract of employment can be terminated. As the employee aged
61
the notice time was increased up to a maximum of six months. During the notice
period the employee was entitled to full wages. When an employer must give
redundancy notices on account of lack of work, the general principle of last-in, first-
out applied to all. However, those aged 45 and over were able to add one extra month
to their seniority for every month worked beyond the age of 45 up to a maximum of
60 months. The law also made 'unreasonable' dismissals illegal with 'unreasonable'
understood in a way that the offered most protection to older workers and union
officials. If an employee decided to bring a case to the labour court, they would retain
their job and be entitled to full pay in the waiting period for the case to be heard.
Law on Employment Promoting Measures (1974)
This law complemented the Security of Employment Act notably in regard to older
workers, those with handicaps and union officials. Here employers were required to
give notice of layoffs to the relevant unions and the local employment office; the
advance notice could be up to a maximum of six months and was dependent upon
how many workers are affected. Once the notice had been issued, the unions,
employment office and employer must then form a committee to explore ways in
which continued employment could be secured with a special emphasis on older and
handicapped workers, and union officials. These committees were also to be used by
the same three parties in cases where the local employment office is looking for firms
to employ older and handicapped workers made redundant from other firms. The
committees attempted to modify the personnel policy of the firm and change the role
of certain jobs to better meet the skills of local workers and the needs of the market. If
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the committee did not find a solution then the local employment office could give
recommendations for the employer to follow. Should the employer refuse to carry out
those recommendations, then the employment office could force the employer to
recruit workers sent to the finn and make the necessary internal policy changes.
Law on Union Officials I Status at the Workplace (1974)
This law extended certain protections to union officials to allow them to go about
their business without fear of disciplinary measures; it assumed that a well
functioning trade union is in the interest of both employer and employee. The law
entitled officials to'paid leave to undertake union functions, access to an office at the
workplace and retention of fringe benefits whilst undertaking union business. Itmade
it illegal for the employer to give the official inferior work and conditions on account
of union activities. The official had a guaranteed right to return to the previous
position held and was given special priority rights in cases of redundancy.
Law on Joint Determination in Work (1976)
The Co-determination Act (Medbestiimmandelagen: MBL) set out the framework for
negotiation between employers and employees with the latter's rights exercised
through the union. The law stated that unions can negotiate joint determination rights
in areas previously the domain of the employer, including organization, management,
recruitment and dismissals. The goal was to achieve equal power between the
employer and unions in the decision making process which is to be democratic and
decentralised. An increase in job satisfaction was considered to be an important goal
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of the law. In order to negotiate on equal terms, access to information regarding the
employer's business was seen as a pre-requisite. The employer, then, was required to
provide information to employees to make negotiations fairer and also to improve job
satisfaction. The law assumed that greater access to information regarding the
employer's business will help to alleviate alienation in the workplace and improve
motivation. Employers were required by the law to open negotiations with employees
if significant changes are planned in the operation of the finn. This could include
reorganisation, expansion, contraction and changes in the work environment. The
employer must postpone any planned changes until negotiations have been
conclusive. In cases where employer and employee could not agree, the employer
must then start negotiations with the employee's central organisation. A failure to do
so could lead to damages being awarded against the employer by the labour court.
Should the employer refuse to start any negotiations, then again, the labour court can
settle the matter.
The Labour Court
The court (Arbetsdomstolen: AD) preceded the laws discussed above although those
laws did lead to a large increase in the court's workload. Prior to the 1970s, the court
would in some years deal with only 30 or 40 cases; after the laws above were passed,
this changed to 150 to 200 cases per year (Edlund & Nystrom, 1988, p.44). The court
had two roles: it acted as the first and Supreme Court in cases regarding collective
agreements and legislation, and it acted as a court of appeal for other labour disputes
taken to common courts. It consisted of 18 members headed by a chair and vice chair
64
both of whom must be experienced judges and were chosen on the basis of not
representing either labour or capital. Three other judges, also chosen for their
impartiality, must have expertise in labour market issues and the fmal13 members are
laymen made up of seven representatives nominated from employers' organisations
and six representatives nominated from employees' organisations. Each member had
one vote and typically a case was heard by seven people made up of the chair, two
other judges and four labour market representatives (two for labour and two for
capital).
Alongside the introduction of new labour market legislation there was also a shift in
the workings of the Labour Market Board, noticeably in the area of relocating clients.
Hostility to the practice of moving people to other parts of the country, especially
from the North to the South, was strong in Sweden (Ryner, 2002, p.l27) and the
practice was colloquially known as the 'removal van policy' (j1yttlasspolitik).
Hostility here centred on what was seen as an impersonal policy that promoted
structural change above the wishes of the client. The removal van policy was
oblivious to the stress and anxiety of moving and the loss of leaving an area where
family and friends remained. The use of this policy in the 1970s receded as hostility
grew. Consequently, more resources were put into placing clients into jobs within the
local area, retraining and encouraging local business investment.
In conclusion, then, a shift in Swedish labour market policy occurred in the early
1970s that produced a more defensive structure, a shift from promoting security by
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subsidising inobility to subsidising security at the expense of mobility. Although the
basic structure of the institutions within the Labour Department remained the same,
the policy shifts aimed to give workers greater say in the workplace (via the unions)
and to take part in decision making processes at the finn level. The shift from an
offensive to defensive policy came about from various security elements built into the
new labour laws. These came to be far more persuasive than the joint determination
aspects of the laws which the Swedes often called the "tut-tut /agen" - meaning the
employer must now sound a hom before running the workers over.
Exogenous to labour market policy, one other major factor influencing the
development of the Swedish model was the impact of the global economy on the
currency. Here, the Kronor was devalued six times between 1973 and 1982. The first
devaluation, in February 1973 by 5%, occurred during a boom period in Swedish
industry where profits and exports were experiencing rapid growth and as such this
did little to quell union calls for something to be done about 'excess profits' and wage
pressures. This boom period rapidly gave way to decline after the international oil
crisis reduced demand. Sweden attempted to offset the losses in the export sector by
stimulating internal demand through an expansionary policy. Yet the international
decline was longer than envisioned and, according to Martin (1984). this placed
Sweden into a deeper crisis than other nations that had contracted during the initial
stages of crisis.
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The offsetting policy had delayed the affects of the oil crisis beyond the 1976 election
and as a consequence it was the Bourgeois coalition government which was charged
with managing the crisis. Importantly, the coalition did not have the political capital
to abandon the commitment to full employment - they faced a strong and organised
labour movement both inside parliament (the Social Democrats) and outside (the
unions). Furthermore, the coalition was an extremely precarious grouping with
diverse opinions on many matters including employment.
The coalition manoeuvred, therefore, to improve Sweden's export costs through a
policy of devaluation. Firstly a small 3% devaluation occurred in October 1976. This
was then followed by 6% devaluation in Apri11977 and 10% in August 1977; the
latter two were part of economic packages designed to reinforce Sweden's trading
prospects. The packages included increasing value added tax from 18% to 21% to
slow domestic consumption, freezing prices for a limited time after which advance
notification was required for an increase, and eliminating payroll tax to reduce labour
costs.
A tacit commitment to full employment meant the government needed to counter any
negative affects on employment that its economic policy would cause. This took the
shape of various training and relief work packages run by the Labour Market Board
as well as more recent developments such as subsidising wages to allow firms to
retain their workforce in full and strengthening legislation to make it harder to layoff
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workers. Furthermore, failing firms were increasingly given loans, credit guarantees
and fmally whole industries were nationalised.
Thus in 1979, a decade after the workers in Svappavaara walked out, Swedish labour
market policy had shifted away from offensive measures and became far more
defensive, from the Social Democratic ideals of rationalisation to the protective
notions of nationalisation. Policy had also shifted in terms of responding to client
needs; or rather it had shifted in response to unrest that threatened the status quo by
addressing a number of contentious areas. In recognising hostility toward the use of
relocation measures in particular, it increasingly sought to achieve labour market
stability: manoeuvres to keep people in their current jobs rather than policies to
promote rationalisation.
Post-1969, then, we can see certain shifts in the nature of policy within Sweden, yet
there were continuities and Eklund (2001), for example, draws this out further by
noting what he characterises as the Swedish model in terms of institutions and
policies:
A large public sector: within the labour market this is relevant in two ways;
firstly, the large number of people employed within the sector and secondly, the
services offered by that sector.
- Generous transfer systems: although cash benefits playa minor role in labour
market in terms of unemployment, other transfers, for example early
retirement, study grants and sheltered employment, have often played a larger
role.
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Big unions and compressed wages: negotiations between unions and employers
at peak level have long been a characteristic of the Swedish model (The Basic
Agreement) with union involvement on labour market decisions and wage
restraint as methods to promote full employment.
Large private firms, big unions and big government: often seen as essential
characteristics of the Swedish model; a corporatist system of planning aiming
toward full employment and low inflation.
- Social Democratic hegemony: in power continuously from 1932 to 1976, the
longest period of rule for any left wing party outside the Soviet Bloc, the Social
Democrats came to defme the political dimension of the Swedish model.
For Eklund, then, the post-1969 landscape was a shift in degree rather than kind. The
Swedish model was essentially the same in terms of institutions and architecture. The
underlying continuity here can be seen as being waged work both as an on-going
political commitment to full employment and as a pre-condition for access to social
welfare and much social life. It is this role that work plays which we will now turn to.
The importance of work
The main continuity throughout this account has been work and the importance of
work. Here Kettunen's argument comes into play; he suggests that the modernisation
process within the Nordic region as a whole was underpinned by three ideological
strains: the spirit of capitalism, the utopia of socialism and the idealised heritage of
the free independent peasant (Kettunen, 2006, p. 60). The third aspect in particular
was important in allowing for the adjustment to industrial waged work (Kettunen,
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1999). Here, then, is the legacy of 'secularized Lutheranism'; that produced the right
to follow the moral norm whereby everyone's duty is to work (Serensen & Strath,
1997; Kettunen, 1999). Kettunen's argument here is generalised for the whole of the
Nordic region and must be read in the knowledge that the countries which make up
this area are actually quite distinct (Baldwin, 1990; Tragardh, 1997). Thus in this
sense Kettunen departs from the compartmentalisation of linear historical blocs but
overplays the similarities within the Nordic region whilst downplaying difference.
The notion of the duty to work as a moral norm is worth exploring further, especially
if we consider it as a historical continuity. In fact within Esping-Andersen's (1990)
The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, the social democratic model contains the
idea of 'individual dependence' whereby 'all benefit, all are dependent; and all will
presumably pay' (ibid, p.28). This sheds light onto Kettunen's (2006, p.60) notion of
the "normalcy of wage-work". Here, then, social security reinforces waged work by
not only guaranteeing continuing income but also by setting its pre-conditions by
linking benefits to income. This idea can be expanded to encompass the idea of work
and by extension workplace as being central not only to wage earning but also to
much social life.
In his enthusiastic account of Sweden, Linton (1985) argues that in Sweden "people
can live their lives in the warm bosom of the labour movement [... ] they can
completely envelop themselves in the environment of the movement" (p.22).
Hyperbole aside, what Linton was describing was more than just union organised
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activities as paternalistic employers also organised many social activities and this
compounded with the fact that Swedish suburbs were often empty of any social
facilities meant that work came to be a site of social value.
This manifested as social clubs run by employers that organised teams in a variety of
sports and other hobby activities that could be based in the buildings provided.
Furthermore, unions organised other activities including 'study circles' and day trips.
Through this process many workers valued their jobs not only for the wages earned,
but also for the social life connected with it. The absence of public houses in the
suburbs gave many workers an added incentive to engage in social activities
connected with workplace. In terms of policy, the powerful Labour Market Board's
(Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen: AMS) main task is 'to take swift action towards evening
out supply and demand in the labour market and to find jobs that correspond as far a
possible to the applicant's wishes and capabilities' (quoted in Wilson, 1979, p.72).
Cash benefits have always been a minor part of this work as the focus has been upon
streamlining the job seeking process, funding training and relocation programs and
initiating measures to create new jobs through various incentives (Jangenas, 1985,
p.35). In other words, policy has attempted to get people into work or to keep people
in work rather than support people out of work.
The duty to work thus goes further than producing rights to work as it also includes
social security rights and social life rights all of which reinforce the principle of
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waged work as the norm. Here benefit levels are linked to wage levels, pastime
activities are linked to employer, union or the Social Democratic movement at large,
and waged work itself becomes the point from which other rights are defined. Full
employment in this context was the natural outcome of a normative system that was a
consequence of Sweden's export focused economy and also its relatively small
population. The architecture of social policy and social life sought to facilitate
continuing employment or the move 'out of unemployment' rather than support
people during periods of unemployment (Eklund, 2001, p.55).
A Critique of historical research on Swedish Social Democracy
This chapter will conclude with a brief critique of some historical research on
Sweden. Here, works in the English language are overwhelmingly focused on the
peak level and it is here that the same basic events are recalled: the Social Democrat's
1932 election victory, the 'Cow Deal' coalition with the Agrarian Party, the Crisis
Program to pull Sweden out of depression, the crushing of the Builders' Union strike
by LO, the Saltsjobaden Accords, the Rehn Meidner Model and finally the end of
Social Democratic rule in 1976. Understood in terms of a linear progression, the
period 1932 - 1976 gives much material to authors associated with what Fulcher
(1987) called 'labour movement theory' or what Ryner (2002) refers to as the 'power-
mobilisation thesis'. Key thinkers here, including Esping-Andersen (1985), Korpi
(1978, 1980, 1983) and Himmelstrand et al (1981), contend that organised labour can
take control of a state's apparatus and use it for its own benefit. Thus compromises
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and concessions as well as shows of strength are all part of the long-term cumulative
strategy advancing labour's interests. As Korpi (1980, p.313) argues "the distribution
of power resources tends to affect the conditions for the distributive processes in
society, the way and extent to which the state enters into these processes, the types of
policies that are used, the arenas in which distributional conflicts tend to become
manifested as well as the outcomes of these processes in terms of various aspects of
inequality". For the 'two wings' of the labour movement, the party and the unions
(Landsorganisationen i Sverige, 1984), political power came through tactical
decisions and alliances. As Rothstein (1990, p.338) notes "political agents are in
some cases able, by forming political institutions, to enhance the class-based power
upon which they build political power". Once in power the movement was able to
transform its industrial power into political power, thus offsetting the economic
power of capital, in order to carry out redistributive measures in the form of social
and economic policies.
This theory has been criticised by Pontusson (1984) as being too simplistic in its
conception of the relationship between Social Democratic policy and union
representation. In other words, the party and the union should not be viewed as two
parts of the same movement but rather as two entities whose complementary nature
during the 1950s and 1960s was a consequence of economic expansion and the strains
between the two in the early 1970s highlighted their complex and often contradictory
relationship. The notion of Swedish social democracy being comprised of a 'party'
wing and a 'union' wing in close harmony is repeated by authors adhering to a
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corporatist interpretation of Sweden. According to this analysis, social democracy
abandoned any goals. of socialism and accepted capitalism, it then cooperated with
employers to manage and stabilise the economy and the state, and lastly it
subordinated labour and integrated it into the capitalist state. Crucially, the unions
cooperated in this management of the economy by practising wage restraint in return
for a degree of influence over government policy. Thus 'corporatism of this sort was
facilitated in Sweden by the combination of a strong labour movement, centralised
union, a legal framework for collective bargaining and Social Democratic ideology'
(Fulcher, 1987, p.223).
Another route is taken by Christiansen and Markkola (2006) who claim that the
development of Nordic welfare states has gone through four 'epochs', in applying this
to Sweden a chronology can be constructed. Firstly, during the period from around
1900 to 1920, social legislation charted a path between local administration and
central legislation. Social policy took on the form of tax financing with the state
acting as co-provider and the individual as the 'prime recipient' including a gradual
introduction of female social rights. In the second epoch, lasting from around 1920 to
1950, Social Democrats achieved political power and transformed themselves from a
class party to a people's party building broad alliances along the way and introducing
comprehensive social reforms. The third epoch, the so-called golden-age of welfare
which lasted from around 1950 to 1980, embedded the idea that economic growth is a
precondition for welfare. During this period all policy aspects were moulded into the
welfare state framework that tightly knitted all policy together. Finally, the fourth
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epoch, from the 1990s onwards, saw the development of workfare policies that
emphasised the 'duties' of clients and especially the unemployed.
Another key theme has been to attempt a pinpointing exercise to ascertain when the
Swedish model 'ended', with the late 1970s being a popular choice. This period also
saw the emergence of more critical analyses of Sweden alongside works that asked if
the model can adapt to the new environment or if it is, indeed, dead or dying (Childs,
1980; De Geer, 1992; Lundberg, 1985). Indeed, many of the critical works can be
seen as part of the Swedish Employers' Federation (SAF) backlash (Swenson &
Pontusson, 2000) that followed the 'red wave' of the late 1960s (Ryner, 2002). This
understanding allows the idea of a Swedish model to be split into two eras: a period
of birth and growth, followed by a period of contraction and then death. Or even,
following Martin (1979) and Stephens (1979), a later shift toward a socialist or a
labour managed state, or 'third stage' Keynesianism. For other authors, the shift in the
late 1970s marks a shift from 'self regulation to state intervention' (Kjellberg, 1992,
p.99). Thus, the shift in policy practice in the 1970s is understood both as the high
tide of Swedish social democracy and also as the first nail in its coffin.
Again, there is much here that points to a linear understanding of Sweden, framed
within the context of the peak level, in which events occur progressively one after
each other. The desire to compartmentalise Swedish history into theoretical or
historical 'blocs' is extremely common and as a consequence has necessitated a tight
focus upon national politics in an attempt to differentiate between certain time
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periods. This has led to an exaggerating of difference between certain 'epochs' and an .
underplaying of continuities. The 'debate' between labour movement theorists and
corporatists can be seen as a case in point. As mentioned above, both these
approaches recall the same basic events from which they attempt to bolster their
ideological positions. Historical understandings of Sweden, in this sense, then, can be
seen as exercises in supporting theoretical stances. The weakness of this approach has
been shown above whereby it generates a tendency toward compartmentalisation of
epochs presented in a linear form, exaggerating or underplaying certain key events.
Esping-Andersen (1990) also used the notion of compartmentalised blocs in his
construction of three welfare 'regimes' yet this attempt fails to appreciate the
temporal nature of those regimes and the outcome is three static concepts modelled
on the 'golden age' of welfare sometime from the 1950s until the 1980s (Christiansen
and Markkola, 2006) and has attracted much criticism (for example: Bonoli, 1997;
Ferrera, 1996; Kangas 1994; Lewis, 1992). Central to Esping-Andersen's analysis is
the concept of 'de-commodification'; a measure of the degree by which citizens are
able to "freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or general welfare opt out of
work" (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.6). This criterion, alongside another measure
known as 'stratification', that was concerned with inequality of access to welfare
were used as yardsticks to distinguish different welfare state 'regimes'. For Esping-
Andersen, his social democratic regime featured 'high' levels of de-commodification
(ease of opting out of work) and 'low' levels of stratification (non-stratified access to
welfare). Notwithstanding the static nature of the regime types, the notion of de-
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commodification by itself has come to characterise the social democratic regime, and
by association, Sweden. This concept appears to clash with the notion of work as both
a duty and as a moral norm as argued by Kettunen (2006). Whereas Esping-Andersen
claims citizens can de-commodify, Kettunen's argument is essentially that citizens are
encouraged to re-commodify as social security reinforces waged-work.
Kettunen's (1999, 2006) approach, in which the normalcy of wage-work is enshrined
as a duty and exists as a sort of historical continuity, whilst certainly difficult to
defend in the era of high Swedish unemployment after 1991 (ibid, p.60), offers a
novel framework in which to analyse the period before high unemployment became
tolerated for two reasons. Firstly, it departs from the tendency toward
compartmentalisation and linear understandings of history and secondly, it offers a
powerful critique of Esping-Andersen. Therefore, what mechanisms promoted this
normalcy of wage-work; in what ways did this impact the individual, and, indeed, do
these wage-work norms actually exist? In order to answer this, a theoretical
grounding sensitive to the individual impact of various mechanisms is required. This
framework, then, is Amartya Sen's capability approach; which was outlined in the
previous chapter.
In sum, then, this chapter has explored the idea of a Swedish Model; it offered a
definition framed around three interconnected facets: a social side, an economic side,
and a labour market side. It analysed the developments that emerged post-1968 in
some detail, especially in relation to the labour market. It suggested that the
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importance of work was a major continuity throughout the period in question. A
criticism was made of historical research on Swedish Social Democracy which
presents a linear history or one of compartmented epochs. Finally, in order to depart
from this tradition, the Capability Approach, as formulated by Amartya Sen, was
proposed as a theoretical underpinning for such a departure. Having explored in detail
the two theoretical elements of this study; the capability approach and the Swedish
model, the following chapter will now set the contextual basis for the case study.
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PART II
The Case Study
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Chapter4
Gothenburg and the rise and fall of shipbuilding
Gothenburg 1621 - 1980
''Here shall the city lie"
In 1621 the Swedish King Gustav II Adolf stood near the mouth of the river Gota,
downstream from Nya Lodose, with a view to building a new town in the area. The
Kalmar War had ended some eight years earlier, but at the Treaty of Knared, Sweden
had to pay a heavy ransom to the victorious Danes for the return of the fortress
Aivsborg at the mouth of the river. Once the narrow strip of land between Denmark
and Norway was back under Swedish control, the need for defence and more
development in the area was considered urgent. The location near the A'lvsborg
fortress and opening of the river Gota was considered ideal. Here could develop a
town to facilitate Western Sweden's imports and exports, to bypass the Danish
Sound, to overcome the frozen Baltic ports and importantly to build up a strong
fortification against Sweden's foremost enemy, Denmark. Such reasoning can be seen
in the words of the King's confidant Axel Oxenstierna who argued "Gothenburg as a
town is a nail in the eye of the Jutes" (quoted in Andersson, 1996, p.29). As the King
surveyed the land, suddenly, so the legend goes, a dove being pursued by an eagle
landed at the King's feet in an attempt to find shelter. The King took this as a sign
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from God and stretched out his hand saying "Hdr skall staden ligga" - Here shall the
city lie (Sandstrom, 1910, p.294).
Planned by Dutch architects whose experience of building in the low-lying
Netherlands was considered important, the city was constructed around a series of
canals that served as both defence and as drainage for the water logged ground the
city was built on. The town rapidly grew into an important port and trading centre
after the Treaty of Roskilde in 1658 ceded large areas of land to the north and south
of Gothenburg to Sweden and thus put the city in a, less exposed position. Early
governance of the town was headed by a burggreve, a Royal appointment similar to
the British title of earl. The council was made up of twelve members consisting of
four Swedes, three Dutch, three Germans and two Scots - highlighting the importance
of early trade links for the town. In 1668 the town's citizens won the right to
representation in the Riksdag.
Early trade links with the Netherlands were soon complimented by links with
England and Scotland; two factors helping to cement the links were the presence of
an English fleet in the Sound during the Swedish-Danish war (1657-1658) and also
the Great Fire of London in 1666 (Ashton, 2003). In the former, the Swedish King,
Karl X Gustav, noticed how the English ships could out-manoeuvre the Dutch
designed ships of the Swedish navy and in 1659 the King paid two English
shipwrights to build warships of the English design in Gothenburg. The second factor,
the Great Fire, created a great demand for Swedish timber which was shipped through
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the Gothenburg port. The war between England and the Netherlands at this time also
created a strong demand for timber and masts to re-fit the English navy. Later the
creation of the Swedish East India Company in 1731 brought wealth to the city which
consequently expanded due to both foreign trade and as a point of departure for the
132 overseas expeditions the company embarked upon during its 80 year heyday. The
city also became an important departure point for the many Swedes that immigrated
into North America during the 19th century. Indeed, between 1850 and 1910 1.5
million Swedes left for America, the majority departing from Gothenburg
(Ljungmark, 2008).
In its first two hundred years of existence Gothenburg transformed from a fortress or
garrison town into a major trading centre, from having 4000 residents in 1670 to
105,000 in the last decade of the 18th century (Hedin, 1995, p.9; Fritz, 1996, p.186).
Toward the end of this period came the first developments that gave the town a large
industrial base. In 1847 a Scotsman, Alexander Keiller, made the first steam powered,
iron-hulled ship in Gothenburg and six years later he founded an engineering
workshop that later, under his son's directorship, moved to the northern bank of the
River Gota on the island of Hisingen and was renamed Goteborgs Mekaniska
Verkstads Aktiebolag. At about the same time Carl Christian Barchmann founded
Ericsbergs Metall och Tackjerns Gjuteri an engineering workshop specialising in
galvanisation. Another workshop, Lindholmens Varvs och Fabriks Aktiebolog, started
making ships in 1848 and was also located on the northern banks on the river. These
three workshops had, by the start of the 20th century, turned into dedicated shipyards
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and helped to give Gothenburg a large industrial sector. Other firms founded around
this time included the ball bearing manufacturer Svenska Kullagerfabriken (SKF) in
1907 and the car manufacturer Volvo in 1927 which had started life in 1915 as a ,
subsidiary of SKF.
Outside of engineering other industries such as textiles, provisions and paper had a
large presence in the town and especially the cotton industry which dominated by
employing 32% of all industrial labour in the period 1866-70 (Fritz, 1996, p.142). But
the largest finn in terms of size was the Lindholmen shipyard which in the 1890s
employed no less than 1300 workers. This growth in new industry was matched by a
population that almost doubled from 105,000 in 1890 to 202,000 in 1920 (ibid, p.l86)
and expanded the city limits outward.
Alongside industrial and population growth the town started to take its modern form
in terms of governance and city structure. Key here is the reform of 1862 that gave
power over the town's affairs to local authorities and thus expanded the activities of
the town's officials as well as allowing for a municipal tax to be levied on its citizens.
Many services which had once been the domain of private enterprise now came under
the control of the town such as bridges over the river, energy provision, street lighting
and the tramways. Electricity consumption grew rapidly in the first two decades of
the 20th century as industry expanded, while the electrification of the tramways in
1900 allowed the city to expand further.
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Table 4.1: Employment in Gothenburg 1910 - 1945 (Percent)
Trade 1910 1920 1930 1945
Agriculture 1 6 5 3
Manufacturing 45 42 42 46
Commerce 36 18 21 22
Communications - 12 12 11
Administration 9 7 8 12
Domestic - 8 8 5
Other 9 7 4 1
Source: Fritz, 1996, p192, Olsson, 1996, p.78
Table 4.2: Manufacturing employment in Gothenburg 1920 - 1945 (0005)
Trade 1920 1930 1940 1945
Engineering 17 20 24 28
Textile 15 19 17 16
Building 8 12 13 14
Provisions 6 7 7 7
Paper 4 5 5 6
Rubber 3 3 2 2
Timber 4 3 3 2
Chemical I 2 2 2
Other 1 2 5 5
Total 60 73 77 82
Source. Olsson, 1996, p.84
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Economic development in the inter-war years was a story of growth during a time of
stagnation. Gothenburg was Sweden's 'Atlantic port', a major centre for international
trade that should have been hit hard by the contraction of world markets during this
period, yet industry expanded. Indeed this was a period of early stagnation for both
the shipbuilding and cotton industries, especially in the 1920s. Those other two
staples; coal and steel, were not present in Gothenburg but instead the city had a
number of high technology engineering firms including SKF (ball bearings), the
city's largest work place at this time producing 20% of the world's bearing
production, and ESAB (welding technology) that grew during this period and both of
these firms' growing exports compelled the port to also expand. Key to this expansion
was the defeat of Germany in World War I which allowed Swedish engineering firms
to exploit the hole left in the market. Furthermore, the shipyards were later able to
capitalise upon early investment both in the repair sector and new builds for Swedish
shipping lines, the emerging oil industry and Norwegian ship-owners to the extent
that in 1933 the Gotaverken yard was the world's largest yard in terms of gross
register tons launched. Another factor here was the diminished role of the UK as a
shipbuilding nation after World War J; this gave the Swedish yards access to new
markets and less competition (Bohlin, 1989, p.20). During World War II the yards
were in a strong position in terms of new production techniques.
The pre-war period also saw voting reform that gave equal votes to men in 1911 and
women in 1921. The newly democratised city administration had a Social Democratic
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and Communist majority which lasted until 1959 and for almost thirty years from
1934 to 1963 a single Social Democratic chairman, Ernst Jungen.
Table 4.3: Distribution of seats in the Gothenburg Council 1919 - 1979
Year Party
HIM LlFp Brie s V/K Other
1919 20 14 26
1920 20 11 29
1922-3 19 6 31 3 1
1926-7 18 10 25 7
1930-1 20 8 32
1934-5 16 8 27 7 2
1938 14 8 30 8
1942 12 8 30 10
1946 9 13 23 15
1950 5 24 25 6
1954 7 22 24 7
1958 13 18 24 5
1962 9 18 28 5
1966 13 27 1 30 9
M Fp C S V Other
1970 8 27 7 33 6
1973 12 19 11 32 7
1976 13 17 10 35 6
1979 18 16 7 31 8 1
Source: wwwz.historia.su.se/urbanhistory /cybcity Istadlgoteborglvalresultat.htm (accessed 08/10/09)
Key
WM - Rightist / Moderate LIFp - Liberal I Folk
Bf/C - Agrarian / Centre S - Social Democrat
V/K - Communist / Left
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The three decades after the end of World War II were a period of record growth in
Gothenburg that saw the population increase by 200,000. In engineering this was a
time of rationalised production techniques, investment in new factories, new
technologies and expansion, the older industries such as textiles and rubber receded
as car and ship production carne to dominate the city. The port continued to grow in
importance as both exports and imports increased and containers allowed for rapid
and systematic working procedures. The high-tide for this growth was the mid-1960s
after which the shipyards operated in an increasingly difficult environment, although
they did experience a few 'boom years' in the early 1970s, which eventually saw
them eclipsed by car production as the dominant industry.
Growth in these 30 years outstripped the supply of labour to the extent that Swedish
active labour market policy drew on the surplus labour in the northern parts of
Sweden and many workers moved south. When this supply started to dry up, industry
looked further afield to other Scandinavian countries, and especially Finland, to
recruit workers. When this source was found lacking Yugoslavian guest workers were
recruited. During the period of growth demand for labour outstripped supply by 4:1,
yet by the start of the 1970s this had reached equilibrium and by 1975 had reversed so
that supply outstripped demand by 4: 1.
The 1973 oil crisis signified the start of a more turbulent time in Gothenburg. In
certain industries, notably shipbuilding, export sales were hit very hard and the
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industry never recovered. Other major employers in Gothenburg fared better; Volvo
survived the crisis exceptionally well and capitalised upon growing consumer demand
by introducing new vehicles, better product development and marketing campaigns
showing the safety of Volvo products. SKF also weathered the crisis well as its large
and varied market share protected it from individual sector collapse. Yet industrial
employment shrank during the 1970s as the collapse of shipbuilding shed thousands
of jobs and supply industries cut back on capacity.
The mid-1970s, then, saw a contraction in industry and also a shift toward a service
sector economy. Heavy industry in the form of shipbuilding was in rapid decline and
although car production still dominated, the port saw strong growth with trade
increasing from 20 million tons in 1975 to 35 million in 1980 (Olsson, 1996, p.298).
Many connected industries such as shipping and logistics benefited from this and
helped to increase trade. Although containerisation of the port meant increased trade
did not automatically mean increased employment, the connected service industry,
especially logistics expanded to cater far beyond its home port. Manufacturing
industries in general lost 10,000 employees between 1975 and 1980 (ibid, p.296),
emerging research industries such as telecommunications and pharmaceuticals grew
during this period but in terms of employment, these industries were not labour
intensive.
Thus in 1979, this thesis' focus, Gothenburg was undergoing a shift from a city
dominated by manufacturing industries toward one based more upon service
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industries and high technology research and knowledge sectors. But in 1979 much of
this was yet to come and perhaps not even obvious. What was becoming certain was
that the city would need regenerating; as old industries disappeared, emerging firms
had different needs. To encourage private investment, the city would need to
modernise infrastructure, have a skilled workforce and a long term vision of what the
future should be like. In 1979 the most pressing of these demands was to clean-up and
regenerate the old shipyards, now lying dormant, and to retrain the workforce leaving
the industry.
The rise and fall of shipbuilding in Gothenburg
Gothenburg's three large shipyards, Gotaverken, Lindholmen and Eriksberg, all
started life as general engineering workshops in the eighteenth century and through a
process of expansion and specialisation had become dedicated shipyards by 1910.
During the first two decades of the twentieth century the main activity at the yards
was repair work but slowly ship production started to eclipse the repair work. The
yards started making tankers for Norwegian ship owners who dominated the oil
transport market; fluctuations in supply and demand coupled with the long production
period to make ships produced three spikes of activity in the inter-war years: 1926-7,
1928-29 and 1937-8. These were boom times for the yards who received many
orders, yet at other times there were periods of stagnation as demand dropped and the
ship owners sought to sell off some of their fleet thus flooding the market and
reducing the price of new-build ships.
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After the Second World War the Gothenburg yards entered a thirty year period of
growth dominated by orders for tankers. Two important changes in the international
shipping market affected the yards: firstly, the tendency of shipping lines to look
further afield when placing orders. Previously orders for ships were typically placed
with firms operating in the same country as the shipping line (with the exception of
Norway), thus sheltering the shipbuilding firms from international competition. After
1945, to a much greater extent, shipping lines placed orders outside of their national
base; this was largely due to the rise of the use of the flag of convenience which
bypassed much national regulation. Secondly, the rise of Japan as a shipbuilding
nation made the international market for ships extremely competitive.
During the 1950s the Gothenburg yards benefited from the increasingly international
nature of shipping and were able to attract orders from shipping lines which
traditionally placed orders with yards of the same nationality, the UK standing out as
a prime example of this trend. The yards followed a general trend toward a more
internationalised and export dominated focus away from their earlier Norwegian base.
The Korean War and the Suez Crisis both produced huge demand for ships, especially
tankers, and the yards worked to capacity. The yards modernised their production
techniques and dug new docks to fit the increasingly large tankers that were being
ordered. During this period the typical tanker size grew from 8000dwt to 41,750dwt
(Hedin, 1995, p.103).
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Capacity became a serious concern in the late 1950s because of the close proximity of
the yards to the centre of Gothenburg; they could not keep expanding in their present
locations without buying up prime (and expensive) city centre real estate. In 1958 the
board of directors at the Gotaverken yard made the decision to construct a new
shipyard away from the city, further out in the estuary:
"The board has during the year decided to commence with the construction of a new
shipyard at Arendal within the Gothenburg region. The construction will require an
outlay of circa 150 million Crowns and will allow for the possibility of constructing
vessels up to a maximum of 100,OOOdwt"(quoted in Hedin, 1995, p.l04).
Completed in May 1963, Gotaverken's Arendal yard was built along Fordist
production lines adapted from the experiences at nearby Volvo. It worked by
mimicking the conveyor belt lines used in car production; it had a clear and rational
input - output route, large parts of the vessels were prefabricated and then assembled
in parts. Crucially, this took place indoors and the completed ships emerged from the
factory gradually in the same manner that toothpaste emerges out of a tube. Working
indoors meant the construction of ships could take place away from the extremes of
weather that could produce outside temperatures lower than minus twenty Celsius. A
British delegation that visited the yard in 1963 commented that "one hour with a
Swedish yard produces more than double what other countries' yards can produce"
(quoted in ibid, p.l07). This new method of mass producing ships became known as
the "ArendaI Principle".
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Although the yard was designed to accommodate new builds up to a maximum of
100,00dwt, during the Six Days War and certainly by 1969 orders were placed for
vessels as large as 228,000dwt requiring significant logistical and re-fitting work as
well as broadening the docks (Ohlsson, 2002, p.IS). Here the nature of shipbuilding
was shifting from an essentially manual activity into a more technical and planned
enterprise. This required expanding the planning and design departments, to bring in
more skilled technical staff and to employ computerised control of planning, stock
levels and construction progress. This shift was also mirrored at the Eriksberg and
Lindholmen yards where investments were made in new computerised systems, larger
docks and gantry cranes as well as recruitment drives for skilled technical staff.
After the end of the Suez Crisis the Japanese yards became increasingly dominant in
the world market growing from a 10% market share in the early 1950s to just under
50% by the late 1960s (Bohlin, 1989, p.59). This increase was at the expense of many
European yards and Britain was hit especially hard dropping from a 50% market
share to 6% during the same period (ibid). Sweden in general and Gothenburg in
particular managed to retain its market share of around 10% for the entire period 1950
- 1975. This was thanks to the large investments made in the yards in the 1950s and
1960s. Initially these were funded through the yards' own profits, but as the 1960s
progressed the yards found this increasingly difficult and were obliged to tum to the
state for development loans (see Table B8, Appendix B).
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Although the 1950s and early 1960s are often seen as the 'golden years' for the
Gothenburg yards, they were still highly vulnerable to international fluctuations in the
shipping market as well as having to compete against Japan's credit competition. In
the late 1960s the Swedish yards asked for a government inquiry into the Japanese
threat and the problems of credit guarantees. At about the same time a team of
investigators from the International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF) visited Japan to
observe the yards' production techniques and credit arrangements. The team was
headed by Swedish Social Democratic politician and Metall official, Hans Hagnell.
He presented his findings in a report to the IMF and then to the Swedish Metall
union's shipbuilding conference in June 1966. There he argued that, in order to meet
the Japanese threat, Sweden would require a far more systematic approach to
shipbuilding, huge investment in infrastructure and technology. higher wages to
attract skilled workers and better credit guarantees (Beckholmen, 1979, p.30).
Concurrently the Swedish government inquiry presented its findings and offered a
solution to what it saw as the threat of over-capacity; the committee recommended
stronger co-ordination of all the large Swedish yards in an attempt to halt competition
between yards and to allocate to each yard a certain specialism. The industry
completely rejected this, and in February 1967, the director of the Gotaverken yard
was interviewed in the newspaper Aftonbladet where he argued "we can manage
without [Industry Minister] Strang's help" (quoted in Sjolin, 1991, p.45).
The Gothenburg yards benefited greatly from the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 as
this led to heavy demand for larger tankers which could carry larger loads over the
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increased distances necessitated by the closure. Although problems persisted in terms
of credit guarantees and Japanese competition, the investment in modernising the
yards paid off and orders peaked after the Canal closure. During this period all the
yards suffered from severe skills shortages and workers with desirable skills could
exploit the labour market as the competition to attract certain workers was intense.
The yards increasingly found the need to use 'grey' labour as both welders and platers
- the most sought after workers - had very high quit rates as they constantly moved
jobs to secure better terms.
A large percentage of the 'grey' workforce was comprised of immigrant workers, the
majority of which were Finns and Norwegians, but significant amounts were
Yugoslavian guest workers. The use of grey labour was heavily criticised by the
unions on account of the fact that grey workers were paid more than the shipyards'
own workers for doing the same job. Grey workers also received a number of untaxed
benefits. This had the affect of producing tensions at the workplace which lowered
productivity and had negative effects on morale. Furthermore, the unions argued, grey
labour was not only illegal as it violated certain labour legislation but it also had
encouraged wage drift not only at the yards but in industry in general - a critique also
made by other engineering firms. In the early 1970s the yards agreed to cut back their
dependence on grey labour with an aim to abolish it all together. This was not entirely
successful and as late as 1975, just days before its collapse, the Eriksberg yard was
employing 400 grey workers, 90% of which were immigrants (Beckholmen, 1979).
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Table 4.4: The extent of 'grey' labour in the blue collar workforce at the three large
Gothenburg shipyards. 1961 - 1973
Ordinary 'Grey'
Year
workforce labour
1961 9135 337
1962 9136 466
1963 9082 635
1964 9293 1258
1965 8971 1120
1966 8582 1049
1967 7782 1072
1968 7466 1147
1969 7123 1387
1970 6958 2082
1971 7614 1915
1972 8072 982
1973 7956 1340
Source: Bohhn, 1989,p.285
In order to cut back on the use of grey labour, the yards had to start a recruitment
drive alongside attempts to make the yards pleasant places to work. This occurred at a
time when issues of workplace representation and job security were gaining currency
in Swedish debates. At the yards, measures such as scrapping piece work in favour of
monthly wages, increasing representation committees and access to management and
funding research into the affects of workplace environment on workers were
undertaken (Svensson, 1983). At Gotaverken, the blue-collar union leader Bengt
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Tengroth accepted the position of personnel director, claiming "it is my ambition to
transform my new office'" (quoted in Gartvall, 1980, p.14).
As this was getting underway the yards were about to enter a boom period, the order
books had 'never been so full' (Beckholmen, 1979, p.65) by 1973. This produced
new confidence at the yards which had been in difficult finances at the turn of the
decade with the Lindholmen yard being bought and then closed by its neighbour
Eriksberg and the Gotaverken yard being saved from bankruptcy by government
intervention. The early 1970s were 'bonanza years' (Strath, 1987, p.84) for the yards,
they were able to capitalise upon the investments made in the 1960s and they were
able to retain their dominant position in the world market second only to Japan.
Table 4.5: The world's largest shipyards ranked by tonnage (GRT) launched in 1965
3 Tengroth was a controversial character, having moved from the upper ranks of trade unionism to higher
management, he was often suspected of having conflicts of interest from many on the side of capital and
was seen as a traitor by many of the side of labour.
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Gross Register
Yard
Tons Launched
Mitsubishi, Nagasaki 618,226
Ishikkawajima-Harima, Aioi 487,907
Hitachi, Innoshima 422,500
Gotaverken, Gothenburg 416,407
Mitsui, Tamano 349,310
Kure losen, Kure 319,450
Kawasaki, Kobe 302,530
Ishikkawaj ima-Harima,
298,568
Yokohama
Mitsubishi, Kobe 267,298
Eriksberg, Gothenburg 248,347
Source: Olsson, 1996, p.221
During the period 1973-4 orders were at record heights and output surged. Bohlin
(1989) argues that demand was to large extent speculative: 'cheap building prices,
generous credit facilities and inflation (and inflationary expectations)' (p.422) drove
the demand; the order books were full up to 1977. Then the 1973 oil crisis struck and
demand for ships and especially tankers which the Gothenburg yards specialised in
evaporated. No new orders arrived after 1974 and the backlog of orders was fmished
by 1976-7. The market had collapsed.
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Plate 4a: The 402,OOODWTTIT Nai Genova, one of the very last ships to be finished at the Eriksbcrg
shipyard, pictured here being launched in 1978. Source: Gothenburg Shipbuilding Hi torical Society
9
In Gothenburg 14,500 worked at the shipyards in the mid-1970s, a further 3500
worked in supply activities; the city was home to some of the most productive yards
in the world with reputations for quality products, but they had no customers. This
precarious situation was mirrored at the peak level where Sweden had five different
governments between 1976 and 1982, each with their own solution to the
shipbuilding 'crisis'. Once the orders stopped coming in the yards collapsed at a fast
rate; Eriksberg was first in 1975 when it faced bankruptcy and was saved through the
purchase of the yard by the state for a nominal one Swedish Crown. Eriksberg was
then merged into the Gotaverken yard which itself needed saving from bankruptcy in
1976. The merger led to tremendous over capacity at the yards and the tendency for
the workforce to be split into A and B teams.
The future of shipbuilding in Sweden was uncertain precisely because the industry
had gone through slump periods before and emerged a year or two later when demand
grew again. Could this slump follow that pattern? Much of the help given to the
industry in 1975-1976 was based upon this reasoning; this was a temporary matter
and the yards will be back in profit in a few years. By 1977-1978 this line of thought
was losing favour as other yards in Sweden reported that they too were facing
difficulties. In September 1976 the Swedish shipbuilding industry was nationalised,
by 1978 all large Swedish yards were state owned.
In Gothenburg the industry faced heavy cuts in capacity and employment at the yards
dropped from the peak of 14,500 in 1975 to 3,000 in 1986, all of whom where
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involved in repair and offsh~re work (Strath, 1987, p.8S). Throughout the period of
contraction representatives from Gothenburg lobbied various industry ministers hard
to reduce proposed cuts; an example of this can be seen in the Riksdag debates of
1978. Here a Liberal minority government had taken office after the three-party
Bourgeois coalition collapsed. A new industry minister, Erik Huss, was lobbied by
the unions to alter his predecessor's draft shipbuilding bill. Key to the lobbying
efforts here were the close links between (blue collar) unions and the Social
Democratic party (now in opposition); the unions were able to secure Social
Democratic support for a Liberal bill that reduced the cuts proposed by the previous
industry minister. Translated to cuts in Gothenburg, this was the difference between
2,300 job losses and 1,400 losses.
Although there was a growing recognition that the yards needed reduce capacity, the
desired route was through gradual cuts and promoting a change toward alternative
production such as offshore platforms and specialist vessels. Whereas the importance
of the shipyards for Gothenburg has often been taken as a given with both politicians
and academics pointing to employment figures and going no further, an attempt must
be made to quantify and qualify the need to act. That is to say, what effect would a
large plant closure have on Gothenburg in terms of employment rates, added pressure
on services and the population of the city?
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The Importance of the Shipyards to Gothenburg
1975 was the high tide for shipbuilding in Gothenburg; it was at this time point that
the yards employed the largest amount of workers both in absolute terms and in
relation to total industrial employment. It was also the year that the Eriksberg Yard
collapsed and the tide changed for good. By 1975 the industry directly employed
14,500 individuals in Goteborg with an additional 0.8 individuals for each employee
working in supply activities within Sweden of which 0.25, or 3265, were locally
employed (Hamilton, 1980, p.ll). Direct employment accounted for 25% of all
industrial employment in Goteborg and as Strath (1987). notes "[t]he importance of
the yards for the labour market in the shipbuilding centres can scarcely be
exaggerated" (p.85).
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Plate 4b: Gotaverken's Arendal yard in 1978. Source: Gothenburg Shipbuilding Historical Society
102
Plate 4c: by 1983 the Arendal yard had diversified into making off-shore platforms. Note the office
block in the upper part of the photo is now significantly larger than in 1978, reflecting the more
technical nature of the new production. Source: Gothenburg Shipbuilding Historical Society
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The Gothenburg Region's labour market
Total employment for the Gothenburg region in 1975 was 280,000 of which 30%
worked in the industrial sector and 35% in service industry (see Table B5, Appendix
B). Manufacturing accounted for 65% of all industrial employment with Volvo, SKF
and Gotaverken dominating with 40% of industrial employment and the shipyards
accounting for 20% (Lansstyrelsen, 1978, p.5). If the focus is narrowed to
Gothenburg municipality (see Figure A3, Appendix A, for a map detailing the
regional and municipal areas), manufacturing accounted for 74% of industrial
employment (compared to 60% ten years earlier) with Volvo, SKF and Gotaverken
employing 58% and the shipyards 25% of all industrial workers (ibid: 6).
From 1971 to 1975 employment in the region grew by 2,800 each year, most of that
expansion occurred within the public sector with industry expanding by 500 places
each year. Between 1975 and 1977 industrial employment reduced by a total of7,000
people in the region of which 6,000 were within the municipality. The shipbuilding
sector lost 3,000 direct jobs over the period with a 1,000 more being lost in supply
and subcontract industries. Overall, the total employment for the region grew by 600
during the period and employment in the municipality shrank by 1,600.
During the 1960s the number of job openings outstripped the number of job seekers
by around 1:4. The early 1970s saw this ratio close to around 1:1 but by 1975, the
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relationship had flipped to resemble the 1960s only in reverse so that the number of
free places had shrunk as the job seekers grew.
Table 4.6: Job seekers in the Gothenburg Region 1976-1977
Difference
November 1976 November 1977
Number Percent
4,928 7,561 2,633 53
Source: Lansstyrelsen, 1978
Table 4.7: Job openings in the Gothenburg Region 1976-1977
Difference
October 1976 October 1977
Number Percent
5,054 3,157 -1,897 -38
Source: Lansstyrelsen, 1978
Table 4.8: Job seekers per job opening in the Gothenburg Region 1976-1977
October 1976 October 1977
1.5 3.1
Source: Lansstyrelsen, 1978
These figures mask to some extent the number of unemployed people as once an
individual had been placed in some sort of activity by the local labour market
authority (AMS), they were no longer counted in the above tables (see Table B6,
Appendix B, for a more detailed breakdown of the figures). The number of people
taking part in activities organised through the AMS was significantly larger than the
number of job seekers.
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Table 4.9: Labour market measures in the Gothenburg District 1975-1978
Activity November 1975 November 1976 November 1978
Relief Work 1,315 2,099 2,853
Training 2,158 3,525 5,198
Work Experience 240 261 268
Archive Work 1,356 1,294 1,313
Semi-Sheltered 322 358 435
Work
Sheltered Work 720 726 800
Total 6,111 8,263 10,867
Source: Lansstyrelsen, 1978
Furthermore, within Gothenburg municipality the numbers of people accepting early
retirement had doubled during the period 1970 - 1976177from 9,000 to 18,000 which
amounted to 6.2% of the entire 16-64 age group. Within the group of early retirees,
23.1% were aged between 60 and 64, 13.6% were aged 55 to 59 and 15.6% were aged
between 45 and 54. At the other end of the spectrum, people under 25 registering as
unemployed had also grown to 2,800 in 1977 which was an increase of some 68%
over 1975 levels. Again, this figure masks the larger numbers of people involved in
activities organised by the AMS.
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Table 4.10: Labour market measures in the Gothenburg District in 1977 for
individuals under 25
Activity November 1977
Relief Work 1,903
Training 1,400
Work Experience
Archive Work
Semi-Sheltered 270
Work
Sheltered Work
Total 3,573
Source: Lansstyrelsen, 1978
Adding the unemployment figure to the numbers involved in AMS activities gives us
around 6,400 individuals or 8% of the total age group. If we add together the figures
for unemployment, AMS activities and early retirement we get a figure which implies
that 9% of the working age population in the Gothenburg district stood outside the
open labour market.
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Table 4.11: Summary of individu~ls outside the labour market in the Gothenburg
Region. November 1977
Status Number
Unemployed 7,560
AMS Activities 10,870
Early Retirement 21,710
Total 40,140
Source: Lansstyrelsen, 1978
This figure was seen as reaching the upper limits of the capacity of the district to
absorb unemployed people; if the open market's ability to absorb new workers did
not improve then the district should expect the unemployed figure to grow as the
number registered for AMS activities was close to hitting the ceiling of resources. To
go further would imply putting 'increasingly powerful stresses' upon the district
(Lansstyrelsen, 1978, p.17). A glimpse into the financial costs of early retirement for
the individual, the state and the county can be got from a report into the socio-
economic costs of the shipbuilding contraction prepared by a consultancy firm
'INDEVO'.
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Table 4.12: Financial costs for early retirement of blue collar workers
Age Accumulated costs for: Total
The The The State
Individual Commune
65 0 0 0-6100 0
64 6,300 3,200 51,500 67,100
63 12,100 6,200 110,900 129,200
62 18,000 9,000 160,000 187,00
61 23,000 12,000 206,000 241,000
60 27,000 14,000 248,000 289,000
59 31,000 16,000 288,000 335,000
58 35,000 18,000 324,000 377,000
57 39,000 20,000 358,000 417,000
56 43,000 22,000 398,000 454,000
55 46,000 23,000 418,000 487,000
54 49,000 25,000 444,000 518,000
53 51,000 26,000 469,000 546,000
52 54,000 28,000 492,000 574,000
51 56,000 29,000 513,000 598,000
50 58,000 30,000 533,000 621,000
Source: INDEVO, 1980.
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Table 4.13: Financial costs for early retirement of white collar workers
Age Accumulated costs for: Total
The The The State
Individual Commune
65 0 0 0-10,400 0
64 6,700 4,300 69,900 91,300
63 12,900 8,300 154,700 175,900
62 19,000 12,000 224,000 255,000
61 24,000 15,000 287,000 326,000
60 29,000 19,000 346,000 394,000
59 33,000 22,000 400,000 455,000
58 38,000 24,000 451,000 513,000
57 42,000 27,000 498,000 567,000
56 45,000 29,000 542,000 616,000
55 49,000 31,000 582,000 662,000
54 52,000 33,000 619,000 704,000
53 55,000 35,000 653,000 743,000
52 57,000 37,000 685,000 789,000
51 60,000 38,000 715,000 813,000
50 62,000 40,000 742,000 844,000
Source: INDEVO, 1980.
The financial costs for early retirement, then, were calculated as costs spread between
the individual, the commune (council) and the state with all three having to bear
greater costs as the retirement age reduced. The greatest financial outlay was on the
part of the state as this is where the retirement funds would be paid from. The
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individual's costs were greater than the commune's as this was mostly calculated
from lost potential earnings, whereas for the commune the costs were limited to
funding services that the retiree may have cause to use. One cost not factored in here
was the loss of purchasing power on the part of the retiree and the effect this had on
local businesses and by extension, tax revenues for the commune. Thus the total cost
for a blue collar worker to retire at age 50 was 621,000 Swedish Crowns with the
individual losing 58,000. The average blue collar wage at the shipyards during this
period was 5,000 Crowns per month (Gotaverkens Verkstadsklubb, 1979).
Effects offuture scenarios
In December 1977 the Shipyard Analysis Committee, organised through the Industry
Department at national level, requested that Gothenburg's county administrative
board (Liinsstyrelsen) investigate the consequences for Gothenburg (at both local and
county level) of various capacity reduction alternatives within the shipyard industry.
This report, designed to brief ministers and finished in February 1978, presents the
effects of a number of future scenarios and as such gives us an understanding of the
importance of the shipyard industry to the Gothenburg area. It takes the reduction
level debated by parliament in 1977 (Alternative 1) as its base and then proposes
three scenarios beyond that level and predicts the effects of these in 1982 and 1985.
The report was concerned only with the large new build yard, Gotaverken Arendal,
the repair yard, Gotaverken Cityvarvet, and the engine works, Gotaverken Motor.
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Alternative 1
This prognosis followed the proposals for the shipbuilding industry set out in the
shipbuilding proposition debated at the Riksdag in 1977; it demanded a reduction of
personnel by 30% and the closure of the Arendal shipyard during the period 1978 -
1985. The outcome of this, it was predicted, would be a reduction in job vacancies by
6,000 plus a reduction in employment within the manufacturing sector by 8,000
people of which 7,000 would be lost by 1982 (Lansstyrelsen, 1978:17).
The authors then turn their attention to areas of expansion that could potentially
absorb a greater. number of people in the future. Here the petrochemical industry was
predicted to contribute an additionall,100 job openings in the period up to 1985. It
was felt the transport industry (specifically Volvo and Saab-Scania) would not
increase their recruitment and that the ball bearing firm SKF would reduce their
intake of workers. In general the transport industry was seen as facing an uncertain
period with a downturn predicted to be stronger in effect than the years leading up to
1978. Looking into other sectors, the fishing and forestry industry was predicted to
reduce its job openings by around 1,000 over the period, while the building, trade and
communications industries were predicted to stagnate around the 1975 employment
level. The personal service industry, it was predicted, would grow by around 2,000
people, initially in the area of social insurance.
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Finally turning to the public sector, the predicted growth here was 18,000 employees.
But it was argued that it would become difficult for the local and county councils to
achieve such an 'ambitious' development plan within the traditional areas of
expansion: nursing, child and elderly care on account of both the costs and also the
weak growth in the basic industries within these sectors. In other words, the
additional growth would mean supply was higher than demand, or simply that the
growth would lead to hospital wards, day care units and pre-school centres under
utilised and nurses, care assistants and nursery staff unable to provide the service they
were trained to do - there would not be enough patients and clients to fill the new
services,
The prognosis predicted a half percent rise in gainful employment by 1985 from the
1975 level of 44% but with an accompanying 'relatively substantial' redistribution
between men and women. Male employment was predicted to fall, especially for
those over 50, whilst female employment was estimated to rise. The population was
predicted to fall by 1982 and then rise slightly by 1985. Industry was predicted to
contract throughout the period and for employment in other sectors to rise (see Table
B7, Appendix B for population figures from 1974 to 1985).
113
Table 4.14: Prognosis for Alternative 1
Employment
Year Population Commuters
Industry Other
1975 602,603 80,561 199,345 14,910
1982 597,775 67,465 213,933 17,420
1985 599,201 66,401 218,131 18,268
Change '76-
-4,828 -13,096 14,588 2,510
'82
Change '76-
-3,403 -14,160 18,786 3,358
'85
Source: Lansstyrelsen, 1978
Alternative 2
This prognosis illustrated the effects of a reduction of 30% of the current production
level to a new level of 70% across all three areas concerned (Arendalsvarvet,
Cityvarvet, Gotaverken Motor) with no yard closures. The outcome was estimated to
be a reduction in industrial employment by 2,388 people and a further 1,422 in other
sectors by 1982 and a further reduction in other sectors to 1,815 by 1985.
Table 4.15: Prognosis for Alternative 2. 1982
Employment
Population Commuters
Industry Other
Alt.llevel 597,775 67,465 213,933 17,420
70% level 590,854 65,077 212,511 17,046
Change -6,921 -2,388 -1,422 -374
Source: Lansstyrelsen, 1978
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Table 4.16: Prognosis for Alternative 2. 1985
Employment
Population Commuters
Industry Other
Alt. I level 599,201 66,401 218,131 18,268
70% level 591,191 64,013 216,316 17,851
Change -8,010 -2,388 -1,815 -417
Source: Lansstyrelsen, 1978
This scenario would also see the population drop further than it would under the
proposals for alternative one thus implying that the population would decrease further
if the yards remained open with a reduced capacity compared to a, closure of the
Arendal yard. No reasoning is given for this but one possible explanation may be that
by closing the yard funds could then be used to encourage expansion in growing
sectors, whereas if the yard remained at 30% less capacity it would still require
funding and that would imply fewer funds available to other areas. As well as the
population dropping, the number of commuters working in Gothenburg was predicted
to fall. This figure giving some weight to the explanation that keeping the yard open
at a 30% capacity reduction would hinder growth in other sectors.
Alternative 3
Here the prognosis illustrates the effects of a 30% reduction in new build areas only,
and would imply keeping Cityvarvet and Motor at a 100% production level.
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Table 4.17: Prognosis for Alternative 3. 1982
Employment
Population Commuters
Industry Other
Alt.llevel 597,775 67,465 213,933 17,420
70% level 593,749 66,015 213,063 17,189
Change -4,026 -1,450 -869 -231
Source: Lansstyrelsen, 1978
Table 4.18: Prognosis for Alternative 3. 1985
Employment
Population Commuters
Industry Other
Alt.llevel 599,201 66,401 218,131 18,268
70% level 594,651 64,951 217,008 18,011
Change -4,549 -1,450 -1,123 -257
Source: Lansstyrelsen, 1978
In this scenario the results were more favourable than those in alternative two; the
population would drop less, employment in both industry and other sectors would
also drop less and the number of commuters would increase. The authors, then, saw
the new build yard, Arendal, as being the biggest obstacle to recovery; it was a drain
on development funds even when capacity was reduced.
Alternative 4
The final alternative shows the effects of a total closure of all shipbuilding activities
by 1985 at the three areas concerned. It would imply shutting down both Arendal and
Cityvarvet and eliminating vessel engine production from Gotaverken Motor,
116
significantly reducing its output. The result of this would be the disappearance of
8,000 job vacancies over the period within the industry sector and a further
disappearance of 6,500 jobs in the service industry. The population for the region
would reduce by over 27,000 people by 1985.
Table 4.19: Prognosis for Alternative 4. 1982
Employment
Population Commuters
Industry Other
Alt.llevel 597,775 67,465 213,933 17,420
0% level 575,206 59,142 209,767 16,565
Change -22,569 -8,323 -4,166 -855
Source: Lanssryrelsen, 1978
Table 4.20: Prognosis for Alternative 4. 1985
Employment
Population Commuters
Industry Other
Alt.l1evel 599,201 66,401 218,131 18,268
0% level 571,685 58,078 211,662 17,335
Change -27,516 -8,323 -6,469 -933
Source: Lansstyrelsen, 1978
This alternative would also reduce the number of commuters coming into the city.
The figures show that such a closure would have the strongest affect out of all the
alternatives between the two time periods, that is to say that the trends would
continue past 1982 and into 1985. The reasons for this could be two-fold; firstly that
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such a large closure would take time and workers would continue to leave the
industry over the whole six year period under examination, and secondly that the
closures would be very difficult for the city to recover from. The authors may have
factored both reasons into their prognosis for alternative four.
The report then turns its focus to subcontract and supply industries and predicts the
effects of the different alternatives purely in this sector alone. It firstly shows that in
the period 1975 - 1977 the industries lost over 1,000 jobs, at alternative one that
figure was predicted to drop by over 1,000 more; at alternative two the drop would be
around 1,500 more and lastly at alternative four the report states the industries would
employ only 60 workers in the region and 55 of those would be in the municipality.
Table 4.21: Employment in subcontract and supply industries to the shipbuilding
1981 prognosis
1975 1976 1977 Alt.l Alt.2 Alt.4
level level level
Region 3,631 3,162 2,546 1,380 895 60
Municipality 3,331 2,891 2,311 1,320 855 SS
Source: Lansstyrelsen, 1978
In the four alternatives an assumption is made that if an individual becomes
unemployed and cannot find work they will look further afield and leave the
municipality. This assumption is based upon the traditional Swedish active labour
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market policy of encouraging worker mobility from contracting to expanding
.industries. Should no work be found and the person stays within the municipality and
registers either as unemployed, for AMS activities or receives early retirement, the
effects upon the local service industries will, conversely, be beneficial. But, as
mentioned earlier, there was a ceiling to this and once breached numbers of
unemployed would rise. The issue of people choosing not to relocate in order to find
work was one that had been growing since the late 1960s when popular opinion in
Sweden became more vocal in its opposition to the measure as it was not only very
stressful but also uprooted families and broke links with communities and areas
where people may have been settled for generations.
Table 4.22: Increase in unemployment numbers 1978 - 1985 within Gothenburg
Municipality if relocation does not occur
Increase in
Alternative
Unemployment
1 +7,700
2 +9,000
3 +8,700
4 +13,300
Source: Unsstyrelsen, 1978
After presenting a current overview of the labour market and the prognosis based
upon four future scenarios, Lansstyrelsen then presented some working assumptions
which must inform measures for reducing the negative effects of the shipyard
closures. Up until the point of publication, the authors state that the effect of
contraction within the shipyards has largely been contained within that industry. This
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was about to change as the four alternatives presented above show. Furthermore, the
limits of the municipality to absorb individuals exiting the labour market were being
stretched to the extent that without large scale investment unemployment would start
to rise rapidly. The time honoured Swedish solution of moving individuals (and their
families) from areas of contraction to areas of expansion (the removal van policy)
was also under pressure. This was on account of the fact that all Swedish counties
were experiencing the same problems with little or no expansive industries, the
difference being in degrees.
Society's total costs for rising unemployment are not limited to unemployment
benefit, the report argued, but also include such direct costs as retraining, relief work
and higher rent subsidies. Indirect costs, both social and economic were difficult to
measure and the report holds back from attempting such a task, but a research
document written by shipyard workers belonging to the union Metall and in
collaboration with Gothenburg University under the collective name The
Shipbuilding Crisis Circle (Varvskris Cirklarna (1978» outlines the social effects ofa
large increase in unemployment figures. They singled out the 25 and under age group
as being hit especially hard by reductions in personnel at the shipyards. Many in this
group, they argued, drop out of society after long periods of unemployment and turn
to crime and alcohol abuse. The following social factors were also considered to be
serious side effects oflarge scale unemployment which would require 'strong efforts'
from society and the individual to overcome:
- Marriage problems
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Alcohol abuse and other substance abuse
Psychiatric problems including metal health
Adaptation problems
Education problems
Personal economic problems
Most, if not all, of these side effects were considered to be the consequence of losing
an identity as a 'worker' in a country where employers and trade unions organised a
considerable amount of a person's social life. To lose a job was not just to loose
income but was also to lose access to many social activities. Without this access, it
was feared, the individual would lead an increasingly isolated life, in which
frustration could manifest as violence, where alcohol becomes a 'solution' and
physiological disorders could be the result. Both the direct and indirect economic
costs to society as a whole, the report argues, are paid through many different forms
including:
Unemployment benefits
Labour market subsidies
Labour market training
Public reliefwork
Funding work in protected industries
Relocation subsidies
Reduced intake of tax
Increased costs of social services
Increased housing subsidies
Early retirement
Uinsstyrelsen's report argued that proposals for action must be based on offensive
measures rather than defensive ones. In other words that action must be taken to
121
increase employment, rather than bolster the mechanisms for absorbing
unemployment. This was a different crisis to the one in the late 1960s. Then calls for
collaboration between yards and questions of credit were largely forgotten as the
industry pulled out of its fmancial problems and entered a boom period, now there
was no question as to if this was a temporary slump in the industry. The yards must
adapt to alternative production to survive. It was argued that the majority of workers
will not find equivalent employment in other firms or other areas should the yards
close, rather it was expected that they would either take early retirement or find
insecure work. Furthermore, by adapting to alternative production the yards would
promote the social aspects of employment at the cost of reducing the isolating nature
of retirement. Alternative production would also give work to subcontracting and
supply industries as well as developing new technical knowledge both at the yards
and with subcontract firms which would encourage new technical firms to locate in
the area to take advantage of the skilled workforce. Lastly, it was argued that the
profit returns for alternative products would probably be better than for conventional
vessels. The report argued that the reasoning behind this approach of promoting
alternative production was that in the long term the yards must reach profitability and
ergo lessen the burden upon the municipality, the region and the state. Four final
points are made regarding reasons to act: firstly, workers on the whole would be free
from the complicated cooperative process between various institutions that the
shipyards were in the midst of; secondly, in regard to the highly distressing labour
market situation within the Gothenburg region that already finds itself with the
highest number of early pensioners in the whole country and almost 10% of the
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labour force currently outside the open market, strong action could halt this trend.
Thirdly, Lansstyrelsen's prognosis for 1976-82 within the Gothenburg region points
to a shipyard contraction that could potentially lose in excess of 6,000 people with
addition losses of 7,000 within the manufacturing sector and lastly, society's costs for
absorbing the growing unemployment clearly exceeds society's budget level for
1979.
Thus by the late 1970s the clear consensus was that the shipyards were not going to
return to profits, the market had collapsed for Swedish built ships and the options
were either to adjust the industry to make something else or close it. The
consequences of closure, either fully or partial, were presented to the industry
department which then briefed the industry minister. This happened on two occasions
as a Liberal minority government came to power in late 1978 interrupting the
previous government's plans for the shipyards. Therefore, when the second 1978
shipbuilding bill was 'debated at the Riksdag that autumn there was a clear sense of
urgency and the optimistic view that the yards could return to profit without a major
restructuring operation was far from dominant. Indeed, the question was effectively
about how much to cut and how soon, as well as if these cuts should follow the
'salami principle', that is, equal cuts across all sites, or if a number of sites should be
selected for immediate closure.
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Chapter 5
The Project
Expert committees and past experience
By 1978 the shipbuilding crisis was in its fourth year and a number of a research
projects and overseeing committees had been created at peak level to offer solutions
to the crisis and to coordinate action. One such committee was called the 'Gothenburg
Delegation', which was organised by Lansstyrelsen and created by a directive from
the Industry Department in May 1977. Its membership consisted of senior civil
servants from the administrative board, trade unionists, and local politicians and was
chaired by the county governor (Landshovding). Its role was to act as overseer and
coordinator of regeneration projects in Gothenburg, to conduct research and to lobby
government for funding for various development projects.
An example of its work was the creation of a special development project set up to
regenerate the now vacant Lindholmen shipyard; the project was called "Project
Lindholmen" (PLAB). The Gothenburg Delegation's work here was to lobby for the
project's creation and to provide evidence during the subsequent Riksdag debate. The
Bill passed and the project was created with initial funds of 60 million Swedish
Crowns. Itwas not managed by the Gothenburg Delegation, but rather it was situated
as a company under the nationalised shipyard umbrella group Svenska Vary. This
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was typical of the work of the Delegation; it would provide expert help in lobbying
for funds, producing research reports and generally trying to keep the regeneration of
Gothenburg on the political agenda regardless of the governing party. As such it was
non-partisan as members were from all major political backgrounds, the work of the
group based on purely local issues that transcended partisan debates. The use of these
groups in Sweden reflects a technocratic approach to problem solving that is often
non-partisan or at least bi-partisan, with the groups working toward their remit and
then reporting back to the peak level",
The creation of Project Lindholmen is important because of its structure and its
influence on the design of the project this thesis focuses upon. It shows how the
boundaries between nationalised industry and municipal development projects could
become blurred. Project Lindholmen was created as a limited company wholly owned
by the state shipbuilding concern, Svenska Vary, yet its activities were designed to
regenerate an area for the benefit of the municipality. Key here was an agreement
between Svenska Vary, the municipality and the state to codify how the area should
be regenerated. The outcome being that this would be a state funded exercise
controlled through the nationalised Svenska Vary with the municipality being the
largest beneficiary. The project took its staff from the personnel department of the
Eriksberg shipyard which had taken over the Lindholmen yard some years previously.
Its remit was to clear the area of the unwanted aspects of a shipyard, to capitalise
upon the existing infrastructure by either encouraging new firms to set-up on the site
4We can see another example of this in the 1991 Rehnberg Agreement (Rehnberg 6verenskommeIse) that
brought together many Swedish actors under the common good of maintaining the Swedish economy
during a particularly precarious time (Kjellberg, 1998).
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or to use the area as a location for internal training of shipyard employees. It set its
sights on transforming the area into a site for research and development activities for
emerging high technology industries, which, it was hoped, might recruit from the
surplus shipbuilding workforce. This approach would benefit all three parties in the
agreement; the municipality would benefit from a former brown-field site being
regenerated and potentially new industries locating there; Svenska Varv would
benefit by collecting rent from the firms hoping to set-up there and the state would
benefit by reducing unemployment figures.
Project Lindholmen, then, had been operating for over one year when the Riksdag
met in late 1978 to debate the latest shipbuilding bill. Concurrently another expert
committee had been preparing a report for the Riksdag debate, this one had been
organised by the Social Democrat opposition's shipbuilding group and the union
shipbuilding reference group comprising of both blue and white collar unions. This
group's remit was to produce a report for the Social Democrats to base their
opposition to the shipbuilding bill on. Essentially this was to offer a 'development'
alternative to what was seen as a proposed 'liquidation' solution being promoted by
the government. The Social Democrats and unions had at their disposal some
extremely well funded research departments which were put to use in writing the
report. Although this was designed to be feed into an opposition motion in the
Riksdag, it was still in a sense non-partisan as only the blue collar unions were
affiliated with the Social Democrats; all other organisations involved were non-
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affiliated trade unions. This was still a technocratic rather than partisan committee
that sought to find a solution to the problem posed.
An important link between the union shipbuilding reference group and the
Gothenburg Delegation was a lawyer employed by the blue collar union Metall's
number 41 division in Gothenburg. Soren Mannheimer was a member of the board of
the Gothenburg Delegation and also working for Metall as well as being a Social
Democrat politician. Mannheimer was not unique in his position as the nature of
Swedish expert committees was such that they were typically staffed by a wide range
of expertise from a variety of backgrounds depending upon the nature of the enquiry.
In producing the report, the shipbuilding reference group had based some of their
arguments upon the experiences of a Swedish state owned steel mill in Dalarna
County in the town of Borlange (Naringslivssekretariat, 30/0111979). There a large
plant was due to contract with the loss of 475 jobs. A plan had been put in place to
regenerate the area with special development funds and the creation of various
committees. Alongside this a special organisation was created to absorb the
transferred workers where they would look for work or receive individualised training
programs over a two-year period. The shipbuilding reference group argued that such a
scheme could be used within the shipbuilding industry to allow it to develop in new
areas whilst shedding surplus labour in a less controversial manner. For the Social
Democrats this would be entirely consistent with their championing of development
through •socially acceptable means' .
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The Riksdag Debate
In September 1978 the industry minister Nils G Asling prepared a government bill
proposing a 30% cut in employment across all the shipyards under the Svenska Vary
umbrella and the closure of two yards including Gotaverken Arendal in Gothenburg.
He was unable to carry out his bill as the three party coalition government he was part
of resigned over the issue of the future of nuclear power in Sweden. A Liberal
minority government took over power and a new industry minister, Erik Huss,
prepared a new shipbuilding bill that was presented to the Riksdag in early November
1978. Being a minority government, the Liberals depended upon the support of other
parties to enable their bills to pass and this was no different with their 1978
shipbuilding bill. The major differences between this new bill and the earlier Asling
bill were that the 30% cut in capacity would now be reduced to a 20% cut within two
years and that this would be across all large shipyards and no yards were now singled
out for closure (Riksdag, 1978/1979:49, pp.8-10).
In late November 1978 the Social Democrat opposition presented their alternative to
the proposition in the form of a motion. They considered the Huss proposition to be
better than Asling's earlier version but they were still critical of the capacity cuts:
"The government's proposition contains some improvements in conditions over those
presented by the three-party government in their press release in June 1978. There is
however cause for grave criticism even toward the present proposal. It is obvious that
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the proposals - if carried through - will lead to unplanned and ill-conceived
dismissals" (Riksdag, 1978/1979: 141, p. 2).
Furthermore, the proposition was criticised for being essentially short-term in its
scope and this was considered a mistake. For the Social Democrats, a solution had to
be long-term and planned in such a way that the potential of both the yards and the
employees was factored into the solution. It was also argued that any solution needed
the input of the workers themselves and that unemployment was totally unacceptable:
"An adjustment process which results in extensive unemployment cannot be accepted
from a socioeconomic, social or humane viewpoint
[...]
It goes without saying that the planned action and design must occur in close
consultation with employees and their union organisations" (ibid).
The Social Democrats then set out their alternative; they argued that their approach
would allow the industry to 'hibernate' to some degree until a better global market for
shipping emerged. This implied that no yard would close and that capacity reduction
would essentially be a 'mothballing' exercise until a better understanding of the long-
term market conditions could be ascertained. In the short-term the yards should adapt
their output toward alternative products such as wind turbines, offshore platforms and
specialist vessels. Personnel reductions at the yards should also follow 'socially
acceptable forms', that is to say, it is "unacceptable that the government has not even
taken so much responsibility for those that are employed at the shipyards so that
large-scale dismissals can be avoided" (ibid, p.3). Essentially, then, the Social
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Democrats saw the yards and their personnel as a valuable resource and that the
shipbuilding crisis should be solved through development not liquidation.
In regards to the reduction of the workforce, the Social Democrats proposed that the
surplus labour be gradually minimised over a longer period and that an employment
guarantee lasting until the end of 1980 would meet these aims. During this period of
'respite' various government employment projects must be started. The employment
guarantee would take the form of transferring the workers to a special company:
According to our opinion a special organisation, separate from current production
should be built at the shipyards. This organisation should absorb the personnel that
become redundant through the capacity reduction and rationalisation process. The
personnel concerned retain, therefore, their employment in the enterprise. For those
personnel placed in the organisation, they will benefit from special measures. The
circumstances for the employees within the organisation that stands outside the
ordinary production should, nevertheless, not prevent Svenska Varv AB from utilising ~
parts of this labour force for special tasks. It can then, by way of example, apply to
short capacity or special projects. This utilization for example does not imply that the
employees must interrupt a started training period or refuse an invite for employment
outside the shipbuilding industry (ibid, pA).
This notion of a special company to 'pool' surplus labour was already taking place in
Borlange, the Social Democrats argued, and there it was seen as a great success. The
principle should, therefore, be extended to the shipbuilding areas.
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Opposition to an employment guarantee centred around three arguments; that it was
unnecessary as the shipbuilding areas had 'better' labour prospects compared to other
depressed areas, especially in Northern Sweden where unemployment was high, and
that was where resources should be focused. It was also unjust as it gave shipyard
employees better resources than other unemployed individuals, even other workers
that had been made redundant from the yards some months before or those that would
be made redundant after the guarantee. Lastly it was inappropriate as it prolonged the
adjustment process which all parties agreed must happen: why delay the inevitable?
Another critique was that an employment guarantee amounted to little more than hot
air. In an exchange in the Riksdag, a politician from the Moderate Party picked apart
the Social Democrat motion and argued that each measure proposed was already a
feature of Sweden's active labour market policy and as such "it is therefore the
normal labour market policy rules that will apply for the shipyard employees" (quoted
in Gartvall, 1980, p.123-4). This critique was dismissed by the Social Democrats as
being valid only in principle, thus implying that in practice the labour market rules
didn't always follow the letter of the law.
The Social Democrats were the largest single party in the Riksdag, but not large
enough to pass their motion alone (if they had have been, they would have been the
ruling party). For the Liberals, they needed the support of other parties as they were
in a clear minority. The Social Democrats, then, lobbied some Liberal politicians and
managed to persuade a number of them to support the motion, thus the Liberal
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proposition passed on the 19thDecember 1978 with the modifications proposed by the
Social Democrat motion.
The design and funding of the project
On the 25th January, 1979, the Industry Department wrote to the board of Svenska
Varv outlining the decisions made during the debates and charged them with both
creating a special organisation to be called 'Projekt 80 AB' (P80), to work with the
unions regarding reductions in personnel and the employment agencies regarding
employment opportunities:
Within the framework of the employment guarantee and in cooperation with the
employment agency, to facilitate the transition to new and permanent work for the
personnel that is transferred to P80. The personnel will be individually prepared for
either work or pensioning. The preparations for new employment are to be put in place
through both internal and external training, both theoretical and practical. Pending the
opportunity for new employment, the company shall occupy the employees with
training and lor work. (projekt 80, 1979a)
Capacity reduction must happen in such a way that the yards, when the adjustment
process is accomplished, have a personnel structure that renders an effective enterprise
within all the divisions. So as to reach this requirement the shipyards and the unions
will agree on such forms of personnel reduction that the new situation demands.
(Quoted in SjOlin, 1991, p.87).
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For the Industry Department, then, capacity reduction will only take place within the
scope of joint consultation between the shipyard management and the unions. This
put the unions in the difficult position of wanting to influence the capacity reduction
but not wanting to be blamed by their membership for any 'unjust' decisions. The
aims of both unions and management were two-fold; to reduce capacity by 20% and
to render the shipyards as effective as possible. The novel aspect here was that the
workforce will be transferred to an internal project; that is, the workers were not
officially made redundant from the firm, rather they were transferred 'sideways' to a
new department.
The Industry Department also stipulated that P80 would only be created in
Gothenburg. The reasoning behind this was that in the other large shipbuilding areas a
20% capacity reduction could take place over the two year period through 'natural
wastage'. Only in Gothenburg was the workforce comprised of enough younger
workers to make natural wastage an unfeasible solution.
In January a number of fact-finding visits organised by Gothenburg municipality took
place. The team was comprised of senior union officials, county level civil servants,
management from the shipyards and local politicians. One such visit was to West
Germany to observe efforts to stimulate the depressed Ruhr district, and another visit
was to Borlange to study the employment guarantee that had been used in the
contraction of Swedish Steel AB (SSAB) and influenced the Social Democrat's
motion in the Riksdag. There, the general principles of the guarantee were laid out:
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The necessary personnel reduction shall take place without lay-offs or terminations
The redundant personnel shall be transferred to a special organisation and will be given work or
training through individual programs
Transferral to the 'personnel pool' is to be offered to all employees
The personnel surplus shall be resolved in a two-year period
A recruiting freeze will be in place within SSAB
Unoccupied positions shall be filled through internal advertising
The costs for the redundant personnel will be covered by the executive board
(Naringslivssekretariatet, 30/01/79)
Another key influencing factor was the experience of Project Lindholmen (PLAB)
discussed earlier in this chapter. The idea of extending the principles of PLAB into a
general model for future industrial management techniques had been discussed
internally for some time and, with the advent of this project, the ground appeared
fertile for the seeds of PLAB to take root. Here, then, was an opportunity to apply
those principles: collaborative research, training and production within the two year
employment guarantee (Molinder, 22/05/79).
The architect behind much of PLAB was the former personnel director of the
Eriksberg shipyard, Leif Molinder', and the board of directors at Svenska Varv chose
him to put the flesh onto the bones of the employment guarantee. Molinder's first task
was to locate the project within PLAB as he saw the two as complementary. He set
out what he saw as an 'acute' situation within Swedish shipbuilding with
5 Molinder had worked as personnel director for Gotaverken (1963-1967), production director for the
Lindholmen Yard (1967 - 1970), personnel director for Eriksberg (1970 - 1978) including Project
Lindholmen and then P80 (Molinder, 1989, p.7). He later gained a reputation for closing down yards
effectively, after P80 was wound up he successfully closed down the Landskrona yard with only 1% of the
workforce experiencing long-term difficulties and later oversaw the closure of the Uddevalla yard and
Kockums in Malmo (Lawrence & Spybey, 1986, p.38).
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redundancies already a reality and 'time therefore running out to develop new ideas'
and create new work opportunities for the redundant personnel. The 'traditional
methods' of dealing with supernumerary workers, namely, vacancies within the same
sector, new jobs within the labour market and pensioning were to be supplemented by
a new method: to use a special project to create jobs (ibid). The creation of jobs was
certainly nothing new in Sweden (Sease, 1977), but what was seen as novel here was
to use a firm to create jobs not only outside of its own business, but also outside of its
own sector. Molinder saw three advantages to situating the project within the scope of
PLAB: from the individual's perspective, a high degree of personal contribution
would be necessary to remedy their situation: from the project's perspective, to not be
charged with using 'harsh measures'; and from Svenska Varv's perspective, to not be
accused of off-loading certain responsibilities. The disadvantages were two-fold: the
present situation rendered an extremely difficult environment to operate in, and that a
redundancy notice would, for a certain section of workers, be very hard to carry.
Lastly, Molinder argued that PLAB had a duty to help solve what was a difficult
situation; Project Lindholmen had been created to develop redundant shipyard land,
should it not extend this principle to the redundant workforce and develop them also?
Thus P80's mould was cast through the experience of SSAB in Borlange and the
principles and resources of PLAB in Gothenburg. During the first five months of
1979 the PSO's structure was worked out, invitations were sent out to various
institutions requesting their collaborative help and asking for nominations to an
advisory committee. Funding for P80 came from the budget set out in the
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shipbuilding bill; it channelled funds into Svenska Varv from the Industry
Department. The funds were then allocated to each yard within the group and from
there into individual projects. In the case of P80, the funds came via PLAB. Further
funds were allocated to Gothenburg to be used in conjunction with the contraction
process. This included 265 million Crowns for 'employment measures', 200 million
Crowns for development of alternative production at the yards, 125 million for
producing vessels for developing countries and 2.2 million Crowns to develop surplus
shipyard land.
The clients: selection criteria and reasoning
Whilst the design ofP80 was being drawn up, the management ofSvenska Vary were
working with the unions to achieve the 20% reduction in personnel. The main
influencing factor here was the demand set out in the letter from the Industry
Department that the reduction "renders an effective enterprise within all the
divisions" (quoted in Sjolin, 1991, p. 87). Under Swedish labour law a firm which
proposes to layoff members of its workforce must do so by respecting seniority by
following the last-in first-out principle. The ranking of employees by seniority had to
follow a law that gave the over 45s 'extra seniority' by adding one notional month to
their service history for every actual month of service they had worked after their 45th
birthday. In other words, after 45, every month worked counted for two months of
service. This was designed to protect older workers who, it was argued, were less
desirable to employers and found it difficult to compete on the labour market.
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Another vulnerable group was those with the loosely defined 'limited employment
opportunities', workers categorised in this group were to be given special priority if
threatened with redundancy. Therefore, Swedish labour law had distorted the last-in
first-out principle by skewing it in favour of older workers and those with limited
opportunities. As mentioned in chapter three, these measures were manifestations of
a shift in Swedish policy during the early 1970s toward a more defensive nature that
valued security over mobility.
These laws which promoted security clashed with the Industry Department's demands
for an effective enterprise as the least effective workers were considered to be older
workers and those with little chance of finding other work, the very workers the law
protected. Furthermore, the nature of shipbuilding in Gothenburg had placed a
premium on certain trades (welding and plating) and these workers were in great
demand to the extent that they would often change firms to secure a better pay
package or working environment. As a consequence, the most sought after workers
were those with the shortest service history and therefore the first to be made
redundant. The law, then, was working against the demand for an effective enterprise.
To follow the last-in first-out principle would have removed so many platers and
welders from the workforce that the shipyards would not have been able to function"
Thus it was necessary to deviate from the labour law and this was achieved through
exploiting how P80 was situated within Svenska Varv. Whereas the law stated that
6 Interview with former Social Democrat politician (10112108)
137
the last-in first-out principle will be used in instances of redundancy, the contraction
process at the yards transferred the workers to P80. There were no redundancies; the
workers were moved sideways, they were transferred into another firm under the
Svenska Varv umbrella. This transferral was reinforced by the fact that no worker lost
their employment service history, they retained their union membership and their pay
levels remained intact. By sidestepping the last-in first-out law, the reduction of the
workforce was able to meet the demands of rendering an effective enterprise: the
transferral was to be selective.
This put the unions in the difficult position of working with management (as the
Industry Department demanded) whilst supporting their membership; the former was
preparing a selective list of workers to be transferred, the latter was extremely hostile
to selection. Strath (1987) claims that protests and a rift between union leaders and
members broke out after the agreement between the shipyard manag~ment and the
unions became public. Indeed, one Gothenburg newspaper ran the headline "Union
Boss: Choose Who You Want" (Sjolin, 1991, p.89) and another newspaper
interviewed some shipyard workers:
"We're thinking of refusing to transfer to Projekt 80 and are prepared to go to the
Labour Court"
"There are many of us who are thinking to refuse to transfer to Projekt 80. The
principle of 'last in first out' has been abandoned"
"This is like getting the sack. That's not what it's being called - but that is what it is.
I've heard that workers over 55 that are placed in Projekt 80 will try a little extra to get
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early retirement. It is not so easy to find a new job when you're this old" (Goteborgs
Posten, 29/06179: 11).
Strath (1987, p.105) claims that the protests which threatened to open a cleavage
between the union leadership and the members were effectively quashed once the
selection process individualised the threat. Furthermore, as the notification took
place immediately before the summer holiday break, the transferred workers had
two weeks to consider their situation before returning to work, this further
individualised the circumstances as it took place during a period away from the
workplace.
It is important to note that the transferral to P80 was completely voluntary, that is to
say, workers were invited to transfer to P80 and the possibility to say 'no thanks'
was really there. The white-collar union SIF published a bulletin explaining P80 to
their members under the heading "Yes, thanks, or No, thanks to P80" (SIF,
20/08/79):
First and foremost: you can choose. You have a real possibility to say no thanks to
the invite you receive to work in P80. Because it is an invite - not an order!
Whether it is good or not good for you to say yes; is for you to judge for yourself.
[...]
If you become selected and invited to work in Projekt 80 and judge that with the
help from the company's resources can find sufficiently good work before 31"
December 1980, you ought to say yes. If you say yes and find no job before 31"
December 1980 then in all likelihood you will become unemployed after that date
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[...]
If you judge that you can find a job by yourself or with help from
Arbetsformedlingen's 'ordinary' service within the same time period or if you
believe that you could find a new job but need a little more time than until the end
of 1980, then you ought to say no thanks.
There was no mechanism to compel people to transfer to P80; however, the
overwhelming majority of those invited did transfer. Many of those transferred
thought that it was compulsorily even though management and the unions took
special measures to clarify the voluntary nature of the process as the above example
shows. In total just 26 people turned down the invite to transfer to P80, 16 blue collar
workers and 10white collar workers (P80, 1980c, p.ll).
The criteria for selection aimed to remove the least efficient members of the
workforce. The three main factors for being selected for transferral to P80 were old
age, short employment service and high absenteeism (Posner, 1982). The reasoning
behind this was that in was considered uneconomical to retrain older workers as they
would soon retire. Furthermore, some of the more physical shipbuilding tasks were
deemed unsuitable for older members of the workforce. Those with a short
employment service that were selected were typically young and lacked the necessary
experience to work at maximum efficiency. Lastly those with high absenteeism were
either the long-term sick, those suffering from depression or they were alcoholics.
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The composition of the clients
The shipyard bill had demanded a cut of 20% from the 1977 employment levels at the
yards which initially translated to 2,333 people but by the time the first invitations
were sent out in the summer of 1,979 this figure had been reduced by natural wastage
and resignations to 1,568 invitations, later adjustments increased that figure so that by
the time P80 had finished the total number of workers transferred was 1,814 made up
of 1,331 blue collar workers and 483 white collar (P80, 1982, p.4) (see Tables BI-B4,
Appendix B, for a detailed breakdown of the composition).
P80 was made up of a disproportionate number of relatively old and young workers,
in the case of blue collar workers the distribution was skewed toward the young and
especially those aged 21 and younger; for white collar workers it was the elderly that
accounted for the majority with the largest age group being the 59 year olds. The
mean average age for blue collar workers was 39.5 and the average duration of
service was 11 years. For white collar workers, the average age was 53.4 and duration
of service was 23.9 years.
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Plate Sa: a twelve page information booklet was given to all the workers invited to transfer to Projekt
80. It contained contact telephone numbers, a brief history of the project including which organisations
were involved and its aims.
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The skill composition of the transferred workers differed from the composition found
at the yards as a whole; those jobs over represented in Projekt 80 compared to the
yards included cleaners, transport and dock workers, stores and construction workers,
whereas those jobs under represented were welders, sheet metal workers, plumbers
and fitters. Amongst white collar workers production leaders and technicians were
over represented and no job was especially under represented. Looking solely at the
composition within Projekt 80, for blue collar workers, welders and sheet metal
workers made up the largest skill sector in terms of absolute numbers even though
they were the smallest skill sector in terms of proportion transferred. For white collar
workers, both planners and production technicians, and foreman and instructors made
up the largest groups within Projekt 80.
Table 5.1: Skill group and average age of white collar workers transferred to P80
Largest
Mean
White Collar Skill Group Number Age
Age
Group
Production
137 58 53.3
TechnicianIPlanner
Draughtsman/Designer 58 59 56.3
Clerk/Secretary 81 58 51
ForemanlInstructor 137 59 53.6
PersonneVFinance/Security 22 55 I 61 53.6
Source: adapted from P80, 1980c, Tables B7 & BlO, Appendix B.
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Table 5.2: Skill group and average age of blue collar workers transferred to P80
Largest
Mean
Blue Collar Skill Group Number Age
Age
Group
Welder/Sheet Metal Worker 521 21 34.5
MachinistIFitterlMaintenance 194 62.5 46.0
PlumberlElectrician 163 21 39.5
AssemblerlPainter/Carpenter 63 60 49.5
Transportation/Crane
187 58 51.1
()perator/Stores
CleanerlFireman/Other 137 64 50.3
Source: adapted from P80, 1980c, Tables B7 & BIO, Appendix B.
Both groups had significantly large clusters of people born before 1922, 22.4% for
blue collar workers and 46.8% for white collar. People in this age group had the right
to the so-called '58.3 pension'; here, under normal circumstances where the last-in
first-out rule applies, those aged 58 and three months and older could volunteer to
quit their jobs and receive 90% of their wages for a period of 450 work days (1 year,
nine months) paid by unemployment benefits, then upon reaching 60 they could apply
for early retirement. Furthermore, the 90% wage was the minimum right and often
firms would contribute extra which could potentially bring a person's wage up to the
100% level (Stahlberg, 2004, p.59), thus implying that there was no financial loss
involved in applying for the scheme. P80 differed slightly from this as the last-in,
first-out rules did not apply and thus initially there was no scheme comparable to the
58.3 pension. Later pressure from the unions compelled the project to include a
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special 'elderly guarantee' that was created for those aged 55 and over. This, then,
lowered the applicable age for the 58.3 pension by 3 years and 3 months, and in doing
so sheltered those workers within P80, rather than within the unemployment benefit
system. Once the workers reached 58 and 3 months they could transfer to the 58.3
pension: those who were very close to transferral age by the time P80 was due to
finish (one or two months maximum) were either kept in the scheme beyond its finish
date or, if the opportunity arose, transferred back to their old jobs.
The inclusion of an 'older guarantee' points to an acknowledgement (albeit belated)
that older workers had difficulty in securing work on the open market and that this
should be accounted for in the design of P80. What P80 did was to occupy these
workers until it was time for them to retire. As such it promoted the positive aspects
of work such as socialisation, keeping active and having a wage over the negative
aspects of unemployment like isolation, depression and a lower income. Within P80
older workers would be kept busy until they could retire.
In comparison to this, another group for whom securing work on the open market was
problematic were those categorised as 'vulnerable'. These were people with physical
and mental disabilities as well as those suffering from depression or alcoholism. A
variety of measures existed in Sweden to help people in this group including sheltered
and semi-sheltered work and a special intensive type scheme called 'daddy care' in
which people that needed constant supervision were given activities in a very secure
environment where the ratio of worker to carer was approaching I: 1. Yet P80 did not
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foresee the demand for these services and did not design a special scheme for them,
nor did the unions pressure the project for any special measures.
Amongst the transferred workers, 110 were categorised as having 'socio-medical'
problems. These were people for whom an illness or disability was judged to have
been a consequence of social factors. In practice this group consisted of people
suffering from severe depression or alcoholism or sometimes both and were therefore
categorised as part of the 'vulnerable' group.
A major factor influencing the different treatment of older workers and the vulnerable
was the role of the unions in pushing for special treatment for older workers which, in
turn, was a consequence of older union members pushing their representatives to
further their cause. This sequence was missing in the case of vulnerable workers on
account of the very nature of their vulnerability. That is, their special needs situated
them outside of the system inasmuch as they needed special workshops to
accommodate them or they spent periods of time in hospitals or clinics and because of
this they did not have the same access to the union representatives as other workers.
They became almost invisible in the eyes of the union as they were detached from the
workplace.
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Chapter 6
The Functioning of the Project
The authorities: their expertise and role within the project
Svenska Varv
The state-owned Svenska Varv (Swedish Shipyards) was created on 1st July 1977
after the Bourgeois coalition government nationalised the majority of the large
Swedish shipyards in September 1976. It was an umbrella group that after 1979
contained all the large shipyards in Sweden: Kockums, Gotaverken, Uddevallavarvet,
Oresundsvarvet and Finnboda. After the Riksdag debate regarding the two. year
employment guarantee, Svenska Vary was charged with creating the special
organization, Projekt 80 (Industridepartmentet, 11/01/79) the funding of which came
from the state via Svenska Vary.
The day-to-day running of Projekt 80 was overseen by its own board of directors and
Svenska Vary'S input here was through the Vice-President Bengt Tengroth although
in practice it was LeifMolinder who reported to Tengroth. Essentially, Svenska Vary
was concerned with fulfilling the decisions made at the Riksdag: a 20% reduction in
personnel and a two-year employment guarantee for the 'redundant'. P80 was
required to produce progress reports which Svenska Varv then added to their reports
given to the Industry Department.
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Kommun
Gothenburg's Kommun (council) was organised around the central city council which
in Gothenburg was its own municipality. 90% of the seats within the council are
permanent constituency seats with the other 10% being adjustment seats. The
members of the council were elected through central party lists with the people voting
for the party rather than the individual although it was possible to cross individual
names off the list if the voter didn't want to vote for one particular person. The party
lists were arranged in such a way that a cut off point reflecting the number of votes
the party received would indicate who was elected with those above the line receiving
seats. The structure of the Kommun was split into committees and companies, the
former included departments such as public works and transport, and the latter
included energy, public transport, social housing and so on.
Within P80 the Kommun was directly involved through having a seat on the advisory
board and also indirectly through the seat occupied by Naringslivssekretariat (more
on this organization, below) which reported to the Kommun. Throughout the crisis
period the Kommun had naturally taken a keen interest in the shipyards; once an area
of strong growth (and revenue), the collapse could have lasting effects upon the city.
The Kommun worked closely with not only the contraction process of the yards but
also the development of the vacant yards and the personnel - it was involved in the
fact-fmding trips to other depressed areas, helped to set up collaborative work with
industry and started development projects to inject new life into the yard areas.
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Komvux
Komvux 7 tKommunal vuxenutbildning) is an adult education service delivered at the
Kommun level and during the timeframe of this study was centralised at the state
level. The institution was created out of political debates during the 1950s and '60s
regarding adult education. the education minister at the time. Olof Palme, had raised
the question some years earlier when he was a member of the board of directors for
ABF (Arbetarnas bildningsfdrbund: Workers' Education Association). Palme set the
terms of debate around the issue of adults' rights to access the same quality of
education that children received; he further argued that society as a whole would
benefit from a well educated population. In bringing the debate forward he also set
the boundary between what fell into the scope of ABF and what a new adult
education service would have in its domain. When the distinction was drawn,
Komvux became an adult education institution modelled upon the school system for
children with state recognised qualifications, courses bound by timetables and free at
the point of delivery.
Regulation of Komvux came from the state school authority (Skolverket) that was
responsible for standards and in part for funding. Finances for Komvux came through
two routes, both of which originated at the state level: firstly, the state gave an annual
allowance to Komvux for yearly expenses such as wages and maintenance which
could be spent as was seen fit. Secondly, the state funded Komvux via Skolverket;
7 This section is based upon Johansson & Salin (2006) and discussions with a former director of adult education in Vllstra Getalands
Un.
149
this money was to be used for special destinations and as such was subject to
spending controls and reviews.
Within the context of Projekt 80, financing for Komvux came via Skolverket, not
Svenska Varv, This, then, implied a budget that was conditional upon standards being
set by Skolverket rather than Svenska Vary. In other words, Komvux's work within
Projekt 80 was bound by educational standards rather than the more short-term
desires of Svenska Varv who were keen to remove 20% of their personnel from their
books. This translated to a policy of promoting academic achievement measured
through examinations. In terms of P80, Komvux allowed workers to study and
achieve qualifications that would help them to better compete on the job market.
Arbetsf6rmedlingen 8
The labour market authorities plaid a major role in P80. The institutions were
centralised within the Department of Industry and Labour with peak level authority
belonging to AMS (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen: the Labour Market Board) whose
director generals had, since 1948, been SAP politicians. At the county level were the
county labour boards, LAN (Liinsarbetsniimnden), within which were located the
local AF (ArbetsjOrmedlingen: Employment agency) offices. Within each AF was an
AMU (Arbetsmarknad utbildning: Labour market training board). Thus the
8 This section based upon discussions with a former lecturer working at AMU.
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hierarchical structure of the labour market authorities from peak level down was:
AMS-LAN-AF-AMU.
The funding for the labour market authorities came from the state via AMS. The
structure here was similar to that of Komvux in that two 'pots' existed, one for day-
to-day expenditures, or planned expenditures, such as building maintenance and staff
wages. The other 'pot' was for special projects and this would be filled as the need
arose. The day-to-day 'pot' could be used for whatever AF deemed was necessary,
but the special project 'pot' came with spending constraints from AMS. Here the
special projects were planned at peak level (with input from below) and spending was
also allocated at this level. Funding in this 'pot' was subject to spending reviews and
regular progress reports.
During the period in focus AF and AMU had an extremely broad range of options
open to them in regards to dealing with workers. Generally speaking, the two main
options were education or work. The first port of call was a personal interview with
an AF representative where the individual's options were explored. This was the
stage where individual desires and labour market realities met, and a way forward
was worked out. Sometimes this could be as simple as matching an individual's
capabilities and desires to a vacant position but if an individual's skill had become
obsolete, typically education in one form or another would be the preferred option.
The AF representative would explore new career paths with the individual and then
match the skills needed for a given job with a training course.
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A certain amount of forward planning was necessary here so that AF did not prepare
people for jobs that did not exist or for jobs in contracting sectors. This was achieved
in a number of ways, largely through close contact with other state departments but
also through the employers' federation SAF to the extent that their research would pin
point growth areas from which AF could be advised of a future need for trained
personnel in that sector.
Once an individual's future career path had been laid out, they would register for
preparation courses (preparand utbildning) that would bring them up to speed in
areas such as Swedish, mathematics and possibly a second language. Once they were
deemed to have reached the required level they would transfer to their designated
skill training. The preparation courses here were individualised to the extent that no
formal examinations took place, rather a meeting of AMU officials would decide on
an individual basis when a person's abilities were such that they could move forward.
AMU specialised in vocational education (yrkesutbildning) in a very broad sense, it
offered courses for every skill sector from welding or forestry to administrative work
or computer programming. More theoretical courses were offered by Kornvux and AF
would also register individuals there. Indeed, during the period in question, AMU
suffered from some negative connotations in comparison to Komvux - the latter was
seen as a more 'refined' option and the former as a 'lower' type of education.
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Within P80, the labour market authorities had two representatives on P80's advisory
board, one from LAN and one from AF. For the transferred workers, their encounters
with the labour market authorities were limited to AF and AMU and followed the
pattern outlined above. This was especially true for blue collar workers; for white
workers this pattern differed inasmuch as Trygghetsradet (more on this organization,
below) was also involved and the two institutions had a close working relationship
within P80. AF had officials working full time within P80 who would conduct the
initial meetings with the workers and explore further options, there was also one
specialist 'career path leader' who worked one day per week within P80.
AF operated in a difficult environment in regards to job searches and made full use of
measures such as relief work (beredskapsarbete) and probationary employment
(provningsarbetei, the latter usually leading to full time employment after the
probationary period was over. On account of the reduced employment opportunities,
AF personnel often had to guide individuals toward a job in a growth area even if this
was not their initial desire. This would occur at the initial meeting stage and would
often take the form of exploring related professions. Compulsion here was via benefit
reductions and stoppages. Simply put, unemployment benefit was limited in time and
during this period it was assumed a person would move either into a new job or into
one or another program arranged by AF. Where this failed was often when the person
concerned was diagnosed with some form of 'sickness', for example depression or
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alcoholism, in these cases they would be transferred from AF's books and re-
categorised as 'sick' and would then be eligible for sickness benefits (sjukpenning).
The blue collar metal workers' union (Svenska Metallindustriarbetareforbundet:
Metall) is a highly centralised organisation and a powerful player within the blue
collar union federation, LO. Metall is typical of Swedish unions in that it organises
around a sector rather than a skill, for this reason all the blue collar workers at the
yards were represented by Metall. The' union was structured around geographical
divisions (avdelning), the largest of which, number 41 (AVD41), was founded in 1896
and represented the Gothenburg area. Within the division were smaller groups
organised at the employer level that were known as 'factory clubs' (verkstadsklubb).
The contraction of shipyards in Gothenburg into the state owned Svenska Varv meant
that just one factory club represented all the blue collar workers, the club was
Gotaverkens Verkstadsklubb which was founded in 1901. The membership of
division 41 peaked in the mid 1970s at just fewer than 45,000 members and the
membership for the verkstadsklubb peaked at the same time period at around 6,500
members.
Metall's activities were often intertwined with those of the Social Democrats (SAP)
and this made the union extremely well connected. An example of this can be seen
9 This section is based upon Metall (1996). SjOlin (1991). discussions with a fonner official of Gotaverken '5 Verkstadsklubb, 8 former
Mctall and SAP politician. and an academic at Goteborgs Universitet.
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from the collapse of the Eriksberg Yard where the local factory club was better
informed of the economic realities than higher management (Strath, 1987, p.94).
Metall had representatives on every board of inquiry concerning the shipyards,
division 41 appointed representatives to the Riksdag and in 1973 became the first
division within Metall to appoint a full time lawyer who also sat as a SAP member for
Gothenburg city council and was chairman of the Gothenburg Economic Policy
Delegation .:
The union worked in close collaboration with Svenska Varv in designing P80 but
publicly kept the relationship at arm's length to dissociate themselves from
contentious issues such as the abandoning of the last in first out principle (ibid,
p.l 05). At the factory club level, a representative sat on P80's advisory board and the
club also organised four research projects that informed both activities at the yard and
also contributed to union debates about the best action to take regarding the shipyard
crisis. Of importance to the discussion here are the project researching alternative
shipyard production and the implications for workforce levels, a project to engage
with members of the white collar PTK union confederation with a view for future
collaboration and a group researching the experiences of union members who were
involved in the merger of Eriksberg's and Gotaverken's Motor divisions. These
research projects formed part of the briefing that Metall took to the debates within
P80's advisory board.
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SIF/SALF10
The two white collar Unions involved In P80 were SIF (Svenska
Industritjanstemannaforbundet: Swedish Industrial Staff Workers Union) and SALF
(Sveriges Arbetsledareforbund: Sweden's Supervisors' Union). SIF was organised
under the white collar union confederation TCO (TJiinstemiinnens
Centralorganisation: The Swedish Confederation for Professional Employees) and
SALF under the PTK (Privattjiinstemannakartellen: The Private Sector Staff Cartel).
In 1976 SIF had 1900 members at the Gotaverken yard and SALF had 550 members.
Within the shipyards each white collar union had its own club that was similar to the
blue collar verkstadsklubb, within these clubs there were also sections for each
Gotaverken company. On issues that concerned the whole Gotaverken concern (and
later Svenska Varv), SIF and SALF organised together around the PTK cartel which
had 2,500 members in 1976 which also included SO members of the civil engineers'
union CF (Ctviltngenjorsforbundet).
Both SIF and SALF had been involved in the union reference group that had
informed the SAP before the Riksdag debates that created P80. The white and blue
collar unions had a history of collaborating at the verkstadsklubb level on important
issues and P80 was no exception to this. One clear example of this collaboration came
with the combined lobbying of P80 management to introduce an 'older guarantee'
within P80 to offer increased security to those aged 55 and over.
10 This section based upon Gartvall (1980), Nilsson (2008) and discussions with a former Metall and SAP politician.
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The white collar workers transferred to P80 organised a 'union reference group'. This
was unofficial inasmuch as it was not recognised by P80's board, indeed there was
some confusion about the union's role in this regard at some board meetings. The
reference group acted rather like a 'shadow' organisation with the union organising
work groups based upon the individual skills present, for example transferred workers
from the personnel department would monitor relations between workers and
management; designers would monitor plans for new projects and so on. This group
met regularly throughout the period P80 ran and, at least in theory, would offer
alternative perspectives to decisions made at the management level within P80.
Trvgghetsradet11
Trygghetsradet's (TRS) ongms lie in an agreement from 1972 between
Arbetsgivareforeningen SFO (Statsforetagens forhandlingsorganisation: The Public
Sector Employers' Bargaining Organisation) and PTK (Prtvattjanstemannakartellen:
The Private Sector Staff Cartel) which was later expanded into an agreement between
PTK and SAF (Svenska Arbetsgivareforeningen: the Swedish Employers'
Association). The labour market unrest of the late 1960s (see chapter three) formed
the kernel that created SFO as an intermediary corporatist institution between
employers and labour in 1970. Two years later, in 1972, SFO and PTK reached
agreement on a 'security package' as part of a central wage bargaining settlement and
this agreement was, in 1973, expanded to include SAF through bargaining on the side
II This section is based upon Trygghetsradet (2004), Forsberg (1996), SFO (1990) and Skeppsbyggaren
(1979-80),
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of PTK. The outcome of this was TrygghetsrAdet which positioned itself as an
organisation which operated within both the labour market and the social insurance
system for white collar union members.
The organisation offered a range of services including a 'clearing service' which was
open to all members irrespective of age and employment time. The idea here was to
complement the work of AMS by offering an individual approach and handling that
was claimed to be 'unbound' from the regulations that constrained AMS, thus a more
combined form of support was possible for job seeking white collar workers. This
service included funds for educational development, help with starting one's own
firm, 'acclimatisation' grants, wages during trainee work placement and
supplementary wages.
Another service offered was AGE (avglmgsersattningarna: severance payments),
which was open to all who were over the age of 40 and had at least five years service
at their place of work. The amount of funds a person was entitled to was calculated by
taking into account a number of variables including age, length of service, education
level, the conditions of the local labour market, family circumstances, disabilities and
wage level before being laid off. These funds were designed to be complementary to
the 'A-Kassa' unemployment benefits. For workers over 55 that had at least ten years
service, a special variant of AGE was created called Stodet till de dldre
tjdnstemdnnen (support for older employees) that was especially designed for those
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workers whose firm had gone bankrupt. Here the support was designed to assist in the
limited number of years until the person was eligible for a pension.
Toward the end of the 1970s a new service was created that attempted to prevent
layoffs iUppsagningsforebyggande verksamhet), this shifted the scope of
Trygghetsradet's work from what was essentially a reactive one, into a more
proactive service. The idea here was that when a firm notified the labour market
authorities that it was in economic trouble (as the law stated it should notify the
relevant bodies), Trygghetsradet would then commence with individually designed
measures for the affected workers, and this could include education, training as well
as the clearing service that was normally offered. The difference here is that this
would take place whilst the individual was still employed by the firm, thus if the
measures were a success, the individual would not become unemployed, but would
rather spend their final period at their old firm undergoing training and searching for
new work. The project was carried out in collaboration with the local labour market
authorities and representatives of the PTK union and had a state grant of 75% of
costs.
Within the scope of P80, the layoff prevention scheme was unnecessary as many of
the features of that service were present within the organisation. Thus
Trygghetsradet's work within P80 was focused upon its clearing service and AGE.
The organisation had had a presence at the yards since 1977, initially only one day
per week, but by the time of P80's creation in 1979, that was increased to a
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permanent presence. It worked in close cooperation with the personnel department at
P80, PTK and the labour market authorities. One of the major issues was that white
collar workers within P80 had typically earned fairly high wages within the
shipbuilding industry and finding work at a similar earning level was difficult.
Trygghetsradet assisted here through the clearing system by not only searching for
suitable work, but also offering grants and supplementary wages to individuals who
took jobs at lower wage levels or to those carrying out work experience or further
training.
Funding for Trygghetsradet came via a special fund that SFO paid into at a level set at
0.5% of the PTK union's average wage level for each member. In other words, for
every 100 Kronor earned, 50 ore would be paid into the fund, these resources were
then at the disposal of Trygghetsradet,
Naringslivssekretariat
Naringslivssekretariat was an organisation founded in 1977 and was part of
Gothenburg Kommun's group of industry and commerce companies. It promoted the
interests of businesses within the Gothenburg area and sought to advance the
economic well-being of Gothenburg. It produced reports on the current business
environment, advised bodies at all levels and offered services to firms considering
investing in the area. Working alongside authorities at the county level it helped to
organise research and development as well as pinpointing areas for stimulation grants
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and other development projects. Within P80 it advised the organisation via a seat on
the advisory board.
Collaboration within the project and its place within city regeneration schemes
The most visible collaboration within P80 was at the 'frontline' of service delivery
where the clients encountered officials from various institutions. Here the mix and
therefore the collaboration between officials differed between blue and white collar
workers. For blue collar workers, collaboration was between the local job centre (AF)
and P80 in the first instance where a route would be planned to get the client back
into work. If this entailed a form of training then either the adult education service
(Komvux) or the vocational training service (AMU) would also be involved. The
difference for white collar workers was that they had access to Trygghetsradet which
worked extremely closely with the local job centre to place clients in work on an
individualised basis.
All the institutions involved were highly centralised, but the individualised
framework in which they operated required a degree of autonomy from the centre.
This was achieved by way of how each institution affiliated itself to P80; here
institutions adapted themselves into the framework of P80 whilst retaining their own
expertise and structure. In practical terms, institutions nominated representatives,
some of whom then worked full time alongside P80's various departments but still
remained employed by their institution.
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Behind the front line, collaboration between institutions was continuous and also
temporary. Continuous in the sense that all the institutions worked within the project
at the same time and were represented at board and advisory group meetings;
temporary in the sense that collaboration was individualised at the client level and
lasted only until work was found. Thus a framework of structured collaboration
existed at the managerial level and a flexible and temporal collaboration existed at the
individual worker's level.
The collaborative effort to get people into work required not only making clients 'fit
for purpose' but also helping the labour market to be prepared to absorb the workers.
What is most surprising here is the lack of input from private employers and their
representative body SAF. Indeed, there was no seat on the advisory board for
employers, no representative on the board of directors and not once did either body
invite employers to their meetings. Rather, the needs and views of employers were
conveyed in an abstract manner via the city council and its business development
board (Niiringslivssekretariat). In order to prepare the labour market to absorb the
transferred workers, P80 needed to collaborate with other city regeneration projects as
by itself it was too small and lacked both the financial and political means to mould
the market.
The major problem for P80 in this regard was that city regeneration projects were in
their infancy during the period P80 ran. Furthermore, no coherent vision of
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Gothenburg's future was yet formulated and so regeneration tended to lack any long-
term strategy and was more ad hoc in nature. Against this backdrop, P80's place
within city regeneration schemes was marginal. A major factor behind this was that
regeneration was seen as a city or county level responsibility with funding coming
from the state. P80 was technically a finn within the nationalised shipbuilding
concern Svenska Vary. This arrangement meant that often P80 was seen as an
isolated project rather than one sharing the same goal of regeneration and as such was
marginalised at best and often absent from discussions regarding regeneration. Thus
P80 lacked the means to mould the market by itself and it also lacked the influence
necessary to mould regeneration projects (which were in their infancy, anyway), it
therefore turned to the public sector where its influence was stronger and also
attempted some novel projects within a semi-sheltered sphere in order to place people
into jobs.
How it all worked
Projekt 80 AB was officially created on th May, 1979 when the management and
unions signed their co-determination agreement. P80 had seven permanent
departments which were modelled upon the structure of the already established
Projekt Lindholmen (see Figure AI, Appendix A). Each client's route through the
project was determined by the personnel department which worked in close
cooperation with the local job centre to reach individual solutions for each worker
transferred.
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The personnel department
The focus on individual solutions was achieved systematically by following
procedures that allowed for four alternatives, all of which ultimately aimed at the
individual fmding work on the open market. A special procedure was also drawn up
for more intensive actions should a worker prove to be especially difficult to place in
work. Essentially the procedures codified various possibilities within the framework
of P80 with the four alternatives ranked by order of preference.
Firstly, within alternative one, which was the most desirable option, the individual
obtains work on the open market immediately after a planning interview. The
desirability of this option lay in the speed in which the individual found new work,
thus minimising both expenditure and resources within P80. The planning interview
was the first point of contact the individual had with P80 after the transfer, this was a
one-to-one interview where a range of possibilities were explored within the context
of the individual's work history, qualifications and future desires. These interviews
were conducted in close cooperation with Arbetsformedlingen and if the interviewee
was a white collar worker Trygghetsradet was also involved. Thus the resources were
set up for the rapid transfer to new work should a vacancy be found that was
compatible with the individual's skills and desires.
In alternative two the individual is transferred to the production department after the
first planning interview. Often this was on account of a certain skill being rusty or
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maybe needing updating, but could also be as there were no job vacancies that fitted
the individual's skills and therefore the decision was made to keep the applicant busy
until such a time as a suitable job became available. Throughout the time spent
working with P80 there would be guidance and follow up meetings both to check up
on the general well-being of the worker and to explore openings within the labour
market. It was also envisioned that within this alternative the worker could move
between the production and education departments should a skill need updating or
learning from scratch.
Alternative three took the worker direct to the education department after the initial
planning meeting. This was often on account of the skills and knowledge a person
had being incompatible with the current labour market and a decision being made at
the planning meeting to retrain within a growing sector. Here it was hoped that the
worker would not work at all with the production department but would instead find
permanent work after finishing the training period and attending a follow-up meeting
designed to place the worker in a new job.
Alternative four was considered the last option and was reserved for difficult to place
workers. The special procedure drawn up for problematic individuals was often
applied here. Firstly, immediately following the initial planning meeting, another
meeting would take place with the welfare department where psychological problems
were hoped to be detected early as well as problems such as alcohol abuse and
physical problems that could affect job opportunities. If the person in question was a
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white collar worker, then Trygghetsradet would also arrange for a special session.
Once these initial interviews were out the way, an "intensified labour exchange
service" (P80, 1979b) using local experts and staff as well as personnel from P80 and
trade unions would aim to get the individual into permanent work. Failing this, the
individual would take some training courses deemed to help in achieving work or
take temporary work within PSO which was considered a better option to
unemployment. Should the individual still fail to find permanent work, the labour
exchange service would expand it search firstly to the county level and then to the
national level whilst temporary and probationary work would also be searched for at
the regional and national level. The remaining problematic workers were the long-
term sick, older workers, the partially disabled and those with alcohol abuse
problems. The solutions here included early retirement, pensioning, rehabilitation,
vocational training and what became known as 'the other solution'. This was based
on the argument that "continued occupation is a better alternative to early retirement
pension for the persons concerned as well as for the community" as "continued work
gives self esteem, chances of being together with friends at the work place and
opportunities for medical care" (P80, 1979b). Therefore, the idea was to occupy the
individual with work that achieved, as far as possible, maximum results for the costs
involved. These 'results' were not limited to personal concerns of development and
welfare but also to limiting the expense of such an exercise by making the job
generate some monetary returns.
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Plate 6a: an example of the internal procedures for placing clients into work.
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A number of specialist work groups were also set up within P80 including the
'Resursgrupp' that was concerned with socio medical issues and any negative effects
emerging from the transfer to P80 and the 'Skyddskommitte' whose remit was the
welfare of all workers within P80, the scope here went beyond the Resursgrupp to
include work based accidents. The welfare of the workers was given serious
consideration. Special attention was given to problems that may arise out of the
redundancy notice, both work-based and domestic, and absenteeism was followed up
in order to check for any causes for concern (P80, 1980b). Alcoholism, domestic
violence and suicidal tendencies were concerns that had emerged during studies of the
transfer process from the Eriksberg Yard to the Gotaverken Yard earlier in the decade
(Herloff, 1979) and in an attempt pre-empt the issues, routine contact meetings were
held with all workers (Posner, 1982). This formed part of a ten point guideline on
how best to secure the welfare of the workers within P80. The importance of work
and especially what was termed meaningful work is evident in the ten points:
1) People that become unemployed generally lose faith in themselves rather quickly.
It becomes more and more difficult to do something about the situation and a loss in
working capacity can occur to such a degree that it may never be restored. This is
bad personal development and bad for the national economy. Help must be given to
find new and permanent occupation as soon as possible. Temporary work or
purposeful training pending a new job is better than being unemployed. Individual
solutions for all persons concerned are a must and never give up: continuous
following up until results are reached is required.
2) The active cooperation of all people concerned in regard to looking for new work
is required for a good result.
3) All people have their strong and their weak points - it may be that the strong
points have had no chance to show up in the previous job. Try to build a new future
on the strong points of the person in question.
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4) If the person has been less successful in his previous employment, it may depend
upon other factors than the person himself. It may depend upon unsuitable work in
relation to his personal qualifications, on fellow workers, foremen or conditions
outside the job.
5) A new job maybe a fortunate event for many people - "the best thing that ever
happened to me" - Assist as many people as possible to reach such a result.
6) Certain people will not be able to solve their problems in connection with the
change of employment - be prepared that some people may be so depressed that they
try to commit suicide - prevent this with active following up of absenteeism together
with personal welfare assistance.
7) Assume that many people find security in their work, i.e. they want to keep their
old jobs, the well-accustomed routine in the old workshop and together with the old
fellow workers and supervisors - try to get them to understand that security may be
found in a positive change.
8) Some people may continue to be in a state of "dream thinking" - "in spite of
everything I think it will be OK and I will keep myoid job" - get them to understand
that this will not come true and that it is absolutely necessary for them to actively
search for a new job.
9) For many people the greatest problems will arise in their own homes - to give
family and friends an acceptable explanation as to the reasons why he or she has
been separated from his or her old job.
10) It will be more difficult to find temporary work and new permanent employment
for white collar employees and supervisors than for blue collar workers. Start a
number of new projects which in the future, in some cases, may result in new
business activities, but which under all circumstances will give meaningful
occupation pending new and permanent employment (P80, 1980b).
The Training and Education Department
The education department of P80 was headed by Ingela Olsson who managed the
training department of Gotaverken's Cityvarvet repair yard and all internal training
within P80 was carried out by the same personnel and with the same structure. The
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department had the capacity to train 250 personnel with the proviso that at least half
of those places were filled with welding and plating training - this reflects the fact
that the training department had been set up to facilitate education within the ship
repair business that it was located within. There were 30 instructors available and the
department had 4000 square meters of space at its disposal, again reflecting its ship
repair focus. An additional 64 places at local colleges had been hired for electrical,
milling and turning courses. In the first instance, it was agreed that courses that take
some time to complete should be placed within the remit of local colleges and the
AMU; failing that, the department could offer two year courses in sheet metal work,
welding, boiler making, electronics, mechanical engineering and pipe fitting.
In conjunction with a local college, two year courses were available in metalwork and
telecommunications and one year courses specialising in advanced repair techniques
and tool making. Further one year courses in Swedish, English and Mathematics were
offered via the adult education service (Komvux). The training department ought to, it
was stated, in the first instance, use its resources for shorter, 'complete' courses of the
type above and training for white collar employees ought to be planned and arranged
in collaboration with the education authorities, AMU, the Education Association
(Studiefbrbundy and external course organisers. To complement this, a number of
'packet courses' were offered. These were earlier courses that had been designed
around the needs of the shipyard and were now offered to P80 personnel (P80,
1979c).
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P80's education policy stated that its purpose was to improve the employee's
opportunities within the labour market (P80, 1980c, p.12). To this end:
For those workers whose educational background and work experience doesn't
correspond with the expected demand within the labour market a more comprehensive
training should be considered.
The AMU and the affected employees will discuss various training options. If the
Employment Office judges that the desired education can lead to permanent work and
if suitable training places are obtained, the Employment Office can decide upon
training and grants. Project 80 will pay the cost difference between the employee's
wage and training grant as per the employment guarantee.
For those employees with short or long term decisions to receive equivalent work
within their own profession a more limited training can be appropriate. Further
education and training within their profession is an example of such complementary
training with a view to broaden the individual's competence. (ibid).
The above policy was the result of extensive deliberations over how to interpret the
employment guarantee and importantly how to prioritise between training and
employment. The result was based upon the policy used by AMU and attempts to
strike a balance between those whose knowledge and skills are considered to be
desirable within the labour market and those who either have generally limited skills
or that their knowledge is within a sector that is not recruiting or even contracting.
Cooperation between the training department, AMU and Komvux toward P80's
education policy resulted in education and training that focused upon supervision and
preparatory courses where the employees had the chance to evaluate various options
regarding future training and work opportunities. The two-year employment
guarantee allowed the decisions to be made under relatively calmer conditions
without some of the immediate worries often associated with redundancies. This
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period also allowed those who were approaching retirement age to take courses
designed to prepare individuals for retirement.
Although courses and job searches were, to an extent, tailor made, this was within the
limits set out above, furthermore, the two-year guarantee set a time limit which was
further reduced to eighteen months as the first workers to be transferred were not
notified until July 1979. Thus the transition into new and permanent employment had
to be achieved within a short time frame and this influenced to a large extent the type
of options available. One outcome of this was that the majority of workers who
registered within the education department took just one course and this group also
had the highest percentage of individuals who found external employment.
The Production and Development Department
The function of the production department was to occupy workers with 'meaningful'
I
work until they found new and permanent employment. Initially the production
department had a maximum capacity for 40 people per week, but this increased over
the life of P80 to a maximum number of around 600. The department had the
redundant Eriksberg shipyard at its disposal with designated areas for both blue collar
and white collar employees to work. The relatively modern shipyard was well suited
for adaptation to a variety of different production activities.
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In collaboration with construction departments from the other companies with
Svenska Vary in Gothenburg, the production department received a number of
assignments, many of which were initially within the area of maintenance and later
the department completed some larger projects. Some of these projects included
moving of a gantry crane from the Lindholmen Yard to Gotaverken Cityvarvet Yard,
insulating the factory offices at Gotaverken Cityvarvet, dismantling and packing up of
equipment at Gotaverken Angteknik's factory at Kallhall, maintenance work at
Ringhals nuclear power station in Varberg, maintenance work on various vessels in
Gothenburg's harbour and maintenance of quays, cranes and other structures at the
Eriksberg shipyard. The production department also employed a number of white
collar workers including foremen, planners and designers in various administrative
tasks linked to this work.
A key area of developmental work engaged with a large number of white collar
workers including foremen and other supervisors. This group was on average older
and possessed specialised skills which made securing jobs more difficult than for
blue-collar workers whose skills were often generic and transferable either straight
away or after some short courses. Therefore "it is both constructive and necessary to
pursue development activities that perhaps in some cases could result in new business
activities, but in every case for the individual in question shall be both meaningful
and developed in the wait for new and enduring work" (P80, 1980b, p.14).
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Furthermore, the department also felt that meaningful work with P80 could result in
individuals investing too much personal interest to the extent that they became
unwilling to leave the project when a new work opportunity emerged. Here a balance
had to be struck between making work so interesting that individuals became
reluctant to leave, and making work so unattractive that individuals would want to
leave. This issue was clarified in the following policy:
"People employed in project activities that receive offers of new work, shall
immediately leave the project activity and take up the offer of new work, even if there
will be disturbance to the project work" (ibid).
Following the decision to create Projekt 80 a series of brainstorming sessions took
place between Svenska Vary and a special reference group made up of local business
interest groups, individual entrepreneurs and local officials. Here P80 became
entrepreneurial in an attempt to create jobs for workers whose specialist skills were
often difficult to match on the open market. The result of these sessions was a 'project
catalogue' with around 100 project ideas. These ideas were thinned out by the
reference group using the following criteria:
- There must be development for the individual
- The project has a possibility for a quick start
- There is no direct competition with another firm in the region
- There must be development for society
- The project must employ transferred workers from P80
Once the various projects had been thinned out, the department recruited the help of
\
external experts and created a project leadership group (projektledning). A large
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number of people to be placed within the development department worked within
these projects. The placing of people into various new projects occurred after an
initial job interview with the personnel department, the exception being those who
choose to also undertake various training courses with the education department; this
group were placed with projects at a slightly later time. In total, six separate projects
were created.
Well Drill Systems AB
This project was involved in developing equipment for boring and extracting water in
developing countries. The idea was based upon a unique pumping principle called
'petropump' using small bore holes; it required a small capital investment and was
relatively easy to develop. The project had initially focused upon the oil industry and
boring in remote areas to find new oil fields. The shift from oil to water was in
response to market conditions and technical issues and especially the demand for
water in some developing countries. The market was considered to be very large for
this innovation and the intention was to capitalise upon the UN's first 'water decade'
that ran throughout the 1980s. At the time of P80's finish, Well Drill employed
around 20 people, the majority recruited from within P80, and had secured orders
from India and Tunisia. P80 spent around seven million Crowns on the project.
Goterm
Based in the solar energy field, Goterm developed, marketed and installed complete
solar energy packets based on special solar panels that could integrate with a
175
building's facade or with the whole building. It also developed heat accumulators
using salt. The project had an advanced testing area where new projects were
developed. Gotenn was in the early stages of development when P80 finished and
employed 2 people full-time from P80. P80 spent around two million Crowns on the
project.
Projekt Akustik 80
The idea here was to supply products and service in the area of noise abatement. The
idea grew out of a large amount of knowledge and experience regarding noise
abatement built up over the years in the shipyards where not only were individual
workers exposed to noise, but also various office areas needed to be relatively quiet.
-
It developed noise dampening products for various air-powered tools and worked on
projects at the Cityvarvet repair yard. At the time of P80's finish, the project had
received 0.7 million Crowns, but at that stage no personnel from P80 worked for the
business and its future was uncertain.
Pro;ekt Skogsenergi
The project was based on the idea of producing and selling equipment for the
manufacture of fuel briquettes in-situ in forest areas where felling is taking place, thus
avoiding transportation and handling of bulky material. Developments were focused
both on the machinery to produce the briquettes and also on their exact composition
with the final product having burning characteristics similar to coal. The project thus
developed in two areas: the machinery used in the forests and also the special
briquettes that had special burning qualities. New prototypes were being developed as
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P80 wound up and it was estimated that within six months the fmal product would
have taken form.
Projekt Industripumpar
This project developed the patented 'petropump' used by Well Drill Systems AB. A
key part of this project group was the collaboration with the local technical university,
Chalmers Technical High School. The project was under the leadership of a
management group specialising in technical and commercial areas and this resulted in
a development plan to focus the project on certain market areas. Its specialisation was
in industrial pumping technology and at the time P80 wound up it was working on
new projects in its chosen market areas. As it was a collaborative project with the
local technical university, its staff would be constantly changing with new ideas
coming forward. It therefore focused upon developing and patenting new products
which could then by licensed or sold - it did not manufacture the products.
ProjektvagenergiIVagk7aftverk
This project's work was based on a report from the Tidal Energy Research Group at
Chalmers Technical High School. It was involved in the manufacture and marketing
of tidal power stations. Some research into the area of combining tidal power stations
with the earlier work with 'petropump' resulted in the possibility of pumping water
into storage towers and generating energy via gravitational pull. Work on this area
was ongoing at the time Projekt 80 finished. This project differed from Projekt
Industripumpar as it not only designed new technology but actually manufactured it
also.
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The Information Department
The information department's focus was both internal and external. Internally, it was
charged with introducing P80 to the workforce: it did this by producing a number of
information booklets (see Plate 5a) and printing articles in the in-house employee
magazine "Skeppsbyggaren" and by working in close collaboration with the unions.
One area where the department was considered to have failed was in the selection
process of transferred workers. Here most employees received their first information
about P80 orally from their immediate supervisors and inevitably, given the size of
the yards, the message differed from not only site to site, but also workshop to
workshop. Thus there was no unified message about P80 until after the workers were
transferred (P80, 1980c, p.18). This was serious not only because mixed messages
would lead to confusion and the potential for rumours, but also because transferral to
P80 was optional and workers based their decision upon the knowledge they had been
given which was a mixture of oral communication from supervisors and union fact
sheets which again differed depending upon which union represented the worker. The
general confusion can be gauged by an article in the Gothenburg Post which
interviewed workers at the yard gates on the day the transferral letters were sent out.
The general mood was one of confusion where some workers argued that the state
should fund training courses instead of P80 - clearly this was a failing on the part of
P80's information department as a major part of the organisation was training. The
state of confusion was not helped by the Metall chief Inge Carlsson whom the paper
quoted as saying "I, in fact, do not know what this can imply" (Goteborgs Posten,
29/06/79) in regard to P80's function (whether his quote was taken out of context or
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if he was being deliberately obtuse is unclear, as Metall was closely involved in P80's
creation (Strath, 1987).
Externally, the information department's main function was to 'sell' P80 to potential
employees. From its inception, there was a fear both within the shipyards and in
general that workers transferred to P80 would come to be regarded as a 'B team' - as
the transferral process was selective rather than following the 'last in first out'
principle, management would choose the most productive, healthy and skilled
workers and therefore, by implication, leaving the less productive, less healthy and
less skilled. This was indeed the case as the Shipbuilding Bill had called for the yards
to be as productive as possible. What the information department attempted to do was
to shift the terms of debate away from good / bad workers and toward a focus upon
the various skills represented within P80 and how these were being developed
without reference to those remaining at the yards. To this end, journalists were
encouraged to visit the project and a number of high profile politicians also visited.
The resulting articles were not always positive (Svenska Dagbladet, 15/09/80) but the
terms of reference had shifted. This campaign was considered to have been a success
on account of the 'strong interest' shown in P80 by employees (P80, I980c, p.l8).
Finally, the information. department was also charged with advertising internal
recruitment. P80's policy had stipulated that no company within Svenska Vary could
recruit externally before a thorough audit of workers within P80. In practice this
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translated to the information department disseminating job opportunities via vacancy
boards and internal memos to other departments, notably the personnel department.
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May, 1979.
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PART III
Analysis and Conclusions
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Chapter 7
Behind the Statistics
The final report presented by P80 to the industry department in 1982 was a short nine
page document that dedicated just one page to the outcomes of the 1,814 transferred
clients. This document tells us that 53% of the clients found new work after leaving
the project, 22% became pensioners, 13% took early retirement on medical grounds
and 12% were either on leave of absence or long term sick leave.
Table 7.1: Outcomes for clients transferred to P80
Outcomes White Collar Blue collar Total
New External 22% 43%
53%
employment Internal 23% 13%
Early 40% 4%
Retirement Old age 2% 2% 22%
Unknown 0% 9%
Early retirement (medical) 8% 14% 13%
Leave of absence or long term sick 5% 15% 12%
Total number transferred 483 1,331 1,814
Source. Projekt 80 (1982)
The report presented the figures as a success on the basis that all the clients
transferred had been found solutions and that none had been left behind. Importantly,
here was a project that had taken almost 2,000 workers out of an industry and two
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years later none of them were unemployed, indeed none of them had been
unemployed at all during this period. Furthermore, the report mentioned the good
working relationships between the institutions and unions involved as further
evidence of success. This was mirrored by the blue collar union leader at the
shipyards who was quoted by Strath (1987, p.105) as saying the project was a
'relative success' that was helped by the 'realism' of the unions. Indeed, ex-officials
from the institutions involved that were interviewed for this research spoke of the
collaborative effort as the project's lasting legacy.
Yet, from a capabilities perspective these figures and comments from officials tell us
very little. The capability approach's strength lies in its sensitivity toward the
individual and in this case the point of interaction between institution and client. The
above table tells us the outcomes for all the clients, but says nothing about the process
of getting to the outcome. A capability perspective recalibrates the notion of success
to include the means as well as the ends. It demands a shift away from the statistics
presented above and onto the dynamics behind them.
From matchingjobs to capabilities to any job will do
Sweden's active labour market policy had long sought to focus upon individuals'
capabilities as the most rational method of allocating scarce resources and for most of
the period from the end of the Second World War until the mid-1970s it was labour
power that was scarce. Not only did Sweden import labour, firstly from other Nordic
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nations and latterly from further afield, it sought to allocate its own stock in the most
efficient way (Wadensjo, 2001). Thus jobs were matched to capabilities, capabilities
were moulded to jobs and an infrastructure was built up to facilitate both. Of note
here is that capabilities were understood in a far narrower sense than that of Sen. Here
capabilities were deemed of worth only if they related to the labour market. That is,
what a person was capable of achieving and what they wanted to be and do was only
important if it ultimately led to a job.
The individual client's wishes and capabilities were explored in an initial meeting
with an advisor from the local job centre. As previously mentioned, the routes
through the project and into employment were laid out in four alternative procedures,
the initial meeting allowed the job centre official to categorise clients into one of the
four alternatives as well as exploring future employment wishes. Those clients
categorised into alternative 1 went straight into employment after the initial meeting.
They were the most desirable in terms of labour market demand and therefore had
their (labour market) capabilities and new jobs matched.
Clients categorised into alternatives 2 and 3.were required to spend time in either the
education or production departments (or both) of the project. In total, 383 clients
registered with the education department with the majority (61%) taking just one
course, 25% took two courses and the remaining 14% took three of more courses. Just
under half of those taking courses were under 30 (46%) and those over 45 amounted
to 20% of the total numbers. Out of those who took just one course, 49% found new
I8S
permanent employment outside the shipyards and 17% were re-employed by the
yards. For those who took two courses, 36% found new work and 17% were also re-
employed. The figure for those taking three or more courses was 29% and 16%
respectively. In total, 60% of those who registered with the education department
found either new work or were re-employed by the shipyards.
Table 7.2: Outcome for individuals registered with the education department ofP80
Outcome Percent
New employment 43
Re-employed 17
Further education 13
Remaining in P80 12
Unknown IS
Total 100
Source: Lennartsson, 1984, p.40
Focusing upon those who found new work or were re-employed, out of the 30 and
under age group, 47% found new employment and 10% were re-employed. 48% of
those aged 31 to 45 found new work arid 18% were-employed and for the over 46s,
25% found new work and 29% were re-employed. Thus the 31-45 age group that was
most likely to have secured new work and those over 46 were most likely to be re-
employed by the yards. The least likely to find new work was the over 46s with 25%
falling into this category and the under 30s were the least likely to by re-employed at
the yards at only 10%.
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For those who registered with the education department, therefore, the longer the time
spent in P80, the chances of either finding employment or re-employment reduced. In
total, 90% of people who spent three months or less in P80 re-entered the labour
market, 69% finding new work and 21% being re-employed. At the four to six month
period, 82% re-entered with 59% fmding new work and 23% being re-employed by
the yards. Between seven and eight months, 67% re-entered, 51% with new jobs and
16% re-employed. At nine months and more only 36% of the transferred workers re-
entered the labour market with 23% finding new work and 13% being re-employed
by the yards (Lennartsson, 1984, P80, 1980).
The production department registered 471 clients and 217 of those were also
registered with the education department. The main focus of the department was
'buffer activities' which the Shipbuilding Bill had required Projekt 80 to engage the
transferred workers in. The statistics from the production department are less
complete than those from the education department, but there are similarities between
the two regarding length of time in the department and individual outcomes.
As with the education department, those who were most successful at finding new
work spent the least amount of time in the department. Out of those who spent four
weeks or less in production activities, 54% found new work. Caution must be urged
here as almost 50% of all workers registered within the production department were
also registered with the education department. P80 gave the transferred workers a
combination of activities and so those who fmished their time with the production
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department within four or less weeks may have transferred to the education
department or to a special project. The statistics are not clear here and all that is
known with certainty is that 54% of those finishing within four or less weeks went
directly into new work.
For those who spent between two and three months in production activities, 39%
went directly to new work, at the four to six month period, 14% received new work
and for those who spent over seven month in production activities only 4% found new
work. Therefore, 95% of workers who spent time in the production department were
there for three months or less and the majority of them were there for less than one
month.
Turning to the outcomes for people registered with the production department, in total
41% found new external employment, 18% were re-employed by the yards and the
remaining 41% exiting the labour market.
Table 7.3: Outcome for individuals registered with the production department ofP80
Outcome Percent
New employment 41
Re-employed 18
Pension 13
Further Education 9
Unknown 11
Remaining in P80 8
Total 100
Source: Lennartsson, 1984, p.42
188
Where the production department differed from education was that 13% of people
registered were pensioned whereas no people enrolled in the education department
were pensioned. This was on account of the fact that there was no desire to spend
resources on training courses for people who would soon be exiting the labour
market. The two year employment guarantee plus the older guarantee meant that
people aged over 55 could either retire within the time scale ofP80 or transfer back to
their old jobs until they reached 58.3. For many individuals in this category, their
time in P80 was about waiting to become old enough to apply for their pension. Their
only dealings with the education department were to take part in the preparation
course on adapting to being a pensioner.
Projekt 80's internal guidelines had emphasised the importance of finding new,
permanent work not just for economic reasons but also for combating factors such as
depression and alcoholism. Yet there was also a tacit understanding that a large group
of transferred workers had no desire to ever work again and were biding their time
waiting for retirement'j. For this group, 'meaningful' work to occupy them was
judged to be the best approach.
As mentioned above, those who were most successful at finding new work spent the
least amount of time in P80. This was true of both production and education
departments; in the case of the latter, the short amount of time spent in the department
suggests that only the shortest of courses could have been taken, typically 'refresher'
12 Discussion with Metall official; 17/09/08
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courses or 'ground' courses with less lecture hours than more complete courses such
as those designed to bring a complete beginner up to competence in a new trade such
as welding or machining or the courses lasting a number of years and taken externally
at local adult and technical schools.
Those who spent the shortest amount of time in the project had the most marketable
skills or capabilities for labour market re-entry and this group was typically the under
45s. Those who spent the longest time in the project were mostly categorised into
alternative 4. This was the group that was the most difficult to place into the open
market and along with the over 45s that had been categorised into alternatives 2 and
3, they were the least desirable workers from an employer's perspective.
Here, then, was the point at which the practice of matching a person's skills and
capabilities to job openings started to recede. Indeed, as late as 27th October, 1980,
some two months before the project's end date, 624 workers remained in the project
(P80, 1980d) and solutions needed to be found urgently. The fast approaching
deadline had the affect of shifting the focus of the project off the workers as such and
onto the deadline date. The date itself became a goal; the workers were the obstacle in
the way of getting there.
The 624 workers were made up of 209 registered as long term sick (187 were blue
collar workers) and 55 on leave of absence (54 were blue collar), just fewer than 50
workers were working in their old jobs but still registered in the project, and finally
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318 workers made up of 189 blue collar and 129 white collar workers were still based
in the project. These remaining 318 workers were given intensive assistance to get
them into work within two months and if the final report's statistics are taken at face
value this was achieved as no clients transferred were registered as unemployed. A
capability perspective demands a recalibration toward the processes involved in
finding solutions for these people.
Importantly from a capabilities perspective, the individuals' capabilities were at this
late stage given little consideration. The onus was firmly on the individual to find
work and the fact that this had not yet taken place was the individual's responsibility.
This led officials from P80 and the local job centre to use coercion to get people into
work. Here the clients were considered to be not looking hard enough for work and
therefore they were notified that if their job search activities did not improve, they
would lose their employment guarantee status and be forced to register as
unemployed. The unions were critical of this move which they described as being
very harsh, especially for the over 55s, but the job centre officials argued that they
found it 'remarkable' that no one from the project had applied for a number of recent
job openings (P80, 1980a).
As well as coercing individual workers to 'look harder' for jobs, officials (especially
from the job centre) had also been pressurising the local council into creating jobs to
place the remaining workers. This, they argued, was on the grounds that the local
authority was the largest employer in the city and 'ought to be able to take another 50
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employees' (P80, 1979d). In both of these examples, the job search process was
taken out of the deliberative context between agency and client. In the former. the job .
search was solely an individual process; in the latter, job creation was an institutional
responsibility. For P80, then, the mutual exploration between client and agency of the
best route into work was reserved for the least problematic clients. Those considered
hard to place were either given complete responsibility or no responsibility for
finding work.
Categorising and re-categorising clients
The categorising of clients into one of four alternatives that subsequently informed
their route into new employment was an attempt to rationalise and systemise the
workings of the project. At its root was an attempt to codify equality: all clients were
able to access the same resources and the individual routes worked out were
differences of degree, rather than kind, in access and treatment. When an individual
became seen as problematic, it was often a matter of re-categorisation, not re-
codification.
Rather like the issues surrounding job searches in the previous section, the project
worked well initially, but faltered when the remaining clients became difficult to
place on the open market. The two largest groups of clients affected here were older
workers and those suffering from disabilities or alcohol problems, the two groups
most likely to have been subjected to coercion as outlined in the previous section.
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The initial classification system that placed all workers into one of four groups was
focused upon the same single outcome: labour market participation. As such, all
clients were 'workers' and it was this narrow definition that produced classifications
that lacked much in the way of sensitivity to difference between clients.
One example of this concerns older workers; here their age had not informed the
classification process and their route back into work was based upon their skills and
experience. This missed a vital element necessary for discerning a person's labour
market participation: their overall desirability to the potential employer. In this case
older workers found their age to be a disadvantage when competing for jobs. In order
to remedy this, the unions lobbied the project to include an 'elderly guarantee' for
older workers. Both blue and white collar unions argued that older workers were at a
disadvantage in the labour market and the project should acknowledge this by
introducing a form of 'safety net' for older clients aged 55 and over. The idea became
official policy and became known as the 'elderly guarantee':
All parties concerned are in agreement that a special consideration must be given to the
elderly. Ifit is not possible for the transferred clients belonging in this category to find
new work. all possibilities must be investigated to solve their future means of support
through various forms of early retirement and other support via insurance during the
period that Projekt 80 continues to work. To the extent that they have had no luck in
finding some private employment by 31"' December 1980 at the latest. the person in
question either remains in Projekt 80 until their future insurance question is solved or
they are invited to resume employment at the firm from where they came. They will
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then occupy the same position in regard to the employment safety law like others in the
company that have not transferred over to Projekt 80. The condition for receiving early
retirement according to this plan is that those in question have transferred to Projekt 80
(P80, 1980, p.5).
The guarantee, then, re-categorised a group of clients as 'elderly' whilst keeping their
original categorisation intact. It retained the primacy of finding work on the open
market but allowed a select group of workers to possess a further safety net. The two
year employment guarantee was to be complemented with a further general guarantee
of returning to the original workplace for those aged over 55 where they could remain
until retirement at 58.3. Re-categorisation here was ad hoc and a consequence of
uncertainty amongst older clients which the unions sought to alleviate. Itwas entirely
defensive and reactionary in that in favoured short-term security for a single
marginalised group over employment creating measures such as grants payable to
employers for employing older workers (Forseback, 1976, p.92). Thus, the example
of older workers has shown how the project's initial view of all clients as 'workers'
needed to be refined in order to insert a clause for a specific group that challenged the
project's notion of all clients finding work on the open market.
Re-categorisation was always the consequence of external factors; that is to say, the
clients themselves were not given an opportunity to challenge or reject how they were
classified. In the case of the older workers, the re-classification came after union
lobbying and was based on a non-interpretative factor: age. But for other workers, re-
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categorisation required expert opinions, although it too came only after the group
concerned challenged the project's workings.
Within the project there was a group of clients that had physical or mental disabilities
and others that suffered from alcoholism. These clients were categorised into
Alternative 4 in the project's procedures - difficult to place workers. The desired
outcome here was still the same as for the other three alternatives: labour market
participation. Re-categorisation here came late into the project; after the most
desirable clients had found jobs and left, the remaining workers were given more
attention and it was belatedly discovered that sizeable amount of remaining clients
were those classified as difficult to place. Here again, in treating all clients as
'workers', the project lacked the sensitivity to differentiate between them and thus
pick up differences in needs. Within the group of difficult to place workers was a
sizable number of disabled and alcoholic clients. This group differed from the over
55s inasmuch as the unions did not argue for a special clause for them; this was a
consequence of the fact that this group of clients was very much 'hidden'.
Whilst still employed at the shipyards, workers in this group had often been located
away from the departments they worked for, this was a consequence of disabled
workers having certain needs that the shipyards met by placing all such workers
together in one area. The negative affect this had was that the workers did not
socialise with other members of their department and had little contact with union
representatives. Alcoholic workers, whilst not located elsewhere, came to rely heavily
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on certain colleagues that could assist them in their jobs. Once these workers were
transferred to P80, this arrangement stopped and alcoholic workers found they had no
colleagues around them to help and disabled workers found they had no network of
contacts to represent them.'!
Thus for this group re-categorisation was a consequence entirely of the project's
realisation that members of the group were not finding new jobs. The process of re-
categorising was based upon medical expertise that had already been known to the
project as it was on the individual worker's personnel files. Re-categorisation here
was about recognising the medical expertise and formulating a new classification:
special needs. Whereas the original procedures for difficult to place workers had
factored in some options for what were termed 'the remaining problems', the re-
categorisation of workers allowed various measures to be explored earlier and not as
a last resort after all placement attempts failed as the original procedure had codified.
Once the clients had been defined as 'special needs' by the project, the local authority
was requested to provide places in sheltered industries into which it was planned a
number of clients could transfer. Although the data is incomplete regarding how
many clients went into sheltered industries, the fact that they were not consulted
remains valid. Indeed, the entire process from the initial focus upon this group of
workers to their eventual placement occurred without their involvement: it was a
process conducted and informed entirely by expert opinion.
13 Discussion with Metall official; 17/09/08
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Re-categorisation was also an option in cases where a client was considered to be
uncooperative. This included cases where a client refused placements, was absent
without a reason or generally lacking in cooperation toward officials within the
project. Although officials considered such non-cooperation to be highly unusual, if a
case did emerge, then an option open to them was to re-categorise the client as being
'sick'. The argument here was that, if work placements were continually refused and
a client was uncooperative, then they were suffering from some form of illness that
needed to be investigated. In this case a re-categorisation as 'sick' would remove the
client from the project and onto the relevant institution that was capable of providing
better care for the worker.l" As in the examples of older workers and the disabled,
this process was ad hoc and only came to be considered after the normal workings of
the project could not cope with specific clients.
All three examples presented here are manifestations of the same issue. Projekt 80
treated all its clients as potential workers and sought labour market integration as
their outcome. During the early stages of the project issues surrounding problematic
clients remained largely hidden as the most desirable workers found jobs and the
project appeared to function well. Later into the project's life when the problematic
workers became more visible, the functionings of the project were challenged. Yet as
the project had seemingly worked well for the better workers, the failings now were
seen as a problem of the client, not the project. In framing the issue in this way the
14 Discussion with former AMU officia13/12108
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project re-categorised the individual worker rather than adapting procedures to
accommodate the worker. As such clients were moved between different spheres of
technical competence depending upon categorisation. The project remained focused
upon labour market integration and, if clients could not be integrated, then there was
another institution to take care of them.
Residualisation as a consequence of contraction
The process of selection for transferral to the project necessitated categorising clients:
it was older workers, the young and the sick that were transferred. These individual
attributes were not the product of a workforce survey; the information existed on the
workers' personnel files. The categorisation process here highlights how pre-existing
attributes can emerge through shifts in external factors. In this example it was the
contraction of the shipbuilding industry which readjusted the measure of who was a
desirable worker.
During the periods of expansion the shipyards suffered from severe labour shortages
and recruitment drives targeted other Nordic countries and later widened further to
include Yugoslavian guest workers (Sjolin, 2003). Recruitment also targeted workers
in poor health, those with disabilities, and alcohol abuse problems. The shipyards
needed to enlarge their workforce in what was a labour intensive industry and they
needed to do so rapidly to keep up with demand for orders. Thus the yards absorbed
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many workers who required various degrees of support to perform their jobs. For
some the support was needed to help with language barriers, others needed special
workshops or supervision whilst others still got by with the help of their immediate
colleagues. Regardless of the individual's requirements, the need for labour out-
weighed any productivity concerns regarding such workers.
These workers came to be recognised as 'problematic' when the industry went into
contraction. Workers with special needs along with the older workers and the young
were re-defined through a stratification process whereby they were considered
redundant based on personal attributes that at one time had gone unnoticed or at the
worst tolerated. Here we can see the age for being eligible for early retirement being
lowered to remove the upper age group. The young, many of whom had just finished
their apprenticeships, were now considered lacking in experience. The 'problematic'
workers became unproductive.
The standard through which workers were gauged to be either productive or
unproductive shifted. As the industry shed labour the idea of what a productive
worker should be tightened and those at the margins, who had once been considered
capable, were now selected for transfer. The young and elderly, likewise, fell into this
group through no physical change in their circumstances; rather, they came to be
compared to other, more desirable, workers. Thus we can see a process whereby those
workers on the margins, however defined, were the first to exit the workforce.
Furthermore, this process occurred twice: firstly in the transferral process where
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selection stratified the workforce, then again during the functioning of the project
where the sick and elderly became residualised.
The process of contraction re-defined who was judged to be too old, ill or
inexperienced. But the process of selection which was informed by this re-definition
was relative and subjective. Stratifying the workforce along the lines of productive
capacity gave the selection process its terms of reference, but individual selection was
based on a variety of factors of which productivity was only one. In terms of the older
workers and the young, age was the basis for stratification, but relative circumstances
also informed the selection process. If a worker was considered to be sufficiently
skilled that transferral would damage the department they were based in, then they
would remain regardless of age. For this reason, the project contained many relatively
old and young workers, but not all old and young workers from the shipyards.
The example of workers with special needs was slightly different but still based upon
relative circumstances highlighted by the stratification process. Here illness, disability
and alcoholism were categories based on professional judgment. This again was
relative to the environment in which the individual worked: a missing finger is a
disability, but it may not impair output. Thus special needs did not always impact
negatively upon productivity, but productivity itself came to be understood in a
narrower sense and this marginalised many with special needs. Again, it was the
process of contraction that highlighted the residual workers.
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The example of selection for Projekt 80 shows how defining a person as problematic
is in part informed by the wider context. Categorisation was arbitrary, subjective and
relative. During periods of growth those later seen as being problematic were defined
by their occupation: welder, labourer, shipwright, etc. During contraction these
definitions changed and other attributes were highlighted: old, inexperienced,
disabled, etc. The worker subjected to these categorisations had often not changed at
all in the time between the two definitions. An elderly welder was seen as a welder
during times of expansion and seen as old during times of contraction.
Thus who is perceived to be old or young or disabled is influenced by external factors
such as the economic health of the industry in which they work or the state of the
economy at large. When cuts to the workforce are deemed necessary and when the
principle of last-in first-out is abandoned, individuals are evaluated using an entirely
different informational basis (Sen, 1991). During growth the informational basis is
influenced by need to recruit and retain workers. During contraction the basis shifts to
be influenced by the need to remove workers from the workforce.
Responding to clients' demands - the benefit of solidarity?
The elderly guarantee, created after union lobbying, and the lack of any such clause
for disabled and alcoholic workers appears to show that the project responded better
to solidarised clients. In this case both blue and white collar unions were able to
present the case for the older clients, but no organisation spoke for the disabled and
alcoholic. Furthermore, the older workers as a group had typically longer service
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history and were better connected both with each other and to officials. The disabled
and alcoholic clients were a disparate group with only their residual status uniting
them.
Another group that organised well were white collar workers of various ages and
professions who created an unofficial technical advisory group within P80. This
group was extremely well connected as many members were once colleagues with
officials working for P80. The group organised around the professions of its
membership, open to all white collar union members, and created a 'shadow'
organisation that monitored the running of the project and offered advice and critique
whenever possible. Although the project had been designed to keep clients active
with education and production work, this group was able to meet, write reports and
plan future activities during this time.
In contrast to the older workers, this group had a far less responsive relationship with
the project's management. Indeed, the reaction to the group varied from hostility to
bewilderment. At management meetings and advisory board meetings the group was
never invited to participate, its reports were never discussed, and on the few
occasions it was referred to, no-one could say what the group's purpose was. This
hostility here was based on what was seen as a breach of the boundaries of technical
competence. Essentially, management was technically competent and the unofficial
advisory group was not. This highlights the strict demarcation within the project and
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suggests that its largely smooth running nature was in part a product of institutions
rarely crossing boundaries into others' technical domain.
The project management responded to union calls for an elderly guarantee as the
union was recognised as the body that represented the clients. The unofficial advisory
group, however, possessed no official recognition and was therefore ignored. Their
work breached the boundaries of both P80's management and also the official
advisory board. The strict adherence to procedure within the project provided no
opportunity for such a group to be incorporated into the official decision making
process. Therefore, the claim that the project responded well to solidarised workers is
inaccurate; the project responded well to recognised institutions.
The Clients' opinions of their time in the Project
Six months after P80 wound up, during the middle of 1981, a labour market research
organisation tExpertgruppen for Arbetsmarknadsutvdrdering, EFA) conducted a
survey of employees that had been transferred to P80 exploring their opinions of their
time within the project. Regarding the point at which the respondents started looking
for new work, the majority did so only after being transferred to P80. The figures
differ for both blue and white collar workers, but the pattern remains the same; a
minority had started looking for work before being invited to transfer (it must be
recalled that the shipyards had been facing an bleak future since 1975), a larger group
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started their job search in the time between receiving information about being
transferred and actually being transferred and the largest group in both blue and white
collar categories, searched only after the transferral process was complete.
Table 7.4: The point at which respondents started searching for new employment (in
percent)
Before After information, but After
receiving before transfer to P80 Transfer
information
Blue Collar 14 29 57
White Collar 13 33 53
Source: Lennartsson, 1984, p.52
Closely related to this is what methods the respondents used to find new work. Here
the largest group for both blue and white collar workers is those who found new
employment using their own initiative. The figure is higher for blue collar workers,
many of whom had more marketable skills within the labour market than white collar
workers. For both categories of workers, the majority only used their own initiative
after they had been transferred to P80, this was more pronounced for blue collar
workers. The second largest grouping for blue collar workers is those who found
work with the help of the employment office within P80, yet a comparison with white
collar workers shows that this group is far smaller with both personal contacts and job
advertisements placing higher as methods of finding new work as well as the category
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'other' which included services from TRS. For both categories, the unions played the
smallest role in finding new work.
Table 7.5: Distribution of how respondents found new work (in percent)
Blue Collar White Collar
Own initiative 44 36
Employment office within P80 34 14
Advertisement 14 25
Through contacts 16 22
Unions 2 8
Other 18 25
Source: Lennartsson, 1984, p.S2
44% of blue collar workers and 36% of white collar workers found new employment
on their own initiative and this may in part explain why many of the respondents had
a low option of their time in P80. When asked for their view of their time spent in
P80, 40% of blue collar workers claimed it was 'very meaningless' and 21% of white
collar workers expressed the same opinion. Only 8% of blue workers and 19% of
white collar workers found their time within P80 to be 'very meaningful'.
Furthermore, the differences between blue and white collar workers here may be on
account of the differing outcomes for the groups. The majority of blue collar workers
found employment whereas the majority of white collar workers went into retirement.
Furthermore, many blue collar workers were re-employed by the shipyards, often in
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the same role they left only one year before. For white collar workers going into
retirement, P80 offered courses on managing finances and coping with lifestyle
adjustments. The differences of opinion between the two groups, then, may reflect the
differing ways in which P80 was used.
Table 7.6: The respondents' view of their time spent in P80 (in percent)
Very Quite Quite Very
meaningful Meaningful meaningless Meaningless
Blue collar 8 22 30 40
White 19 27 30 21
Collar
Source: Lennartsson, 1984, p.54
When asked to look back and consider if being transferred to P80 could be viewed as
an opportune reason to look for new work, by far the largest group are white collar
workers of whom 70% said no. The figure for blue collar workers also places the 'no'
group higher than the 'yes' group, but only by 15% compared to 56% for white collar
workers. The larger percentage of respondents who answered 'no' were white collar
workers and this may reflect their higher average age when compared to blue collar
workers and that they may have been more settled into their careers and thus less
inclined to see redundancy as a welcome reason to find a new job. For blue collar
workers, the majority also responded in the negative, but 32% did see redundancy as
a welcome event. This may be because typically blue collar workers were on average
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younger than white collar workers and also because they were far more likely to be
engaged in heavy, dirty and often dangerous work at the shipyards, whereas white
collar workers were far more likely to have office bound jobs. For younger blue collar
workers, a redundancy notice may have been an opportune moment to search for a
job with better working conditions or to consider their future careers.
Table 7.7: The respondents' view on whether they felt that their redundancy notice
was in part an opportune/welcome reason to search for new work (in percent)
Yes No Don't know
Blue Collar 32 47 21
White Collar 14 70 16
Source: Lennartsson, 1984, p.58
Closely related here was a question asking the respondents about their time working
at the shipyards and if they felt the work was interesting and met their 'personal
requirements'. Here the majority of both blue and white collar workers were positive
about working at the yards. Again, the white collar workers stand out as the largest
grouping with 83% feeling positive about their time at the yards. This figure must be
viewed in light of the previous question where 70% of white collar workers
responded that redundancy was not a welcome opportunity to find new work. White
collar workers were on average older their blue collar colleagues with an average age
of 53.4 and 23.9 years service in the yards on average. The invite to transfer to P80
was unwelcome for the majority.
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Table 7.8: The respondents' view on whether they felt that the work at the shipyards
suited their personal requirements and was interesting (in percent)
Good Neither good nor bad Bad
Blue Collar 66 16 18
White Collar 83 8 9
Source: Lennartsson, 1984, p.57
As mentioned earlier, having such senior workers transferred to P80 was something
of a novelty as it deviated from many work protection laws. If those laws had been
applied, the majority of white collar workers who had been transferred would not
have been selected. This, then, may help to explain why, when asked if the
employment protection laws should have applied, the majority of white collar
workers answered 'yes'. Blue collar workers, whilst the majority also agreed the laws
should apply, were on average younger and so would have been affected if the laws
applied. The answer here, then, may have less to do with personal concerns and be
more about resentment that the relevant employment laws were side-stepped.
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Table 7.9: The respondents' view on whether they felt that the security of
employment laws ought to have applied to the personnel reductions (in percent)
Ought to apply Ought not apply Don't know
Blue Collar 58 30 12
White Collar 65 31 3
Source: Lennartsson, 1984, p.60
An even larger percentage of white collar workers agreed, when asked, that the
shipyards needed to 'thin out' the workforce. Here 75% of white collar workers
compared to 48% of blue collar workers agreed with the statement. In the case of the
white collar workers, this must be viewed in the light that 65% felt that the security of
employment laws should have applied to the thinning out. This group believed that
the workforce needed to be reduced for the yards to survive, but felt that they should
have remained within the yards themselves as the employment security laws would
have allowed. By comparison, less than half of the blue collar respondents agreed that
the yards needed thinning out. The differences between the two groups are
unexplained; one possible reason may have been the quality of information regarding
the yards' situation that the workers had access to.
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Table 7.10: The respondents' view on whether they felt it necessary to thin out the
workforce (in percent)
Necessary Unnecessary Don't know
Blue Collar 48 35 17
White Collar 75 18 7
Source: Lennartsson, 1984, p.60
Regarding the actual transferral process, the majority of blue collar workers felt they
had not received any reason why they are being transferred, this compares to white
collar workers for whom the opposite applies with the majority responding that they
were given a reason. Furthermore, regarding the general level of information about
P80, both the majority of blue and white collar workers felt it was 'bad' with the
largest group coming from blue collar workers. These figures are particularly
important when we consider that the majority of both groups had no suspicion that
they would be amongst those selected to be transferred to P80. The surprise at being
selected was followed by lack of information about the organisation workers were
being transferred to and in many cases no information regarding why the individual
had been selected.
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Table 7.11: The respondents' view on whether they considered that they had received
a reason for their redundancy notice (in percent)
No reason given Reason given Don't know
Blue Collar 53 35 12
White Collar 32 63 5
Source: Lennartsson, 1984, p.59
Table 7.12: The respondents' view on the Quality of information given to them (in
percent)
Good Neither good nor bad Bad
Blue Collar 20 20 60
White Collar 32 32 36
Source: Lennartsson, 1984, p.61
Table 7.13: The respondents' view on whether they had anticipated that they shall be
amongst the redundant before the notices were distributed (in percent)
Anticipated Some suspicion No suspicion
Blue Collar 25 37 38
White Collar 27 31 42
Source: Lennartsson, 1984, p.58
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Furthermore, the majority of both blue and white collar workers had never considered
leaving their jobs before they were invited to transfer to P80. In this regard, the
majority of workers were not only surprised to find themselves selected, but also had
never given thought to the prospect of leaving their job and embarking upon a search
for new employment.
Table 7.14: The respondent's view on whether they had considered leaving before
their redundancy notification (in percent)
Many times One time Never
Blue Collar 14 34 52
White Collar 2 34 64
Source: Lennartsson, 1984, p.57
Once the transfer had taken place, white collar workers were the most sceptical in
regards to finding new employment, 62% had weak expectations of P80 being able to
arrange new work for them. On the blue collar side, the sceptics and those who had
neither strong nor weak feelings were equal in number. For both blue and white collar
workers, those with strong expectations of receiving new work were in the minority.
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Table 7.15: The respondents' view of the expectations that they had about P80
arranging a new job for them (in percent)
Strong Neither strong nor weak Weak
Blue Collar 22 39 39
White Collar 9 29 62
Source: Lennartsson, 1984, p.63
In terms of jobs that the transferred workers received after P80, the respondents'
feelings regarding a number of factors paint a complex picture. Comparing blue and
white collar workers, the largest differences appear around the question of variety
within the new job: here 71% of blue collar workers felt their new job had more
variety than work at the yards whereas only 46% of white collar workers felt the same
way. Yet this 46% who felt positive about the variety within their new job was the
largest grouping amongst white collar workers in terms of positive feelings. The least
positive was stress where only 20% of white collar workers felt their new job was
better in this regard - 41% felt it was worse. The majority of blue collar workers, by
comparison, felt that stress levels were better in their new jobs. In terms of wages, the
majority of blue collar workers fared better and for white collar workers, the majority
felt it was the same as at the yards. Comradeship for both groups was the same as
during their time at the yards.
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Table 7.16: Respondents' feelings toward their new job in comparison to their old (in
percent)
The present job
Better The same Worse
Wages 40/30· 26/40 24/30
Qualifications 59/31 26/44 15/25
Variety 71/46 16/43 Bill
Stress 40/20 31139 29/41
Interest 64/41 20/44 16/15
Security 52/37 33141 15122
Comradeship 36/27 49/64 1519
• Blue collar IWhite collar. Source: Lennartsson, 1984, p.53
The in-house magazine 'Skeppsbyggaren' painted a very positive picture of P80 (see
Figure A2, Appendix A) and during the last half of 1979 printed stories about the
organisation in every issue (the magazine was printed two times per month). Here the
focus was overwhelmingly positive featuring interviews with transferred workers,
reports on how the organisation functioned on a day-to-day basis and also some
stories about various institutions that were working within P80. We find slightly more
sceptical voices and some negativity only within stories featuring the opinions of
214
many transferred workers. By comparison, the journal 'Arbetsmarknaden' printed a
feature about P80 in its March 1980 edition that tempers the positive tone found in
Skeppsbyggaren; here the majority of interviewees felt they were worse off than
during their time at the yards with wages being a major factor in this regard for the
majority interviewed.
Further comparisons can be made regarding the age of the workers featured in the two
publications, In Skeppsbyggaren the workers are comparatively older and it is worth
recalling here that many of the articles in this magazine were penned by the
information department of P80. The decision to feature older workers was part of a
campaign to encourage older workers to both take up the offer to transfer to P80 and
also to look for work rather than sit out their time until they were applicable for early
retirement. This had financial motives (INDEVO, 1980) as well as going some way to
combat the 'B-Team' stigma that it feared the transferred workers would be labelled
with. Thus we hear of workers in their 50s and 60s who are keen to find new work, to
remain active and to be retrained. When we hear negative views toward P80, it is in
terms of uncertainty regarding the individual's future and an acceptance that the older
one is, the tougher it will be to fmd new work.
The feature in Arbetsmarknaden (10/03/80, pp7-10) focused more upon younger
workers and many of the interviewees believed they were 'lucky' to have found work,
although a common theme running through the article is that the new jobs have come
at the cost of lower wages (for some interviewees, 25% lower) and reduced
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comradeship at the work place. The nature of work at the yards was not missed; the
interviewees had secured work in either the technical or health sectors and did not
long for a return to heavy industry. One interviewee spoke of injuries to his back
during his time at the yards and said he wouldn't return to such work adding "why
should I wear out my body?" (ibid, p.9). Regarding P80 in general he added:
"I know people that received back-breaking meaningless jobs, presumably because
they spoke up for themselves. As for myself, I went with a decision I received within
three weeks. Many colleagues had arranged something before P80, so they could
escape having to go through all that" (ibid, p.9).
Another interviewee claimed P80 had played "no big role" (ibid, p. 10) in helping
him find work after a serious accident outside of work put him on long-term sick
leave. His notification to transfer to P80 came whilst he was still recovering and he
decided to enrol at a local college without ever registering with P80.
A far more positive account of P80 was printed in the Gothenburg Trade and
Shipping Journal (Goteborgs Handels Sjofartstidning, 9/11/79). By coincidence or
design, one of the interviewees for this journal was later interviewed for
Arbetsmarknaden, above. In this earlier feature she is highlighted as an example of a
transferred worker who has successfully found work and is now building a new
career. In the later interview she speaks of the large pay cuts she had to accept and
how she misses her old work colleagues. To compound matters, her husband was also
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transferred to P80 and had now enrolled at a local college. The article was keen to
dismiss notions that P80 was a 'B-team' by showing how the transferred workers had
found new work and also how many companies had expressed an interest in
recruiting from P80. Although lacking in any detail about how the transferred
workers judged the quality of their new jobs, the article's positive slant focused upon
the fact that workers had found new jobs. An official working for P80 is quoted
saying: "but it is important to stress that it is a question about [obtaining] reasonable
jobs and not some sort of occupational therapy" (ibid, p.9).
Absenteeism
Very early on into the life of P80 it became clear that absenteeism was increasing
both in terms of a trend within P80 and also in comparison to those remaining at the
yards. In fact a later study (Posner, 1982) that tracked absenteeism within the P80
cohort during their time in the organisation and also had access to earlier records from
the years 1976 - 1978 found that absenteeism due to sickness had more than doubled
between 1976 and 1980. Furthermore, total absenteeism, including study leave,
accidents, holidays, leave with permission, leave of absence for child care, etc more
than doubled as well from 35.3% in 1976 to 75.4% in 1980 (ibid, p.l9) thus implying
that those transferred over to P80 spent, on average, only 25% of their time with the
company, this can be compared with a figure of around 30% total absenteeism for the
workers remaining within the shipyards (ibid). In other words, the P80 cohort were
absent more than twice as often as they were before being transferred and they were
also more than twice as absent as their contemporaries remaining at the yards.
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Breaking down these figures, we can see that those with short periods of service at the
yards were typically younger and for this group absenteeism was made up
overwhelmingly by study leave and military service. At the other end of the scale,
those with long periods of service at the yards who were older had comparatively low
levels of absenteeism in terms of the average both for sick leave and total
absenteeism. It is the 'middle group' (understood both as age and length of service),
then, where high absenteeism was most pronounced. This group had the highest
levels of sick leave amounting to over 70% for 1979 with over half the group sick for
the whole year. Investigating this group more, Posner (ibid) notes that the merger of
the shipyards and a recruitment freeze in the latter half of the 1970s affected the
personnel structure so that the average age grew as did the number of so-called
'dependent workers'. These were workers categorised as either physically or mentally
handicapped, or both. These two groups found securing work on the open market to
be difficult and so stayed at the yards as other workers better able to compete in the
market left for new jobs. Toward the mid-1970s, then, as these two groups grew
proportionately, they also became more likely to be categorised as sick and spend
time on leave. This was on account of the type of work they performed which was
usually 'heavy' labour rather than the lighter more technical work that better skilled
workers were able to perform. Subsequently, as workers were being selected for
transferral to P80, these groups became over represented on account of their poor
attendance and lack of specialist skills and were therefore a major reason for such
high absenteeism within the project.
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In addressing the question as to why absenteeism increased for the P80 cohort after
being transferred; this could also be a consequence of the over representation of
certain groups of workers and could explain the large differences between the
transferred workers and those remaining at the yards. The three main factors for being
selected for transferral to P80 were old age, short employment service and high
absenteeism. Workers belong to the former two groups left P80 either upon reaching
retirement age or upon securing new employment. The latter group, as already
mentioned, found finding new work difficult either because they were 'dependent
workers' or because they were categorised as 'long term sick' - many people
belonging to this group were selected for transferral whilst being on sick leave and
remained on sick leave well after P80 was fmished.
These two groups of workers had high absenteeism rates and as a consequence this
pulled the average absenteeism rate for P80 up. As to why absenteeism grew within
these two groups after transferral, one factor may be that, once the individual had
been removed from the familiar production environment, issues which had been
secondary to the normal working day became more apparent. Underlying health
problems (physical or mental) may have emerged only after being transferred away
from colleagues and the repetition of a normal working day. Furthermore, those who
were long-term sick may have found little incentive in retuning to P80 rather than
their old job when their health started to return.
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Tensions between local and peak authorities
P80's fmal report mentioned the good working relationship between various
authorities as one of its successes (P80, 1982). Working closely on an individualised
client basis, representatives from authorities would pool resources to achieve the goal
of labour market re-entry. The individualised nature created a fluid environment
where collaborative work would bring together different authorities and different
representatives depending upon the client's needs and this 'mix' of institutions would
dissolve and be remade differently for the next client. This practice occurred only at
the micro level where individual client and representative met. At the level of the
authorities themselves, the working relationship between the peak and the localities,
and sometimes within the localities between various authorities, was often strained.
The tensions emerged as the project progressed toward its end and the problematic
workers became the largest client group remaining in the project. The bases for these
tensions were funding and the approaching deadline. In the case of funding, the
project management were under pressure from the Industry Department and the
Unemployment Benefit Fund (Arbetsloshetskassam to find solutions for all clients
rapidly as the total payroll costs for clients were not dropping as the problematic
workers remained in the project. Furthermore, there was a fear that the funding of
client wages would simply become the funding of unemployment benefits when the
project finished. The project's goal of getting clients into work became a goal of
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reducing payrolls for the Industry Department and reducing potential claimants for
the Unemployment Benefit Fund.
These goals could be conflicting but also complementary. In the early stages of the
project's life getting clients into work and reducing payrolls went hand in hand as
clients found work and the project appeared to function well. Later when the client
base was dominated by residual workers the goals became conflicting as placing
clients into jobs became difficult and reducing the payroll costs became urgent. Thus
tensions grew between the time consuming goal of placing workers into jobs and the
deadline of placing all clients into work rapidly so as to reduce costs.
Thus, tensions emerged over the timescale of the project during its last six months as
agencies sought to extent the deadline for various reasons. For those directly involved
in client placement, an extended deadline would allow more time to the remaining
residual workers. For the Unemployment Benefit Fund, an extension implied less
pressure upon the fund as clients would be drawing wages from the nationalised
shipyard concern rather than claiming unemployment benefits. But for the
management of P80, the deadline was an important measure of the project's success:
the remit had been to find solutions for all clients within two years. An extension to
allow more time to place the remaining clients would imply failure on both measures.
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The economic costs of Projekt 80
The costs of removing 1,814 workers from the workplace, offering them training and
job search facilities, and finally placing them into vacancies or into retirement, is not
limited to the day-to-day running of P80. Total costs must also include funds for
client wages which were fixed at the level of the last payslip from the shipyards,
funding for the institutions involved in P80 and also the costs of funding early
retirement or sick leave.
Breaking down the costs into these component parts is problematic as this ignores the
fact that funding often came from a variety of sources and associated costs of a given
action could impact in a variety of areas. For example a client taking early retirement
would have their pension paid by the state but it would be topped up under the 58.3
rule by the employer (Svenska Varv), on top of this the client's rent would be paid by
the Kommun if they lived in social housing and lastly the personal economic costs of
retirement may imply cutting back of certain activities which would then have an
impact on a variety of other institutions or businesses.
In terms of the running costs of P80, the figure used in the final report and the figure
quoted by Lennartsson (1984) differ slightly with the former claiming 66 million
Swedish Crowns and the latter 62 million Crowns. For Lennartsson this figure is
purely the wages of P80 personnel as all other costs were met by Svenska Varv (P80
being situated on the shipyard grounds). The report, then, may include other costs on
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top of wages. The cost of client wages is missing from the final report as this was
paid by Svenska Vary and as such was not part of P80's expenditure. Lennartsson
includes this cost and claims 40 million Crowns. The report and Lennartsson also
differ over the costs for early retirement with the report claiming 120 million Crowns
and Lennartsson's figure being higher at 133 million. The report also includes the
costs for funding new projects as 12 million Crowns and a further 11 million for
stimulus grants. Lennartsson includes these two costs together with other unspecified
costs into a general 'further expenses' with a figure of 31 million Crowns. The report
also includes a 16 million Crown interest payment due from P80 to the state on
account of an earlier loan. Lennartsson's total cost amounts to 266 million Crowns
and the final report's figure is 225 million Crowns. If Lennartsson's client wage costs
are added to the fmal report's figure we get 265 million crowns, a figure very close to
Lennartsson's total. Thus we can be reasonably sure that P80's direct costs were in
the region of 266 million Swedish Crowns.
On top of this figure funds were allocated to various institutions throughout the
shipbuilding contraction process. The difficulty in putting a figure onto how much of
these funds went to help the clients in P80 is caused by funds being allocated across
both time and geographicallocation. The nationalisation of Swedish shipbuilding into
the umbrella group Svenska Varv meant that funds given to the industry to assist in
the contraction and rationalisation process were not allocated to individual yards
based in certain areas, but rather they were given to Svenska Varv to use in the
rationalisation of the industry as a whole. Furthermore, the contraction process lasted
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ten years and funds allocated before the creation of P80 may have been used to
strengthen services which were then utilised by P80 clients. Yet, funds allocated at
the same time as P80's creation may have only taken effect after P80 was wound up.
Given this, it is not possible to give a figure for the amount of funds given to
institutions to work with P80. Rather, we can look at the funds allocated to Svenska
Varv and various institutions during the period that P80 was created. This will allow a
contextual understanding of the financial impact of P80 within the framework of
contraction as a whole (the following is based upon Riksdag (1978/1979:49) and
Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen (1979». The 1978 Shipbuilding Bill allocated 17,000
million Swedish Crowns for production activities at the yards, 5,275 million for the
purchase of ships from Swedish yards, 675 million in loans to the yards, 2,200
million in financial support for Svenska Varv, 200 million for alternative production
projects at the yards and 125 million in grants to allow developing countries to
purchase Swedish ships. This, then, totalled 25,475 million Swedish Crowns. On top
of this, extra funds to the regions were allocated to assist with employment problems.
In the Gothenburg area this amounted to two million Crowns for AMS, one million to
LAN and 290 million in regional development grants. Therefore, the running costs of
P80 can be seen as being around 10% of total funds allocated in the 1978
Shipbuilding Bill which was designed to contract the entire industry. This 10% of the
entire budget of the Shipbuilding Bill, then, can be expressed as costing 146,637
Swedish Crowns per client.
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Chapter 8
To offer some conclusions, this chapter will address each of the research questions in
turn. It will also consider the significance of the findings and the possible avenues for
further research. To begin, then, the main research question was how did the Swedish
active labour market policy function during a period of stress? Then the two secondary
questions; is Esping-Andersen's notion of de-commodification an accurate portrayal of
the Swedish model? And is there variance between peak level policy and front-line
practice? With these two secondary questions we can start to explore some conclusions.
Is there variance between peak level policy andfront-line practice within the Swedish
Model?
The example of P80 paints a complex picture of conflicting pressures involving a variety
of actors and forces, not only in a top - down sense but also within the project itself. A
key theme that can be drawn out here is the idea of the marketisation of clients coming
into conflict with traditional full employment strategies. The late 1970's recession in
Sweden was the biggest downturn the country had experienced since the 1930s.
Throughout the long period of growth leading up to the 1970s the active labour market
policies had appeared to work but by the time P80 was created, the policies were under
severe strain not least because there were so few growth industries to absorb the
redundant. From the late 1960s onwards, labour market policies had increasingly sought
to engage with the worker at the level of the shop-floor (engagement in this sense means
via the recognised unions - see the latter part of chapter three for an outline of these
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developments) in a variety of matters previously the domain of managerial prerogative.
This drive toward what Olof Palme called the "democratisation and renewal of working
life" (quoted in Martin, 1984, p.260) clashed with the emerging marketisation of workers.
This was most evident in the case of the shipyards where the last-in, first-out rule had
been side stepped thus rationalising the least-able workers out of the industry. P80
became the mechanism for mopping up the fall out from the clash between global market
demands and the local democratisation of working life. Here, the market became the
dominant force in shaping the industry and democratisation was relegated to the sphere of
social welfare where tailor made solutions were offered to all.
Yet this drive ,toward democratisation, even when relegated to the sphere of welfare,
clashed against a type of institutional inertia. The project was designed and managed
locally and incorporated many institutions that operated on the local level. But these
institutions were all centralised and hierarchal; local actions took place within centrally
defined boundaries. This clash is most visible toward the end of the project when a large
group of residual clients were unable to find work. At this point the project's flexibility
and tailor made solutions were rendered impotent by the strict demarcation lines set by
various authorities working in the project. Simply put; flexibility only existed within
defined limits.
This manifested in two ways; either as a strict reading of the internal policies which
didn't allow certain options to be explored or as recognising only official representative
bodies. There is a contrast between the trade union formulated 'elderly guarantee' that
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allowed workers over a certain age to either retire early or to return to their previous jobs
before retirement and the white collar union reference group which P80 steadfastly
ignored. Thus, although the project claimed that flexibility and unconventional avenues
were some of its successes; it still reverted to recognising only the traditional forms of
representation when problems arose and ideas emerged from outside the pre-defined
spheres. Therefore, institutional inertia, whereby democratisation of the system including
tailor made solutions and flexible approaches were given as concessions up to a point,
anchored the project into a pre-defined scope for flexibility.
Variance between peak level policy formulation and local enactment, then, in this
example, manifested as tensions between interest groups or between policy and broader
market forces. In the former, localised flexibility which was itself an outcome of peak
level directives clashed with the hierarchical structure of Swedish institutions. Here two
structures, both of which were essentially top-down, produced tensions at the local level
as flexibility clashed with institutional inertia. In the second example the democratisation
of working life - a top-down initiative to allow more deliberation at the local level
clashed with market forces which relegated deliberation to the sphere of social security.
In this example P80 itself becomes a manifestation of the variance between peak level
policy and local policy practice: it was the agency that marginalised democratisation
policies to the areas sheltered from market forces such as retirement.
This, then, leads to the idea of legitimation. By defining the scope of the project, the
circumstances in which groups where considered to have legitimate voices was also set.
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The project brought together various authorities in collaboration and in doing so also
implicitly prevented the participation of any other interested parties. In the case of the
white collar reference group, this was an unofficial, unrecognised and therefore
illegitimate group claiming to speak for its members. This group had an unresponsive
relationship with the project's management. Indeed, reactions to the group varied from
hostility to bewilderment. At management meetings and advisory board meetings the
group was never invited to participate, its reports were never discussed and on the few
occasions it was referred to, no one could say what the group's purpose was. This
hostility was based on what was seen as a breach of the boundaries and membership of
technical competence and legitimacy. Essentially, established management structures
were technically competent and the unofficial advisory group was not. This highlights the
strict demarcation within the project and suggests that its smooth running may have been
in part a product of institutional rigidity that did not permit the influence of outsiders.
Insofar as variance between the peak and localities is concerned, here we can see how
mechanisms created at the peak level to ostensibly create a more democratic workplace
actually reinforced existing institutional relationships whilst sidelining unrecognised
groups.
A final tension concerns the importance of workplace. Here, the mechanisms to
encourage work, analysed in chapter 3, reinforced attachment to the workplace on
account of the social life which revolved around it. The contradiction here is that Swedish
labour market policy was dependent upon continuous change as it sought to speed up
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technical progress by transferring funds and labour from contracting to expanding firms.
Thus on the one hand the system encouraged mobility in work and on the other it
reinforced the norms of work by situating much social life within that sphere. P80
attempted to bridge this gulf by retaining attachment to place whilst encouraging labour
market participation. It did this by retaining the clients' union membership, length of
service and employment benefits as well as offering intensive support to get people into
new jobs. This was itself a reflection of the mood within Sweden which had seen the
labour market policy becoming more responsive to individuals during the 1970s both as a
consequence of the contracting labour market and the attachment to place which had
gained much public support.
The project's two year employment guarantee was designed to allow the transferred
workers to consider their options under relatively calm conditions away from the
immediate threat of losing a job. During this period the internal guidelines instructed
officials to try and persuade clients to embrace positive change:
Assume that many people find security in their work, i.e. they want to keep their old jobs,
the well-accustomed routine in the old workshop and together with the old fellow workers
and supervisors - try to get them to understand that security may be found in a positive
change. (P80, 1980b).
By retaining attachment to place, the project contradicted itself. This was further
compounded by the physical location of the project at the shipyards - the clients were
still working in the same locality, were members of the same union and engaged in the
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same social activities. Attempting to instil an enthusiasm for change whilst allowing
clients to keep their old workplace security produced a situation where neither aspect
formed part of a coherent strategy that could be easily presented to the clients. The
project existed to get people back into work, yet it also allowed people to retain the links
to their former place of work. As such it provided the conditions for the most mobile
workers to find new jobs and also for the least desirable workers to remain in a semi-
secure state.
Variance between peak and local practice here concerns the centrally directed active
labour market policy of encouraging mobility (the so-called removal van policy:
jlyttlasspolitik) and the localised wishes of the individual workers. Essentially, workers
resisted the extremely unpopular policy of geographical mobility not only because it
involved uprooting people and potentially severing ties with family and friends but also
because of the central importance that the workplace had in people's social lives in terms
of organising leisure activities. Whereas the 'classic' Swedish model encouraged the
rapid transfer of resources, including people, to areas of growth, the reality at local level
was one of resistance.
Thus we can see ways in which conflicting pressures highlight the variance between what
is decided at peak level and what is practised at the front line of policy delivery.
Furthermore, these pressures came to mould the performance of the project itself: the
clash between client democratisation and worker marketisation, the tensions between a
dynamic project and institutional inertia, the role of legitimation in defining which bodies
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possessed recognised expertise and which did not, and the contradiction between
encouraging mobility and offering security.
Is Esping-Andersen's notion of de-commodification an accurate portrayal of the Swedish
model?
Ifwe turn now to the second question which is concerned with the claims made about the
Swedish model in much academic literature. The focus here is on the argument put
forward by Esping-Andersen (1990) that the Swedish model allows workers to 'de-
commodify'. This term implies a person is able to become liberated from the
uncertainties of the labour market without damage to their social rights; they are no
longer a commodity. Was P80 an example of de-commodification? Perhaps the most
persuasive argument in favour of a de-commodifying aspect is that the project can be
seen as a sort of buffer that insulated the workers from the realities of redundancy for a
period of two years, it allowed them to plan their future under relatively calm conditions.
But this was limited in time and the future that needed to be planned was a future within
the labour market. For Esping-Anderson, a policy which allows de-commodification is
one which permits "people to make their living standards independent of pure market
fortes" (1990, p.3), yet for P80 the goal to be achieved for every client was a new job on
the open market. In fact, market forces dominated the workings of P80; every client was
assessed on their ability to find work and the education and production departments were
geared toward developing skills that were desirable for labour market purposes. The
project was designed to keep people actively working whilst they searched for new work.
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Thus rather than seeing the project as de-commodifying, it would be more accurate to
state that it addressed continuity whereby continuous commodification was practiced.
Herein lies the weakness of Esping-Anderson's approach, in the words of Tragardh
(1997) "much of Swedish social welfare is tied to the individual as a wage-earner"
(p.278). All the clients within P80 entered as wage-earners and the majority left as wage
earners, indeed, many of those eligible for retirement were required to re-enter the labour
market by returning to their old jobs in order to apply for early retirement which was
linked to waged work. In fact, this degree of individualised assistance to get people back
into work was only available to a cohort of ex-shipyard workers, that is, waged workers.
Furthermore, the services offered were designed to get people working, not to allow them
to de-commodify. The importance of work here is crucial; it is, as Kettunen has argued
(2009), both a right and a duty. It is the historical continuum which renders the idea of
de-commodification as marginal at best and often irrelevant. The example of P80 shows
that de-commodification was, in fact, positively discouraged. Waged work as a norm was
the foundation on which PSO's architecture was built.
Therefore, Esping-Andersen's claims that high levels of de-commodification that imply
that people can opt out of work without potential loss of social rights and that this opting
out can occur when the individual sees fit is not found in the example of P80. Indeed, not
only was the project designed to keep people in work, the very services the workers
accessed were themselves linked to participation in work. Here, then, we can see a clear
discrepancy between a theoretical claim made about the Swedish model and the practice
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which is found at the front line. In fact, a clear theme that can be taken from P80 is the
notion of beneficiaries receiving different treatment. A comparison between how older
clients were able to obtain concessions within the project by using a different source of
legitimate representation, the unions, and how white collar clients who organised into an
advisory group were ignored, highlights this process as does the treatment of those clients
judged to be 'hard to place'. De-commodification here was certainly not 'high'.
Recapping these two sub-questions, the example of P80 has shown that there is
considerable variance within the Swedish model and that this variance manifests not only
between peak level deliberations and front-line policy enactment, but also between
structural changes implemented from the peak clashing with wider market forces. This
clash marginalised change to areas sheltered from the market. The claim of Esping-
Andersen that the social democratic regime is characterised by high levels of de-
commodification was not proven by the example of P80. Here the project was active in
re-commodifying those transferred: to keep them in work rather than allow them to opt-
out of work. The project was also active in stratifying the transferred workers through the
system of categorisation which dictated not only the route back into employment but
which services the clients could access and which were closed off to them. Having
recapped the two sub-questions, we can now turn to the main research question.
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How did the Swedish active labour market policy function during a period of stress?
As the two sub-questions have demonstrated there is considerable variance at the front
line in Swedish policy enactment and this enactment isn't necessarily de-commodifying.
In answering the main research question we need to do so in terms of the capability
approach as it is here that our focus is shifted away from outcomes and toward a more
analytical account of the project which involves an assessment of how sensitive
procedures were to individual needs and how flexible the authorities were when
encountering diversity. Sen (2009, p.232) argues that the "concept of capability is thus
linked closely with the opportunity aspect of freedom, seen in terms of 'comprehensive'
opportunities, and not just focusing on what happens at culmination". This approach
demands looking beyond the raw 'outcome' data presented earlier - data that was used to
gauge the official success of the project, and rather looking at the project dynamics at the
point of interaction between client and official. Here we can split the analysis into two
areas; freedom to choose and freedom for voice. To what extent did the project allow
clients the real freedom to choose outcomes they valued? And to what extent could
clients voice their concerns in the knowledge that they would be listened to?
In terms of having the freedom to choose this must first be qualified in the sense that this
was a 'freedom' limited to labour market participation, as already noted, non-cooperation
was not an option. In this regard, then, there is a distinction between those clients in
possession of attributes considered desirable within the labour market and those with
undesirable attributes. The most desirable workers left quickly from the project, some in
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a matter of days after being transferred, and as such many required little help from the
project as they secured new work using their own initiative. A survey conducted
immediately after the project finished asked former clients how they found new work, the
answers of those that responded show that 44% of blue collar workers and 36% of white
collar workers found jobs using their own initiative and a further 16% and 22%
respectively used their personal network of contacts.
Table 8.1: Distribution of how respondents found new work (in percent)
Blue Collar White Collar
Own initiative 44 36
Employment office within P80 34 14
Advertisement 14 25
Through contacts 16 22
Unions 2 8
Other 18 25
Source: Lennartsson, 1984, p.52
The data is incomplete in regards to the length of time spent in the project for those that
left on their own initiative or used contacts, but what we can be sure of is that within the
project the possibility of using one's own initiative was there. Thus for many, the
freedom to choose was taken outside the project using their own resources. In this regard
the project's main function was, indeed, to offer a 'butTer' period, as mentioned in
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chapter eight, during which to find new work whilst still receiving a wage. This in itself
could be a positive element from a capability perspective but it only applies to those
workers with the necessary resources to facilitate mobility. For this group providing the
opportunities to achieve valuable states ~f being was simply a matter of temporary
fmancial support. In terms of freedom for voice, again for this group contact with the
project was often marginal and for a short duration, thus limiting the scope for voicing
any concerns if such matters manifested at all.
For those clients in possession ofless desirable skills and attributes, the role of the project
was more central to their route back into work or into retirement. This was especially the
case for the older workers and those categorised as difficult to place. The project's
sensitivity to individual needs was achieved through one-to-one guidance meetings when
the client was first transferred, yet the options explored were framed within one of four
procedures. From a capabilities perspective, the individualisation of this meeting and the
resources offered were grounded in an attempt to capitalise upon the individual client's
abilities and balance these against future wishes and labour market realities. But the
rigidity of the procedural framework limited the options available to enhance individual
capabilities and as such sought to promote clients' opportunities through a narrow set of
codified routes.
The difficult to place clients spent longer in the project and thus had greater scope to
voice their concerns compared to those that left the project relatively quickly. Here we
can see a distinction between the older workers, and the disabled and those with alcohol
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abuse problems. The older workers used union representatives to lobby the project to
modify its procedures to include a special clause for older workers. Thus for these clients,
the project listened and acted on their concerns, but only by proxy through the unions and
then as a distinct group rather than as individuals. This was a sort of abstracted capability
for voice where a representative aggregated all concerns into a single form. This method
of raising concerns failed in the case of disabled and alcoholic clients as union
representation was far weaker. Reliance on unions to voice concerns for clients meant
many individuals had no effective channel through which to exercise a capability for
voice. Without this line of communication placement, decisions were a matter of official
expertise. The minutes of the meetings for the project's board of directors and advisory
group show that individual client concerns were never discussed at this level. The lack of
deliberation between officials and clients considered difficult to place resulted in little in
the way of freedom to choose.
Analysing the project from a capabilities perspective highlights aspects of individual
freedom in terms of choice and voice. The project provided all clients with basic benefits
- a wage, union representation, access to institutions and a set period of security. The
focus here, then, has been on the ability of clients to enhance their capabilities within the
context of the project. When the project was marginal, as in the case of the most desirable
workers, the freedom to choose was an individual concern; these workers could capitalise
upon their sought after status and had little need for the project's facilities. In the case of
the least desirable workers the project was central but the mechanisms of representation
meant that those workers with the ability to access the union structure benefited the most.
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Without representation there was no official line of communication through which clients
could voice concerns and so placing these clients became a matter of central expertise.
The crucial element here is capability for voice. The project comprised an extensive
system of programmes designed to place clients into work in which many institutions
collaborated. But individual client input was limited and routes where concerns could be
raised were assumed to be the domain of union representation. As has been shown, the
capability for voice was thus anchored in the relationship between client and union
official. In the case of disabled and alcoholic clients, this relationship was weak and so
capability for voice was also weak.
This criticism can be expanded to include the capability approach itself and especially
within the scope of individual agency freedom (the freedom to work toward valuable
goals). Here Sen makes much of the opportunity aspects of the capability approach in
which the individual judges and compares a variety of options based upon a given
informational focus. Sen goes to some length (Sen, 2009, pp.244-247) to distance this
from criticism that it is informed by 'methodological individualism' by claiming that the
critique arises through not distinguishing between "the individual characteristics that are
used in the capability approach and the social influences that operate on them" (ibid,
p.245). Nevertheless, as Sen notes "[w]hen someone thinks and chooses and does
something, it is, for sure, that person - and not someone else- who is doing these things"
(ibid). Certainly this happens within the context of social influences but the crucial point
is that it isn't someone else doing it.
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The capability approach's focus is on the opportunity to be and do whatever a person
values. The individual, in this approach, ought to be able to choose to do what they have
reason to value. Clearly, the issue here is that people have differing abilities in terms of
choosing what to do, thus inequality of capability can refer to both a social process of
opportunities or lack of them and also the personal processes of being able to best make
use of information presented, to process it and to choose. Sen notes that "[t]he capability
perspective does point to the central relevance of the inequality of capabilities in the
assessment of social disparities" (ibid, p.232). Here lies the crucial point, disparities in
terms of personal capabilities requires an assessment. Who decides where these
disparities manifest and on what criteria is the assessment taken?
Individual agency freedom is therefore a consequence of personal ability and social
processes. These processes should, from a capability perspective, be used to correct
disparities between individual ability when choosing what to be and to do. The ~rux here
is that in order to correct, one must first assess. How to assess? That is, what
characteristics are considered important and what characteristics are ignored when a
person is assessed in order to correct a disparity in opportunities. This process is
grounded in what Amartya Sen calls the 'informational basis of evaluative judgements'
(Sen, 1991, p.16):
"In each evaluative structure, some types of factual matters are taken to be important in
themselves, others not so. [... ] In this sense, each evaluative system imposes - typically
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implicitly, certain 'informational constraints', which rule out classes of information from
having a direct and first-hand role in evaluative judgements" (ibid).
Here, then, the capability approach's focus on individual freedom is underpinned by a
reliance upon expert judgement that is exercised to address inequalities of opportunity.
This reliance has the potential to become a lynchpin that dictates how and where
inequalities are addressed by focusing on certain areas whilst ignoring others. The
example of P80 has shown that expert judgement has an important impact on an
individual's capability. Using a given set of criteria to categorise a person opens certain
. opportunities and closes others.
Thus for the individual who is in command of their situation, able to access key
information, process it and exploit this to work toward a valuable state of being, the
capability approach is ideal. It places the necessary resources at the disposal of the
individual to exploit as they wish in order to achieve valuable goals. However, for the
less able individual who cannot access or process information to the same degree as a
more able individual, resources need to be allocated in order for these people to also
achieve their valued outcomes. Importantly, the focus upon individual choice relies upon
the less able individual voicing their concerns and worries, if these voices are not heard;
expert opinion may act on their behalf. Looking again to the example of P80, we can see
the consequences of structures that give little opportunity for less able individuals to
voice their opinions.
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The focus upon individual agency freedom is what sets the capability, approach apart
from other forms of equality such as Rawlsian and utilitarian, yet this focus can also be
its weak spot as it relies upon the individual's ability to exploit that freedom. It assumes
not only an ability to exploit given freedoms but also a desire to do so. When these
assumptions are not met, technical expertise is employed to address the issues.
The focus upon individual agency freedom when evaluating a welfare program assumes a
type of client in command of all the options presented, able to make informed decisions
and in possession of a clear vision as to what valuable goals to work toward. Yet in many
respects, clients in P80 just wanted to carry on as before. Whereas a child may be asked
what they want to be in the future, a similar question posed to a worker made redundant
will often produce a reply based on what type of job they used to do. Once a shipyard
worker, always a shipyard worker. In Gothenburg in 2008 the former shipbuilding site
contains a shipbuilding historical association with over 500 members, the former
shipbuilding city is now known as a shipbu~lding city without ships and when
interviewing a former Social Democrat politician about the ideal solution to the yards'
collapse, his response was that the solution should have made sure the yards were kept
open. In such an environment where shipbuilding produced such a powerful identity on
the city, being rationalised out of the industry could be very upsetting. When considering
what valuable goals to work toward, the obvious answer was to go back to the old yard,
to continue as before.
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Projekt 80 was an example of the Swedish active labour market policy in action during a
period of stress. It functioned in a complex manner and this study has shown a variety of
different factors at play. Notably, the system of categorisation had a strong impact upon
how the project functioned for individual clients as did the process of representation. A
variety of tensions within the project or between the project and outside elements also
played a large role in its functioning. There is, therefore, no short answer to the main
research question. Rather, what we see is a project that was at times proactive (in its
initial design), at other times reactive (when the clients couldn't find work), it was given
a degree of flexibility (locally run and administered) but this flexibility existed within
centrally defined boundaries (hierarchical structure of the institutions plus centrally
administered funding). One outcome of this complexity was the varying ways in which
clients were treated with certain groups benefiting to a larger extent than others. Yet one
aspect remains opaque and that is gender.
The Swedish model and especially Swedish unions see workers strictly on class, not
gender, grounds (Higgins, 1996) so perhaps it is unsurprising that P80 did not categorise
the transferred workers by gender. Rather there exists a variety of categorisations based
on skill, sector, age and length of service, but gender remains unknown. Certainly
shipbuilding was a male dominated sector but not exclusively so and although there is
some evidence of the gender makeup of the transferred workers, this is incomplete and
based upon a limited number of medical records. The missing gender aspect, then, is a
shortcoming in this study and one area where future research could be focused. In this
regard a potential comparative study could be made with another sector which contracted
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rapidly at the same time as the shipbuilding sector. Here, some sixty kilometres to the
east of Gothenburg is the town Bonis which was once home to a large textile and clothing
industry (textile och konfektionsindustri: TEKO) which employed a large female
workforce. The rapid contraction this industry occurred during the same period as the
male dominated shipbuilding industry. A comparison between the responses to these two
events has the potential to illuminate a gendered aspect to the Swedish model which
ostensibly has no such gendered aspect.
This research, then, has shown how front-line policy practice can vary from what is
decided at the peak, yet the relationship is complex with certain freedoms being
contained within centrally defmed spheres and outside market forces playing an
important role. Esping-Andersen's joint concepts of high de-commodification and low
stratification were not present in the example which, if anything, was characterised by
principles of re-commodification and in practice was highly stratifying. Work is of
central importance in this model not only as a source of revenue as Esping-Andersen
correctly observes: "it is at once genuinely committed to a full-employment guarantee
and entirely dependent upon its attainment" (1990, p.23), yet work's central importance
extends further as it is also a key source of social integration. Projekt 80 reflects this
importance; it sought, first and foremost, to keep clients in work and it was at its most
proactive in doing so, those clients at the margins became major hindrances and the
subject of the project's reactionary shifts in policy.
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Appendix A figures
Ad\'isory Croup
Figure AI: P80 organisation structure. Source: Gothenburg Regional Archive: Lindholmen Urveckling AB, Projekt 80 AB,
F6ArI.
Figure A2: Projekt 80 as a bridge from uncertainty toward safety. Source: Skeppsbyggurcn, 29/0517
A worker walks across a bridge which crosses a stream called "Unemployment"; h lcav s an orca
called "Uncertain Job at Svenska Varv" and walks toward an area call d "New afcr J b", Th
bridge's hand rail is called "The Unions", its base is "Projekt 0", and th upp 11 arc named aft r
each institution involved and some of the departments within P80, The bank n the lcfl read UN ti
of Termination", the opposite bank is "Help from the Employment fficc",
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Figure A3: a map showing the Gothenburg region, the municipality i the area called 'tcb rg.
Source: Statistik Arsbok Goteborg, 1985.
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Appendix B tables
Table Bl: Date of birth and years of service for blue collar worker
Projekt 80
Date Years of Service 'rolal
of 1-5 6- u- 16- 21- 26- 31- 36- 41- 46· Num
Birth 10 15 . 20 25 30 35 40 4S SO ber
1914 2 I 3 4 I 3 14
15 4 6 2 3 5 9 3 9 2 43
16 6 3 2 6 5 4 8 1 3S
17 1 3 5 7 3 7 5 8 2 41
18 1 ID I 2 7 4 2 27
19 5 4 I I 5 7 1 24
20 3 8 1 2 5 3 5 2 2 31
21 12 3 I 4 7 5 2 1 35
22 I 8 2 3 3 5 10 2 34
23 1 5 1 2 1 3 I 14
24 2 5 3 1 1 3 5 20
25 1 10 2 3 1 4 1 22
26 2 15 3 2 3 25
27 3 7 3 2 I 3 19
28 4 9 2 1 4 2 22
29 4 3 4 1 12
30 6 8 4 I 19
31 2 9 3 1 1 16
32 6 9 3 2 1 21
33 I 8 3 1 1 1 15
34 5 7 1 1 14
35 2 6 5 1 14
36 6 13 3 1 23
37 I 9 3 1 I 15
38 3 9 2 2 I I 18
39 3 7 3 13
40 6 11 2 19
41 7 10 1 2 20
42 9 4 4 2 19
43 4 12 3 4 23
44 3 8 4 6 21
45 5 8 3 16
46 6 12 3 I 22
47 9 17 3 2 31
48 7 13 3 I 24
49 3 18 3 24
50 9 16 2 27
51 10 15 2 27
52 13 16 4 33
53 7 15 I 23
54 4 16 20
55 5 28 33
56 11 25 36
57 19 34 S3
58 39 39 78
59 66 h6
60 45 4S
61 17 17
Total 366 516 99 45 41 S5 76 26 32 7 1263
Source: Projekt 80 AB, 1982
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TableB 2: Date of birth and years of service for white collar workers transferred to
Projekt 80
Date Years of Service Total
of j , 6- ] j , 16- 21- 26- 31- 36- 4]- 46- Num
Birth 5 . 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 ber
1916 I 1 2
17 1 1 I 2 1 2 I 9
18 1 1 4 12 3 8 II 1 41
19 I 2 I 4 3 3 4 3 2 23
20 2 5 9 II 17 3 9 I 57
21 I 4 2 6 14 8 2 7 44
22 2 3 5 6 7 4 I 28
23 I 1 1 3 I I 4 I 13
24 2 2 3 4 4 2 17
25 2 I 3 2 3 2 13
26 2 2 4 4 2 14
27 2 1 2 3 I 9,
28 5 I 6
29 I I I 4 2 2 II
30 I 3 2 2 1 9
31 I 2 2 5
32 3 4 I 2 10
33 I I 3 4 9
34 2 4 2 2 10
35 4 4
36 3 1 3 I 2 10
37 2 1 3 3 2 II
38 2 3 3 8
39 1 I I 1 4
40 1 1 2 4 8
41 1 2 3 2 8
42 I 2 I I 5
43 I 2 I I 5
44 4 3 1 8
45 1 1 1 3
46 6 6
47 1 I
48 2 2 4
49 5 1 6
50 2 2
51 1 1 2
52 4 4
53 1 1 2
54 I 1
55 3 3
Total 3 58 37 56 79 80 57 29 32 4 435
Source: Projekt 80 AB, 1982
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Table B3: Distribution of Skills of Blue Collar Workers Transferred to Projekt 0
Date Skill Tot"1
of Sheet Machinist Plumber Assembler Transportation Cleaner
Birth Meta / Fitter / / / Painter / / Crane /
I Maintena Elecrrici Carpenter Operator I Firema
Wor nce an Stores nI
ker I Other
Weld
er
1914 5 I 2 I 2 3 14
15 4 8 9 3 10 9 43
16 5 9 7 3 8 3 35
17 10 9 10 4 6 2 41
18 3 5 4 2 10 3 27
19 4 5 I 5 4 5 24
20 4 3 4 2 10 8 31
21 5 7 5 3 II 4 35
22 6 8 4 2 10 4 34
23 4 3 I I 2 3 14
24 3 2 4 0 7 4 20
25 4 4 I I 5 7 22
26 4 7 4 I 5 4 25
27 3 3 1 2 6 4 19
28 4 5 I 2 3 7 22
29 2 2 I 0 3 4 12
30 6 3 I 4 2 3 19
31 4 3 0 0 5 4 16
32 3 5 0 2 4 7 21
33 5 4 1 I 0 4 15
34 7 1 0 0 3 3 14
35 7 2 1 2 1 I 14
36 7 5 1 I 8 I 23
37 1 4 2 0 6 2 15
38 6 4 1 0 3 4 18
39 8 2 0 I 2 0 13
40 10 4 0 0 5 0 19
41 8 I 1 2 4 4 20
42 6 3 I I 7 I 19
43 11 4 I 2 1 4 23
44 12 5 I 0 3 0 21
45 5 5 1 4 I 0 16
46 12 3 2 0 4 I 22
47 17 3 3 I 2 5 31
48 9 5 2 0 3 5 24
49 II 3 2 2 3 1 24
50 14 5 4 0 I 3 27
51 14 6 2 0 3 2 27
52 16 6 3 4 2 2 33
53 8 5 6 I I 2 23
54 3 4 8 1 4 0 20
55 22 I 6 2 0 2 33
56 22 6 5 I I I 36
57 34 2 14 I 2 0 53
58 54 6 18 0 0 0 7R
59 51 3 9 0 2 1 66
60 39 6 0 0 0 0 45
61 17 0 0 0 0 0 17
Total 521 194 163 63 187 137 1263
Source: Projekt 80 AB, 1982
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Table B4: Distribution of Skills of White Collar Workers Transferred to Projekt 80
Date of Skill Totul
Birth Production Draughtsman Clerk I Foreman I Personnel
I Planning I Designer Secretary Instructor I Finance I
Security
1916 2 0 0 0 0 2
17 2 ] 4 I I 9
18 11 8 7 12 3 41
19 7 6 5 4 I 23
20 14 15 6 20 2 57
21 15 5 9 13 2 44
22 10 3 2 13 0 28
23 4 I 4 4 0 13
24 8 0 I 5 3 17
25 2 3 3 5 0 13
26 7 0 4 3 0 14
27 3 2 2 I 1 9
28 3 0 0 3 0 6
29 2 ] 2 4 2 11
30 I 1 0 7 0 9
31 1 0 2 2 0 5
32 4 2 3 1 0 10
33 3 2 2 2 0 9
34 6 0 0 4 0 10
35 J I 0 2 0 4
36 I I 3 3 2 10
37 5 0 1 4 I II
38 3 0 1 2 2 8
39 2 1 I 0 0 4
40 3 1 0 4 0 8
41 2 0 0 6 0 8
42 ] 0 0 4 0 5
43 1 0 I 2 1 5
44 4 1 3 0 0 8
45 0 0 1 2 0 3
46 2 1 1 I I 6
47 0 0 0 I 0 1
48 I 0 2 I 0 4
49 2 0 3 I 0 6
50 1 0 ] 0 0 2
5] 1 0 I 0 0 2
52 2 I I 0 0 4
53 0 0 2 0 0 2
54 0 1 0 0 0 I
55 0 0 3 0 0 3
Total 137 58 81 137 22 435
Source: Projekt 80 AB, 1982
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Table B5: IndustrialWorkforce inGothenburg 1945 - J 9 5
Year Blue Collar White Collar
'45 39755 869L
'50 41406 11420
'55 42831 12846
'60 4163] 14417
'65 44123 17810
'66 42636 18221
'67 41126 17422
'68 36763 16509
'69 36879 ]7274
'70 38546 ]7576
'71 38214 17764
'72 38815 18025
'73 38361 18304
'74 38145 18947
'75 39443 19486
'76 39666 ]9416
'77 35452 17974
'78 3465] 17676
'79 33666 17139
'80 33100 18032
'81 32897 17824
'82 33104 18088
'83 30690 15225
'84 30355 15719
'85 30517 15932..Source: Statistik Arsbok Goteborg, 1985
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Table B6: Unemployed and Job Seekers in Gothenburg, 1974 - 1984
Year Number % Total %Male % Female
'74 5900 1.7 1.5 2.0
'75 5100 1.4 1.2 1.6
'76 4700 1.3 1.0 1.6
'77 6400 1.7 1.6 1.9
'78 6700 1.8 1.8 1.8
'79 6900 1.8 1.8 1.9
'80 7400 1.9 1.8 2.1
'81 8100 2.1 2.3 1.9
'82 11300 2.9 2.8 3.1
'83 11300 2.9 2.8 3.0
'84 10300 2.6 2.6 2.7.. ..Statistik Arsbok Goteborg, 1985
Table B7: Population of Gothenburg 1974 - 1985
Year Population at Male Female Aged 16-
YearEnd 64
'74 445,704 218,451 228,736 298,700
'75 444,651 217,744 227,253 297,356
'76 442,410 216,076 226,907 295,262
'77 440,082 .214,663 225,419 292,830
'78 436,985 212,841 224,144 290,571
'79 434,699 211,454 223,245 289,022
'80 431,273 209,555 221,718 287,074
'81 428,171 207,776 220,401 279,974
'82 425,875 206,567 219,308 278,468
'83 424,186 205,344 218,842 278,368
'84 424,085 205,254 218,831 277,607
'85 425,495 205,876 219,619 277,348..Statistik Arsbok Goteborg, 1985
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Table B8: State Aid to the Shipbuilding Sector 1958-197 .
Date Amount Description
(Mkr)_
1958 30 Credit guarantee to Uddevalla Yard
1961 23 Purchase of shares in Karlskrona Yard
1962 15 Purchase of shares in Karlskrona Yard
1963 20 Purchase of shares in Uddevalla Yard
1963 20 Loan to Eriksberg yard topurchase Uddevalla shares
1965 40 Capital injection to Uddeval1a Yard
1967 75 Capital injection to Uddeval1aYard
1970 50 Support for research and development
1971 20 Purchase of shares in Uddevalla Yard
1971 105 Reconstruction of Gotaverken Yard
1974 100 Purchase of shares in Uddevalla Yard & write off of
earlier capital injection
1976 181 Purchase of shares in Gotaverken Yard
1976 420 Capital injection to Eriksberg Yard
1976 25 Support for research and development
1976 -10 Repayment from Uddeval1a Yard
1977 400 Purchase of shares in Svenska Vary
1977 45 Purchase of shares in Gotaverken
1977 859 Capital injection to Eriksberg Yard
1977 375 Capital injection to Gotaverken Yard
1977 60 Special projects
1977 1300 Writing off of loans to Swedish buyers of vessels
1977 800 Credit guarantees
1977 40 Writing off of capital injection to Uddcvalla Yard
1978 600 Credit guarantees
1978 175 Writing off of loans
1978 950 Capital injection to Svenska Vary
1978 1050 Guarantee loss of customer orders
1978 340 Loan to Kockums Yard
1978 250 Writing off ofloans for alternative employment
Source: Varvskriscirklarna, 1978.
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Sources
Primary sources
Gothenburg Regional Archive (Region- och Stadsarkivet Goteborg med
Folkrorelsernas Arkiv)
Soren Mannheimer's personal files
LeifMolinder's personal files
Projekt Lindholmen files, statistics and reports
Projekt 80 files, statistics and reports
Metall AVD 41 files, statistics and reports
PTK files, statistics and reports
Naringslivssekretariatet files, statistics and reports
Lansstyrelsen och Planeringsavdelningen files
Gothenburg County Archive (Landsarkivet i Goteborg)
Arbetsformedlingen statistics and reports 1979-1981
Interviews
Former official of Gotaverken's Verkstadsklubb 17/9/08
Historian at Goteborgs Universitet 1110/08
Former director of adult education in Vastra Gotalands Lan 30/10/08
Former lecturer working at AMU 3/12/08
Former Metall and SAP politician 10/12/08
Secondary sources and periodicals
Lansstyrelsen Reports 1978-1980
Metall, Verksamhetsberattelse 1975 - 1981
Riksdag, Government Bill 1978/1979:49, Motion 1978/1979: 141
Statistik Arsbok Goteborg 1975-1985
UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Annual Reports, 1957-1990
Arbetet 1975-1985
Arbetsmarknaden 1980
Dagens Nyheter 1978-1980
Gothenburg Post (Goteborgs Posten) 1975-1985
Goteborgs Handels SjOfartstidning 1979
Skeppsbyggarren 1979-1980
Svenska Dagbladet 1978-1980
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